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Robert F. Salvino 
 
August, 2007 
 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Dr. Geoffrey K. Turnbull 
 
Major Department:  Economics 
 
 
 
Home rule power gives local governments greater authority to obtain and manage 
fiscal resources and determine the distribution and extent of public services.  By design, 
this authority alters government outcomes.  The vast decentralization and local 
government structure literature examining horizontal and vertical competition 
demonstrates the complexity of predicting the effect of home rule on government sector 
size.  Adding to the complexity, home rule is fundamentally distinct from 
decentralization.  Home rule power gives local governments greater fiscal, structural, and 
functional authority, while state governments may retain partial authority.  This can result 
in duplication of revenue generation and service provision.   
Under the leviathan hypothesis direct and indirect constitutional constraints are 
necessary to control government expansion.  State restrictions on home rule authority 
may serve as a form of direct constitutional constraint that has been overlooked in the 
economic literature.  This dissertation uses 1990 and 2000 Census data to empirically test 
 xiii
  
home rule and other institutional factors’ effects on government size.  The results of the 
studies in this dissertation confirm that home rule relaxes a constraint on government 
size, finding that home rule states tend to have larger government sectors.  The empirical 
evidence supporting the role of institutions in public sector performance is a primary 
contribution of this dissertation.
 xiv
 1
Chapter I 
 
Introduction 
  
Public finance and public choice scholars devote great effort to understanding and 
determining how direct and indirect constitutional constraints affect the local, state, and 
combined local and state government sectors.  Related efforts examine factors associated 
with decisions to impose these constraints.  The literature focuses on tax and expenditure 
limitations and fiscal decentralization as the main objects of investigation for direct and 
indirect constraints respectively.  The focus on fiscal measures is a common theme in 
much of the analysis. 
 Economists devote less attention to incorporating measures of decentralization or 
local discretion beyond purely fiscal powers.   We expect institutional factors affecting 
decision-making behavior and capabilities to affect government size.  Studies attempting 
to quantify attributes of discretionary authority in efforts to make comparisons across 
various forms of local government within a given state as well as to make comparisons 
across states find considerable variation on both levels. 
This dissertation is the first study of local discretion to examine the impact of 
home rule power and related institutional factors on government size.  The measure of 
home rule power extends that developed in Turnbull and Geon (2006) and captures two 
unique dimensions of local discretionary authority not captured by traditional measures 
of fiscal decentralization.   First, local governments may enjoy greater functional, 
structural, and/or fiscal discretion without necessarily limiting powers at the state level.  
Second, considering functional and structural components of local government expands 
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the scope of decentralization beyond the context of purely fiscal decisions traditionally 
measured by how revenues or expenditures are divided between the local and state levels 
of government.  This dissertation ultimately answers the question of how differing 
degrees of home rule power affect the size and composition of the state and local 
government sector.  The approach is general and can be applied to a number of other 
institutional factors that may affect government size or efficiency.  
Public finance scholars uphold the social welfare maximizing and efficiency 
enhancing benefits of decentralized powers in a federal system of government, and 
international economic development experts see fiscal decentralization as a key 
component of their efforts aimed at government reforms across the world (Martinez-
Vazquez & Alm, 2003).  Public choice scholars promote greater fiscal decentralization as 
a form of indirect constitutional constraint, encouraging competition between political 
jurisdictions, creating an effect on government size and power analogous to that of firm 
competition in the private sector and its minimizing effects on the threat of monopoly 
power (Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Oates, 1985). 
Home rule power refers to a local government that has wide latitude in 
interpreting a state constitution’s rules of authority concerning local government.  
Dillon’s Rule, the antithesis of home rule, characterizes local governments that have little 
to no latitude in interpreting these rules of authority.  A straightforward explanation 
defines home rule as the ability to liberally interpret local government authority in terms 
of the powers that are not reserved to the state or expressly denied local governments in 
the constitution.  Contrast this with a strict Dillon’s Rule interpretation whereby only 
powers expressly granted to local governments are available (Richardson, Gough, & 
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Puentes, 2003).  A complication involving the classification of a state as either home rule 
or Dillon’s Rule arises from the fact that home rule power may derive itself from a 
variety of sources:  the constitution, legislative power, or legal precedent.  To emphasize, 
a state that has a very limited home rule amendment may have a local government sector 
with less discretionary authority than a state with a tradition of legal precedent that grants 
greater local discretionary authority in the absence of an explicit home rule amendment.   
 Home rule powers affect three components of government:  government structure, 
functions government performs, and government finance.  Greater home rule power may 
yield greater freedom in regard to these three components.  Alternatively, the latter may 
come to resemble greater home rule power regardless of any explicit assignment of home 
rule power.   
 Home rule freedoms under the structural component may include any or all of the 
following:  ability to and steps of incorporation for a community; rules and restraints of 
annexation; other legal factors such as extraterritorality–whether local governments can 
own facilities or property beyond their boundaries, such as for airports, landfills, or water 
supplies; and form of county or municipal government. 
 Functional home rule freedoms can include the ability to choose different forms 
and/or levels of public services provided by a local government.  They may extend to 
economic development activities ranging from funding such activities to creating 
economic development organizations.  Home rule freedoms may also affect planning, 
zoning, or land use controls, administrative procedures, contracting and purchasing 
decisions, or the authority to cooperate with surrounding localities as in good neighbor 
policies. 
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 Finally, home rule reflects local government fiscal freedoms regarding revenues, 
expenditures, grants-in-aid, and funded and unfunded mandates from state governments.  
Debt limits, tax base limits, limits on local tax sources, spending limits, rules for 
distributing funds, balanced-budget requirements, or rules regarding bankruptcy limit 
home rule. 
Traditional measures of decentralization ignore local discretionary authority.  
Might the increase in local sector discretionary authority open the possibility for the 
emergence of local government leviathans?  Is it necessarily the case that greater 
competition among jurisdictions will dominate the effect of greater local government 
power?  Do the restraining effects of competition differ for county governments and 
municipal governments?   
In a partial equilibrium framework extending greater powers of taxation to the 
local sector while maintaining at least a constant level of taxation in the state sector 
should lead to an increase in the size of government.1  This notion serves as a point of 
departure from the influencing decentralization literature.  Extending this notion beyond 
fiscal powers to include functional and structural aspects of local government adds 
complexity to questions concerning economic effects of greater local discretion.  Does 
greater home rule power enhance government efficiency overall?  Does it increase the 
size of the state and local sector?  Is there a trade-off of service provision between the 
state and local sectors?  This dissertation examines the extent to which greater home rule 
power and other institutional factors increase the size of the state and local government 
                                                 
1 Sobel (1997) and Flowers (1988) present an alternative outcome based on the “common pool” problem of 
two vertical tiers taxing the same tax base.  Assuming the first tier sets its tax rate for optimal revenue, the 
addition of a second tier taxing the same base will result in a decrease in total revenue.  Additionally, Sobel 
(1997) and Wagoner (1995) demonstrate that even if each tier taxes a separate tax base, the combined tax 
rate increases and income effects and interrelated markets lead to a revenue externality. 
  
 5
sector and to what extent these differences create trade-offs in service provision between 
the state and local sectors. 
 Empirical analysis of the effects of greater discretion in the local government 
sector must consider the various hypotheses for and against greater constitutional 
constraints on the reach of government.  The Tiebout hypothesis maintains that citizens 
of a region will sort themselves into jurisdictions that provide the desired bundle of taxes 
and services according to citizen preferences.  Under certain restrictive assumptions, the 
ability of citizens to vote with their feet will have a constraining effect on competing 
jurisdictions, so that no local government could extract undesirable excess revenues from 
its citizens.  Under this hypothesis, the mere threat of mobility constrains government.   
 To explain the behavior of politicians in a representative democracy, public 
finance and public choice scholars have frequently relied on the median voter theorem.  
With single-peaked preferences and single-dimensional issues majority voting satisfies 
the preferences of the median voter, which implies that politicians seeking reelection will 
appeal to the median voter.  However, nothing ensures efficiency of the median voter 
outcome, and in the case of double-peaked preferences majority voting cannot 
consistently aggregate preferences.  Additionally, the median voter theorem ignores the 
role of political ideology, the influence of special interests, and the rational ignorance of 
voters.  Furthermore, there are many circumstances in which government decisions are 
not subject to a majority vote.   
 The homevoter hypothesis (Fischel, 2001) maintains that homeowners have a 
vested interest in the value of their homes and thus their communities, giving them 
incentive to actively participate in local elections in order to protect the value of their 
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homes.   This hypothesis rests on the findings of a vast literature demonstrating that taxes 
are capitalized into home prices (DeBartelome & Rosenthal, 1999; Hughes & Sirmans, 
1992; Yinger, Bloom, Borsch-Supan, & Ladd, 1988).  The homevoter hypothesis 
reinforces the argument for greater decentralization so that these politically active 
homevoters can monitor the value of public goods bundles through their participation in 
local elections.  Turnbull and Mitias (1995) provide evidence supporting the notion that a 
government’s responsiveness to voters increases the lower the government is on the fiscal 
tier.  They find that the median voter model does a good job describing public demand 
for city services, but the model does not perform well for county and state level services. 
 Niskanen’s (1968, 1971) bureaucracy theory asserts that civil servants motivated 
by their own rational self-interest increase their utility by increasing the output of their 
organization.   This greater output increases the likelihood of greater compensation, 
promotions, power, and other perks.  The incentive to increase the bureau’s output does 
not generally increase efficiency, especially since there is no motivation to minimize cost.  
Some have criticized the bureaucracy theory on the grounds that it assumes the 
legislature is not capable of monitoring and constraining this output-maximizing behavior 
(Miller & Moe, 1983).  A response to this criticism suggests that it is not in the interest of 
the legislature to restrain output-maximizing behavior (Breannan & Buchanan, 1980). 
 The Leviathan hypothesis takes bureaucracy theory one step further and combines 
the bureaucracy and the legislature into a monolithic, revenue-maximizing monopoly 
(Brennan & Buchanan, 1980).  This averts the criticism of bureaucracy theory that the 
legislature should be able to control the bureau by asserting that such control is not in the 
legislature’s interest.  Rather all of government is made-up of rational, self-interested 
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individuals who benefit either directly or indirectly from government revenue 
maximization.  
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 begins with 
a brief presentation of the historical context of Dillon’s Rule and home rule.  It describes 
the federal and state constitutional laws determining local government powers and the 
competing perspectives of Dillon’s Rule and home rule regarding the interpretation of 
these laws.  It defines the main functional aspects of home rule power and demonstrates 
how the degree of home rule power varies across states.  This chapter also discusses the 
literature characterizing local discretionary authority, discussing the existing empirical 
evidence about how limitations on state or local government powers affect the public 
sector size. 
Chapter 3 reviews the Leviathan and fiscal decentralization literature beginning 
with a discussion of Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis and related 
developments by Tiebout (1956), Niskanen (1971), Oates (1972), Fischel (2001), and 
others.  The ensuing empirical tests of decentralization and the Leviathan hypothesis by 
Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989) demonstrate effects on government size 
arising through horizontal competition.   Turnbull and Djoundourian’s (1993) 
overlapping jurisdictions theory helps define the vertical relationship within states and 
implications for government size. Oates (1979) and Turnbull (1998) present well-
developed theories of fiscal illusion and its potential to hinder size-reducing effects of 
greater decentralization.  Sobel (1997) discusses implications for revenue and efficiency 
in a multi-tiered system where two or more tiers are allowed taxing power.  Institutional 
factors add a level of complexity to vertical and horizontal relationships, and this chapter 
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discusses relevant studies such as Turbull and Geon’s (2006) analysis of various external 
constraints and empirical studies of tax and expenditure limitations such as Alm and 
Skidmore (1999) and Skidmore (1999).    
Chapters 4 through Chapter 8 present separate empirical models.  Data for each 
chapter is discussed therein.  In general, the samples for the five chapters comprise 1990 
and 2000 pooled cross-sectional data from 47 states in the U.S.   Chapter 4 presents the 
state and local share empirical model, data, and results from the investigation of the role 
of home rule and tax and expenditure limitations in the Leviathan model.  The empirical 
model in this chapter is based on previous studies of decentralization’s effect on the size 
of government (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  Home rule or the lack thereof is 
introduced in this model as an additional constitutional constraint.  This state and local 
share model controls for the effect of tax and expenditure limitations and finds effects of 
exogenous controls for decentralization consistent with previous studies, decentralization 
constrains government size.  Relying on measures of tax and expenditure limitations 
presented in Skidmore (1999) these results are consistent with Skidmore’s findings that 
properly designed tax and expenditure limitations do constrain government size.  
However, the model presented in this chapter indicates that home rule power has no 
significant impact on the size of government.  No attempt is made in this model to control 
for the expected endogeneity of home rule choice. 
Chapter 5 addresses the possible endogeneity of home rule.  The results reveal the 
presence of a self-selection effect.  Failure to control for this source of endogeneity 
produces downward-biased estimates of the revealed effect of Dillon’s Rule’s ability to 
constrain government size.   Unobservable factors in Dillon’s Rule states are consistent 
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with a larger government sector, thus states that choose Dillon’s Rule tend to have larger 
government sectors than states that choose home rule.  The selection-corrected results 
imply that had home rule states instead chosen Dillon’s Rule, the size of government in 
these states would be smaller.  Correcting for the selectivity bias, measuring size of 
government as either the share of state and local taxes in total state personal income or 
state and local own source revenue in personal income, home rule states are predicted to 
have 21 percent to 22.8 percent larger government sectors.  These results are consistent 
with the Leviathan hypothesis. 
Chapter 6 conducts an independent analysis of state and local government sectors.  
The purpose of this chapter is to identify whether the effects of constitutional constraints 
affect the tiers of state government in different ways.  Results are presented both with and 
without selectivity correction.  The separate state and local share analyses verify that 
greater decentralization increases the size of the local sector and decreases the size of the 
state sector, while there is also evidence that greater home rule power increases the size 
of the local sector.  The selectivity-corrected results in the separate analysis reinforce this 
finding.  Consistent with the combined state and local sector analysis, local governments 
in Dillon’s Rule tend to have larger government sectors than in states that choose home 
rule, and correcting for the underlying selectivity bias predicts local governments in 
home rule states would be smaller under Dillon’s Rule. 
Chapter 7 considers the effects of two additional types of constitutional 
limitations on government powers, eminent domain and state budget stabilization funds.  
The eminent domain section examines the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kelo v. New London (2005) to uphold government use of eminent domain to acquire 
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land for transfer to private parties when it serves a broadly defined public purpose like 
economic development.  The empirical results are consistent with the Leviathan model; 
ceteris paribus, states that explicitly empower their local governments to use eminent 
domain for private economic development have larger government sectors than those that 
do not.  The section on state budget stabilization funds extends a study by Wagner and 
Sobel (2006) analyzing differences in constitutional and statutory funds and their 
correlation with tax and expenditure limitations.  As their study implies, the empirical 
examination in Chapter 7 finds that states using constitutional state budget stabilization 
funds tend to have smaller public sectors than states using more strictly-defined funds. 
Chapter 8 applies the overlapping jurisdictions model of Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1993) to examine home rule’s influence concerning the effect of county 
centralization on the size of the public sector.  Drawing upon the empirical findings from 
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) and Campbell (2004), the demand relationship 
between county and municipal general expenditures is modeled as complementary.  This 
chapter investigates the possibility that counties have greater leviathan power than 
municipalities.  Controlling for the share of county general expenditures in total local 
sector spending, the analysis implies that pushing service provision to the lowest level 
possible, municipalities as opposed to counties, will have no effect on the size of 
government in home rule states; however, it will reduce the size of the public sector in 
Dillon’s Rule states.  This suggests that county governments have greater leviathan 
power than municipal governments in Dillon’s Rule states. 
Chapter 9 brings the analysis of the previous chapters together and discusses the 
policy implications and concludes the dissertation.  This dissertation provides an answer 
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to the question of whether allowing greater home rule powers for local governments has 
any effect on the size of the state and local public sector.  Why decentralization has not 
completely extended to local discretionary power is an interesting question with policy 
implications.  The Leviathan model predicts that states that allow their local governments 
to have broad local discretion, greater home rule powers, will have larger public sectors 
than those that do not, so greater local discretionary power may have consequences in 
contrast to the constraining notion of decentralization. 
Extending measures of decentralization beyond fiscal relationships to include 
local discretionary authority as captured by the choice for home rule, this dissertation 
identifies states that allow greater home rule powers to their local governments. These 
states generally have larger public sectors, results that are consistent with Brennan and 
Buchanan’s (1980) leviathan hypothesis.  States may choose home rule rather than 
Dillon’s Rule if they value the increase in public sector size or Dillon’s Rule if they wish 
to constrain government’s spending powers.  The empirical results show that state 
choices are consistent with the leviathan hypothesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Home Rule Background 
 
 The 10th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America reserves 
for the states or the people, those powers not delegated to the federal government in the 
Constitution nor prohibited by the same.  The entire Constitution makes no mention of 
local government.  In general states determine the local-state intergovernmental 
relationship, and so it follows that this relationship varies greatly from state to state, even 
locality to locality.  The U.S. Supreme Court had this to say about the power of local 
governments in Community Communication Co. v. Boulder (1982), declaring: 
 all sovereign authority within the geographic limits of the United States resides 
 
 either with the government of the United States, or [with] the states of the Union. 
 
 There exist with the broad domain of sovereignty but these two.  There may be  
 
 cities, counties, and other[s]…but they are all derived from, or exist in,  
 
 subordination to one of the other of these.  (Citations omitted; emphasis in  
 
 original.)2
  
 Thus, local governments whether they are counties, townships, cities, or the like, are 
creatures of their respective states, and hence the debate of local government freedoms 
and powers begins where the constitution ends, providing the opportunity for each state 
to ultimately determine these powers and freedoms for its local governments (Richardson 
et al., 2003). 
                                                 
2 As published in Richardson, Gough, and Puentes (2003), page 3. 
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 Given the above, the debate about home rule versus Dillon’s Rule is best 
understood after examining the historical context from which the terminology derives 
itself.  In the pursuit of economic development, the questionable behavior of many 
typical municipal governments leading up to Judge John Dillon’s Iowa state court 
decision should provide additional state perspective regarding either the reluctance or the 
willingness to provide local governments with greater home rule powers even today.  
 The term home rule is actually an afterthought of Dillon’s Rule, the latter term 
coming into use after Judge Dillon was forced to interpret the rules of authority in an 
Iowa state court case in 1865.  Judge Dillon’s decision came about during a time in 
American history that saw widespread corruption in municipal governments.  Much of 
this corruption was related to the pursuit of municipalities in steering railroads into their 
towns in the interest of economic development and private gain.  Similar to the great 
debate going on in our states today following the Kelo v. City of New London decision 
concerning the extension of eminent domain powers for purposes of private economic 
development, the focus on property rights in these debates was a prominent one.   
 Another major point of contention regarded municipalities often financing all or 
portions of economic development projects with the issuance of municipal bonds.  In 
many cases municipalities avoided payment on these bonds, and in one case in particular 
the fact that one such municipality had no authority to issue bonds gave the municipality 
legal standing on which to deny any payment on such bonds.  Ironically, it was such a 
decision from which the term Dillon’s Rule came about.  In Clark v. City of Des Moines 
(1865), Dillon applied a strict construction interpretation to determine that the city had no 
authority to issue bonds, and therefore could not be held responsible for paying on the 
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same bonds.  The irony is that Dillon generally was uncomfortable with the conflict of 
interest formed by municipalities’ pursuits of economic development and the effects 
these pursuits had on personal property rights, but his decision enabled this particular 
municipality to completely avoid responsibility for essentially stealing funds from 
individuals in order to finance an economic development project.  However, the ultimate 
legacy of the decision was that local governments and potential purchasers of bonds were 
made aware of the fact that local governments could not authorize bonds or more 
importantly engage in any activity without the authorization of the state (Richardson et 
al., 2003). 
Dillon’s strict construction interpretation became a popular approach of many 
state courts when faced with similar cases involving rules of authority with municipal 
governments as well as other forms of local governments.  In this view, local 
governments have no power unless explicitly granted by the state.  This is one of two 
possible ways of interpreting constitution and law, the other being a liberal interpretation, 
which assumes that local governments have those powers that are not expressly denied by 
law or constitution.  This latter interpretation has come to be referred to as home rule 
(when applied to the rules of authority for local governments).  See Figure 1 (Richardson 
et al., 2003) below for a graphical representation of the manner states assume in 
determining resolutions to questions of local authority.  In general it demonstrates that 
resolution is first sought in the state’s constitution.  If no answer can be found here, the 
legislative decisions may contain the proper ruling.  However, it is often the case that 
neither of the above addresses the question, and then it is up to the state courts to 
determine how to interpret grants of authority (Richardson et al., 2003).   
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Figure 13
State–Local Relationship 
Does state constitution set out 
standard of review? 
Does state legislature set out 
standard of review? 
Use standard set 
out in constitution 
Use standard set 
out by state 
Liberal 
Construction 
Strict 
Construction 
Liberal 
Construction 
Strict 
Construction 
State court sets out standard 
Liberal construction 
(home rule) 
Strict construction 
(Dillon’s Rule) 
How should courts interpret grants of authority 
from the state to local governments? 
                         
Grants of authority from 
state to local governments 
 
Home Rule 
Local governments are granted 
authority over matters of purely 
local concern. 
Basic Undisputed Legal Principle: 
Local governments are creatures of the state. 
Dillon’s Rule 
State grants local 
governments certain 
authority. 
 
                                                 
3 Figure adopted from Richardson et al. (2003), figure 1, page 5. 
  
 16
After considering the combined effects of constitutional, legislative, and judicial 
interpretations of the rules of authority as they apply to various facets of local 
government, it follows then that a state can be classified generally as either a home rule 
or a Dillon’s Rule state.4  Many assume that Dillon’s Rule states have weak local 
governments and strong state government oversight, while localities in home rule states 
have greater freedom to govern with less state interference.  Proponents of home rule 
often assert that home rule states have the benefit of less bureaucratic restraint, allowing 
them to more effectively handle local problems (Richardson et al., 2003).  Krane, Rigos, 
and Hill (2001) note that government reformers, public officials, and civic groups regard 
home rule power as a key ingredient for improving local-state government relations and 
thereby improving the efficiency of local governments.  Whether this supposition is true 
or not remains an empirical question. 
 Having provided the historical context from which the home rule-Dillon’s Rule 
debate originated, it is appropriate to discuss the specific components of local governance 
to which states may grant home rule or local discretionary authority.5  Zimmerman’s 
(1981) ACIR study examining varying degrees of local discretionary authority across 
counties and cities in the United States looked specifically at four separate components:  
structure, function, finance, and personnel.  The home rule study of Krane, Rigos, and 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that a state with a home rule amendment may in fact behave more like a Dillon’s Rule 
state or vice versa.  For this reason, classification is not based on legislation or constitutional designations 
alone, but must consider how the courts in a state have applied and interpreted home rule or Dillon’s Rule 
in past cases.  Thus it is not possible to identify exact points in time when a state may have shifted from a 
home rule to a Dillon’s Rule state or back. 
5 In addition to home rule freedoms varying from one component of local government to another, they are 
often applied with varying degrees for counties and municipalities in a given state.  For example 
Zimmerman’s (1981) ACIR study found that on average, municipalities were given greater freedoms than 
county governments. 
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Hill (2001), essentially looks at three categories:  structure, function, and finance, while 
including personnel freedoms in the function category.6   
 States may grant greater local discretion to any or all of the following structural 
functions or tasks:  ability to and steps of incorporation for a community; rules and 
restraints of annexation; other legal factors such as extraterritorality–whether local 
governments can own facilities or property beyond its boundaries, such as for airports, 
landfills, or water supplies; and finally government form, which for counties describes 
whether the internal decision-making structure of the government is elected executive, 
council-administrator, or county commission with similar choices for municipal 
governments. 
 Functional home rule freedoms can include the ability to choose different forms 
and/or levels of public services provided by a local government.  They may extend to 
economic development activities ranging from funding such activities to creating 
economic development organizations.  Planning, zoning, or land use controls can be 
affected by varying degrees of home rule freedoms.  Administrative procedures as well as 
contracting and purchasing decisions may be affected.  The authority to cooperate with 
surrounding localities, such as in good neighbor policies, can also be restricted or freely 
allowed. 
 Finally, home rule can affect local government fiscal freedoms regarding 
revenues, expenditures, grants-in-aid, and funded and unfunded mandates from state 
governments.  There can be debt limits, tax base limitations, limitations concerning 
                                                 
6 The following categorization can be viewed in greater detail in Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001), which 
provides a state by state analysis of each component as to the degree of local discretion allowed; however 
they do not provide explicit rank comparisons of the varying degrees of home rule power among states. 
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choice of fiscal instruments, spending limitations, rules for distributing funds, balanced-
budget requirements, as well as rules regarding bankruptcy.   
 The process of determining the degree of home rule power for the purpose of this 
study is subjective.  Creating a reliable dataset from the Krane, et al. (2001) study 
demands an objective eye capable of sifting through each chapter’s inherent biases.  In 
general the authors have commissioned local government experts, mostly political 
scientists in academia, in each of the 50 states to prepare the chapter for their respective 
states.  If the book has one overriding purpose, it is to provide support for an argument in 
favor of greater home rule power for local governments.  Each chapter is unique in its 
presentation while adhering to a basic template governing basic content and aspects of 
home rule to address.  There is no cardinal ranking system suggested to the chapter 
authors by the book’s main authors.  There is a set of tables in an appendix that 
summarizes important quantitative details from each chapter and provides general home 
rule information for each state.  In general, when making the home rule determination is 
not clear for a particular, the individual category addressing fiscal freedoms serves as the 
tiebreaker.  For a study of government size, this method is not unreasonable.  For studies 
with other purposes, for example characterizing effective growth management policy, 
another method may serve better. 
 A number of studies have examined the effects of various limitations on fiscal 
freedoms for local governments.  In general these studies have not been concerned with 
local discretion or home rule powers in particular.  Ladd (1978) analyzed state-imposed 
local tax and spending limitations, focusing on the motivation of states to impose such 
restrictions as well as the costs and benefits of the restrictions.  The study employed a 
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linear probability model to determine the likelihood that a state would impose restrictions 
given levels and growth in property taxes and expenditures respectively, finding a 
positive correlation between likelihood of imposing restrictions and property tax burdens 
and growth in expenditures per capita.  Alm and Skidmore (1999) find positive 
correlation between likelihood of tax and expenditure limitation, TEL, passage and tax 
burden and historical growth in tax burdens.  Skidmore (1999) finds evidence that TEL’s 
have a constraining effect on the size of government.  Other studies have examined, from 
various perspectives, the effects of Proposition 21/2 in Massachusetts and Proposition 13 
in California, approved by voters to reduce the property tax burden (Ladd & Wilson, 
1982; Downes & Figlio, 1999; McGuire, 1999; Sexton, Sheffrin, & O’Sullivan, 1999). 
One benefit of considering local discretion, or home rule, in an analysis of 
government size is that traditional measures of decentralization cannot reveal differences 
in pure local discretionary power.  Proportional measures of expenditure or revenue 
concentration or differences in the number of local government units in a state or region 
do not say anything about decision-making powers.  One state may be highly 
decentralized in terms of direct expenditures, but the ultimate decisions regarding these 
expenditures may be heavily regulated by the state.  One aspect of the home rule 
investigation in a study analyzing the effect of home rule on government size concerns 
whether or not greater local discretionary authority enhances the competition effect seen 
from fiscal decentralization, or whether this greater discretion contributes to a loss of 
scale economies as local governments take over functions previously consolidated at a 
higher level.   Alternatively, from the perspective of local taxpayers, John Wallis’s idea 
of government growth suggests that government size may increase with greater home rule 
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power if home rule localities are better able to meet the demands of local tax payers 
wanting a greater level of government services than that being provided under a state of 
less local discretion.  Musgrave’s theory, on the other hand, implies that greater home 
rule power may lead to a decrease in size if home rule localities can better meet the 
demands of the more homogeneous voters to decrease the level of redistribution 
programs.7  Supporters of Dillon’s rule would argue that without proper constitutional 
constraints, local governments will use their power to achieve their revenue-maximizing 
objective against the demand of the median voter (Downes, 1996; Dye & McGuire, 
1997).  Ceteris paribus, extending greater powers of taxation to the local sector and 
maintaining at least a constant level of taxation in the state sector should lead to an 
increase in the size of the government sector.  Extending this notion beyond fiscal powers 
to include functional and structural aspects of local government adds complexity to 
questions concerning economic effects of greater local discretion.  Fiscal decentralization 
will not offset any revenue-maximizing tendency, assuming it exists, if state and local 
spending exhibits a complementary relationship or in non-urban settings where horizontal 
competition is not as strong.  Thus, the Leviathan hypothesis would imply that 
governments operating under Dillon’s rule would tend to be smaller than those under 
home rule (Turnbull & Geon, 2006).  For a listing of states categorized by their home rule 
rankings and some basic characteristics, see Table 1.8  For comparison, Table 2 
summarizes Zimmerman’s (1981) rankings of local discretionary authority. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Wallis and Musgrave’s theories appear as brief side notes in the Oates (1985) study of Leviathan.   
8 Virginia counties and cities have a unique jurisdictional relationship in which counties are independent of 
cities; therefore omitting Virginia avoids this complication.  Alaska and Hawaii are omitted in order to 
focus only on the continental states. 
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Table 1.  States in sample by degree of home rule 
 
State
Degree of 
HR1
2000 1990 S+L Tax Share2 S+L OSR Share3 Averages per Home Rule Rank
    Indiana 1 6,080,485 5,544,159 0.099 0.132 2000 Tax Share 0.103
    Nebraska 1 1,711,263 1,578,385 0.106 0.134
    Nevada 1 1,998,257 1,201,833 0.097 0.129 2000 OSR Share 0.138
    North Carolina 1 8,049,313 6,628,637 0.099 0.136
    Oklahoma 1 3,450,654 3,145,585 0.097 0.134 Average Population 3,138,412
    West Virginia 1 1,808,344 1,793,477 0.107 0.138
    Wyoming 1 493,782 453,588 0.117 0.162
    Alabama 2 4,447,100 4,040,587 0.085 0.138 2000 Tax Share 0.099
    Idaho 2 1,293,953 1,006,749 0.097 0.136
    Kentucky 2 4,041,769 3,685,296 0.104 0.131 2000 OSR Share 0.131
    Maine 2 1,274,923 1,227,928 0.126 0.149
    Minnesota 2 4,919,479 4,375,099 0.111 0.140 Average Population 5,418,568
    Mississippi 2 2,844,658 2,573,216 0.102 0.150
    New Hampshire 2 1,235,786 1,109,252 0.083 0.101
    New Jersey 2 8,414,350 7,730,188 0.102 0.123
    New Mexico 2 1,819,046 1,515,069 0.108 0.136
    Pennsylvania 2 12,281,054 11,881,643 0.098 0.127
    Tennessee 2 5,689,283 4,877,185 0.082 0.114
    Texas 2 20,851,820 16,986,510 0.094 0.120
    Washington 2 5,894,121 4,866,692 0.099 0.132
    Arizona 3 5,130,632 3,665,228 0.100 0.120 2000 Tax Share 0.102
    Arkansas 3 2,673,400 2,350,725 0.102 0.133
    California 3 33,871,648 29,760,021 0.105 0.136 2000 OSR Share 0.128
    Connecticut 3 3,405,565 3,287,116 0.103 0.115
    Florida 3 15,982,378 12,937,926 0.091 0.121 Average Population 7,973,260
    Georgia 3 8,186,453 6,478,216 0.098 0.127
    Illinois 3 12,419,293 11,430,602 0.100 0.119
    Iowa 3 2,926,324 2,776,755 0.101 0.141
    Maryland 3 5,296,486 4,781,468 0.100 0.120
    Michigan 3 9,938,444 9,295,297 0.101 0.132
    Missouri 3 5,595,211 5,117,073 0.094 0.118
    Montana 3 902,195 799,065 0.093 0.126
    New York 3 18,976,457 17,990,455 0.131 0.158
    Rhode Island 3 1,048,319 1,003,464 0.108 0.124
    Vermont 3 608,827 562,758 0.109 0.133
    Colorado 4 4,301,261 3,294,394 0.091 0.121 2000 Tax Share 0.100
    Delaware 4 783,600 666,168 0.101 0.136
    Kansas 4 2,688,418 2,477,574 0.102 0.128 2000 OSR Share 0.132
    Louisiana 4 4,468,976 4,219,973 0.108 0.147
    Massachusetts 4 6,349,097 6,016,425 0.096 0.111 Average Population 3,673,829
    North Dakota 4 642,200 638,800 0.103 0.145
    Ohio 4 11,353,140 10,847,115 0.109 0.136
    Oregon 4 3,421,399 2,842,321 0.088 0.127
    South Carolina 4 4,012,012 3,486,703 0.094 0.138
    South Dakota 4 754,844 696,004 0.090 0.111
    Utah 4 2,233,169 1,722,850 0.104 0.147
    Wisconsin 4 5,363,675 4,891,769 0.114 0.144
1Degree of Home Rule:  1=Strong Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
2State and local tax revenues as share of personal income
3State and local own source revenues as share of personal income
Population 2000 Size of Government
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Table 2.  ACIR rankings 
 
Composite Ranking:  1=state dominant fisal partner, 2=state strong fiscal partner, 3=state junior fiscal partner
Index of city, county rankings by states for structure, functional, finance, personnel are 1 to 5 
where 1 = great local freedom, 5 = small local freedom
Composite Structure Functional Finance Personnel Structure Functional Finance Personnel
Alabama 1 4.50 2.50 2.00 1.75 4.50 4.00 4.75 2.25
Alaska 1 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Arizona 2 2.50 2.00 1.75 1.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Arkansas 1 5.00 3.00 3.00 1.50 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.50
California 3 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Colorado 2 2.50 3.00 3.50 2.00 4.50 5.00 4.50 3.00
Connecticut 2 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00
Delaware 1 1.50 2.00 3.00 2.50 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Florida 2 1.00 1.30 4.50 2.50 1.00 1.30 4.50 2.75
Georgia 2 5.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Hawaii 1 1.00 3.20 4.00 3.50
Idaho 2 3.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 4.00
Illinois 2 1.10 2.00 1.50 2.60 2.10 3.30 2.80 3.80
Indiana 2 5.00 2.50 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.50 4.00 2.00
Iowa 2 1.80 1.90 4.50 3.30 4.00 2.50 4.50 3.60
Kansas 2 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.50 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.00
Kentucky 1 1.50 3.50 2.60 3.50 3.50 3.50 2.60 2.50
Louisiana 1 1.00 1.50 3.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.50 2.00
Maine 2 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.75 4.00 3.50 2.00
Maryland 2 1.00 1.50 2.25 1.25 2.60 2.33 3.20 2.20
Massachussetts 3 1.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00
Michigan 2 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 4.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
Minnesota 2 1.00 1.00 4.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00
Mississippi 1 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 3.00
Missouri 2 1.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.00
Montana 3 1.00 2.00 5.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 3.50
Nebraska 3 1.50 2.00 3.50 1.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 3.00
Nevada 2 2.50 3.50 4.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
New Hampshire 3 2.00 1.50 4.00 1.00 5.00 4.00 5.00 1.00
New Jersey 3 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 3.50 4.50 3.00
New Mexico 1 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00
New York 3 1.50 3.00 4.00 4.00 1.50 3.00 4.00 4.00
North Carolina 1 1.00 1.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 1.25 2.50 2.50
North Dakota 2 1.80 1.50 3.50 2.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 2.00
Ohio 3 1.00 1.50 2.50 1.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.50
Oklahoma 1 1.00 1.50 2.50 1.50 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.50
Oregon 2 1.00 1.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 1.50
Pennsylvania 2 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Rhode Island 2 1.00 2.00 5.00 3.00
South Carolina 1 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.00
South Dakota 3 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 3.00
Tennessee 2 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 2.00
Texas 2 1.00 1.20 1.50 1.00 5.00 4.80 4.50 2.00
Utah 2 2.50 2.00 3.50 2.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 1.50
Vermont 2 5.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00
Virginia 2 3.00 1.50 2.00 1.25 4.00 2.50 3.00 2.25
Washington 2 1.30 2.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 2.80 4.00 4.50
West Virginia 1 4.00 2.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 3.00
Wisconsin 2 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.00 2.50
Wyoming 2 1.00 3.00 3.00 2.50 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
CITY COUTNY
ACIR (1981) Classifications of Local Discretionary Authority.
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Chapter 3 
 
Leviathan and Decentralization Literature Review 
 
 
 Devolution of power from the federal to sub-national levels of government has 
implications for the size of the government sector.  These implications stem from the 
well-documented effects of horizontal and vertical competition and fiscal illusion as well 
as effects from institutional factors yet to be explored.  Significant bodies of literature in 
the fields of public finance and public choice consider and investigate the first three of 
these concepts beginning with the early works of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), the 
ensuing Leviathan studies of Oates (1985), Nelson (1987), and Zax (1989), and more 
recently Turnbull and Djoundourian’s (1993) and Campbell’s (2004) exploration of the 
effects of overlapping jurisdictions in vertical competition.  Empirical research into the 
effects of institutional factors, such as the use of court systems to influence government 
policy, the effect of ideology or political entrenchment on the reach of government, or 
local discretion or home rule power are less abundant (Turnbull & Geon, 2006; 
Bjornskov, 2005; Kau & Rubin, 2002; Keefer & Knack, 2002; Barro, 1997).  
Zimmerman’s (1981) ACIR study attempts to measure local discretionary authority and 
Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001) present findings of a state by state examination of home 
rule power; however, neither study employs any empirical analysis or discusses effects 
on government size.  Turnbull and Geon (2006) investigate home rule effects in an 
application of GARP analysis to median voter outcomes. Their finding that non-urban 
home rule counties tend to violate median voter demands while urban counties do not 
violate, suggests that horizontal competition may be a stronger factor in urban settings.  
This chapter will discuss the findings from relevant studies that have influenced this work 
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and demonstrate to the reader how home rule and other institutional factors add another 
dimension to the government size investigation. 
 
Leviathan 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) provide an explanation for growth of the public 
sector that portrays government as a monolithic entity whose primary motivation is to 
maximize its revenue.  They agree that electoral processes alone are not sufficient to 
constrain this growth.  Thus their basic claim is that electoral constraints and direct and 
indirect constitutional constraints are necessary to restrain leviathan and obtain efficient 
outcomes.  They present three observations to support their contention. 
 
1.  For certain types of decisions regarding the use of resources, electoral processes      
    would not achieve desirable outcomes (regardless of majority  decisions). 
Brennan and Buchanan present three main arguments to support this observation.  First, 
at the constitutional level basic property rights and protection of those rights are given.  
These rights must not be alterable by the whimsy of a majority vote, preferences of which 
surely will change from time to time.  Second, preferences of the electorate depend on 
perspective, whether the vote is at the constitutional stage or in-period stage.  In-period 
voting may not consider the full future costs of current period decisions.  They give as an 
example the determination of welfare spending levels.  In-period voting fails to consider 
the negative incentive effect of the welfare program creating potential recipients in the 
current period, while this can be taken into account at the constitution stage.  Differences 
in outcomes for decision-making in Rawlsian-type preference schemes and the veil of 
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ignorance provide a similar example; individuals will make different decisions ex ante 
about the level of redistribution they would like to pay for in the tax system compared 
with the level they would choose after they have information about their own economic 
position.  Third, rational ignorance prevails when information has a public good quality, 
and thus voters will be underinformed.  Brennan and Buchanan suggest two possible 
outcomes as a result of such ignorance.  If voters recognize this likelihood of ignorance, 
they may choose to constrain the discretionary power of politicians/bureaucrats as well as 
limit the number of politicians/bureaucrats that may assume such power.  On the other 
hand, information asymmetry between the electorate and the politician-bureaucrat shifts 
the power of information toward the politician-bureaucrat and consequently the potential 
to manipulate the process.  The fiscal illusion literature in part derives itself from this 
asymmetry (Turnbull, 1998). 
 
2.  Inherent characteristics of majoritarian political processes suggest an inability 
    of such processes to constrain governments. 
Whereas the context of Brennan and Buchanan’s previous observation takes as given the 
ability to achieve an outcome in line with preferences, this second observation questions 
the ability to achieve such an outcome at all.  Two factors suggest outcomes to the 
contrary:  (1) the operation of majority rule and (2) the role of bureaucracy.  Regarding 
the first, it is well known that in the absence of single-peaked preferences or 
simultaneous policy announcements majority rule generates cyclical preferences wherein 
a case exists for each of three possible outcomes to become the majority outcome.  In 
addition, they demonstrate that simultaneous announcement of policies does not 
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necessarily fully constrain the tendency of the process to allow for candidates to extract 
surplus from an outcome.9  Secondly, in the common case where the actions of 
bureaucrats are not constrained by majority vote (bureaucrats have substantial freedoms 
in the day to day decisions that are not determined by voting outcomes), Niskanen’s 
(1971) theory of bureaucracy maintains that bureaucrats enjoy a monopoly power over 
the supply of public goods and services as well as the ability to set political agendas and 
more importantly that electoral constraints do not threaten this power. 
 
3.  Historical observation of the growth of government and attempts of the  
    electorate to limit this growth suggest that democratic electoral processes may  
    not constrain growth.  
Brennan and Buchanan refer to the fact that United States government spending as a 
share of gross national product rose from 7 percent in 1902 to over 30 percent by 1970, 
and they agree that this in and of itself does not suggest that this growth was against the 
will of the electorate or that 7 percent in 1902 was the “right size”.  Their main question 
is whether or not electoral constraints would allow the electorate to reverse the growth 
trend if desired.  As evidence to support the contention that a majority of voters in some 
areas would rather rely on constitution-level constraints rather than electoral constraints, 
they point to California’s Proposition 13.10  Furthermore, to motivate their arguments 
Brennan and Buchanan maintain that the writers of the United States Constitution simply 
                                                 
9 Brennan and Buchanan (1980), pp. 21-23 demonstrate this in reference to Downs’ (1957) voting model 
where it is assumed that politicians maximize their expected returns from election described as R = Pe S, 
where Pe = Probability (election) and  S= Surplus taken by the politician upon winning election.   
10 Further evidence came later with Massachussetts’ Proposition 2-1/2.  Additionally the current uproar in 
many states in response to the Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which effectively 
removes a constitutional constraint on state and local governments concerning their ability to obtain private 
property for the broader public purpose of economic development, a departure from the public use 
interpretation originally set forth in the 5th Amendment to the Constitution.  
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failed to perceive a need for greater constitutional constraints as they “could not bring 
themselves to imagine governments with the authority and appetites that the modern 
Leviathan is observed to possess.” 
 Before discussing Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) simple revenue maximizing 
model of government, it is helpful to discuss Niskanen’s (1968, 1971) theory of 
bureaucracy behavior as well as the popular criticisms, some of which Niskanen himself 
has acknowledged and addressed (Niskanen, 2001).  Niskanen developed his bureaucracy 
theory while he was a bureau official in the Institute for Defense Analysis.  Gordon 
Tullock had direct involvement helping Niskanen pull his theory together.  Tullock had 
also published his own criticisms of bureaucracies based on his personal experience 
serving in the Department of Labor (Tullock, 1965). 
 It will prove beneficial to review three of Niskanen’s original modeling 
assumptions regarding the bureaucrat-legislator bargaining environment that took the 
most criticism and present the revised assumptions and implications.  The three criticized 
assumptions are as follows:  1) bureaus maximize their total expected budget, 2) 
legislative sponsors are assumed to be passive in accepting or rejecting the bureau’s 
proposed budget-output bundle without evaluating alternative bundles, 3) bureaucrats and 
sponsors bargain over the full range of the possible combinations of budget and output.  
The following revisions to the theory stand today.  First, bureaus maximize the 
discretionary budget or slack defined as the total budget less the minimum cost of 
producing that output expected by the sponsor.  The implications of this assumption are 
the budget is too large, output in terms of demand revealed by the sponsor is too small, 
and inefficiency in production is the normal condition.  Second, the sponsor is not passive 
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in accepting or rejecting the bureau’s proposal.  Notwithstanding this change, two biases 
inherent in the review process still remain.  In terms of effective reviewing, there is a 
freerider problem whereby the cost of reviewing is mainly borne by the committee 
members responsible for reviewing the bureau’s proposal, and the benefits of a thorough 
review accrue to a broader population, resulting in lower quality reviewing.  Third, rather 
than bargaining over the full range of possible combinations of budget and output, the 
sponsors and bureaucrats only bargain over the sponsors’ preferred budget level and the 
“reversion level” or baseline usually defined as the previous year’s budget.  This revised 
assumption recognizes the potential for the agenda setter to manipulate the outcome of 
the bargaining process by strategically choosing the reversion level that maximizes slack.  
See Figure 2 below taken from Niskanen (2001) for an intuitive description of the 
bargaining process.  Point A represents the optimal bundle of public and private goods 
for the decisive voter of the sponsor group with utility equal to U* and output of the 
bureau equal to G*.  The discretionary- or slack-maximizing bureaucrat proposes output 
G’ where utility equals U’ under the reversion-level budget.  Slack equals E – D.  Note 
that the bureau’s output will be higher and the slack or excess budget lower, the higher 
the reversion utility level. 
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Figure 2 
Slack-maximizing Model 
Private 
Government 
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U = U*
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Apart from the above criticisms, some further disagree with the bureaucracy 
theory on the grounds that it assumes the legislature is not capable of monitoring and 
constraining this slack-maximizing behavior (Miller & Moe, 1983).  This is the point of 
departure for Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) Leviathan hypothesis where they take 
bureaucracy theory one step further and combine the bureaucracy and the legislature into 
a monolithic, revenue-maximizing monopoly, thus averting the criticism that the 
legislature should be able to control the bureau by asserting that such control is not in the 
legislature’s interest.  Rather all of government is made-up of rational, self-interested 
individuals who benefit either directly or indirectly from government revenue 
maximization.  
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Brennan and Buchanan’s (1980) simple revenue maximizing model of Leviathan 
is as follows: 
 S = R – G        (1) 
 where G = αR implies 
 S = (1 – α)R        (2) 
 where S is the surplus government obtains for discretionary use, R is total  
 government revenue, G is government spending, and α is the proportion of R that 
 must be spent on G, as determined by a constraint. 
If α = 1 then S = 0, but they maintain that a value even close to 1 still leaves considerable 
room for leakage.  Even if no leakage occurs, they demonstrate that revenue 
maximization is still a good approximation for Leviathan with the following scenarios.  
First, if the decision makers can manipulate the tax system they can arrange it so they pay 
no tax themselves.  Second, in the more realistic case where there are private aspects to 
publicly provided goods, the decision makers can benefit from indirect transfers to 
themselves via the bureaucracy that is in place to carry out the provision of the public 
good.  The welfare bureaucracy is an example.  It would be impossible to transfer tax 
revenues earmarked for direct payments to the poor, but providing services for the poor 
in lieu of direct financial transfers requires a bureau through which surplus can be 
redirected to the bureaucrats.  In this case minimizing direct financial transfers to the 
poor allows the bureaucracy to expand.  This supports utility maximization since power, 
prestige, pay, and patronage enter directly into the utility function and are positively 
associated with the expanding bureaucracy.   
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 It is important to note that Brennan and Buchanan do not assume that this revenue 
maximization is an explicit objective entering into the direct utility function of each or 
any politician or bureaucrat.11  Rather they draw upon the analogy of Adam Smith’s 
public interest outcome whereby self-interested, independent buyers and sellers in a 
competitive market generate an efficient outcome for society.  According to Brennan and 
Buchanan, the interest of Leviathan, “revenue maximization, emerges from the 
interaction of the whole set of governmental decision makers even if no person explicitly 
sets maximum revenue as the goal of his own action.”   
 
Decentralization in a Federal System of Government 
 Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) discuss the evolution of federalism in the United 
States and the role of decentralization.  From 1790 to 1860 states and the federal 
government had comparable responsibilities and hence they refer to this period of 
federalism as “dualism”.  Beginning in 1860 and ending in 1933 federal responsibilities 
grew and they refer to this period as “centralizing federalism”.  A period of “cooperative 
federalism” from 1933 until 1964 saw social programs grow in response to fears 
manifested by the Great Depression.  After 1964 “creative federalism” saw the federal 
government take a more direct and active role in state and local government.  Inman and 
Rubinfeld do not discuss the current period of federalism; however, many refer to the 
present as part of the “devolution revolution” whereby the federal government has 
relinquished some of its hold on state and local programs, beginning for example with 
welfare reform in the 1990’s under the Clinton administration. 
                                                 
11 See Brennan and Buchanan (1980) chapter 2, section 4.    
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 Three institutions are fundamental components of federalism.  There are a number 
of lower tier governments under the central government.  States make up the second tier 
in the U.S. and local governments comprise the third tier.  There may be lower tiers than 
cities or counties, namely special districts with very specific functions.  These state and 
local tier governments have representation in the central government through state 
delegations of popularly elected representatives.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly 
in regards to decentralization, there is a specific assignment of policy responsibilities 
between these vertical tiers of government.  This assignment of responsibilities may 
change according to the will of the voters or politicians, and it varies greatly between 
states and local governments. 
 Fiscal federalism (Oates 1972, 1999), rather than describing the appearance of the 
split of duties among the different tiers of a federalist government structure, concerns 
itself with identifying the appropriate vertical tier of government for each function or 
instrument in an effort to maximize efficiency or social welfare.12  It considers the 
interrelation of these tiers and the effects various instruments will have if exercised at one 
level versus another or at two or more levels simultaneously.  Fiscal federalism attempts 
to account for positive effects of policies including the mobility of tax bases or the role of 
externalities, and normative concerns such as distributional effects of various instruments 
or government programs.  It examines tax instruments, user fees, debt financing, 
intergovernmental grants, or any combination thereof as potential revenue sources for 
providing government services and suggests efficient and equitable approaches to 
financing programs or distributing funds across the various tiers of government.  In 
general the theory of fiscal decentralization maintains that social welfare is maximized 
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when decentralized tiers provide local public goods because it is likely that preferences 
and costs of provision of local public goods will vary across jurisdictions, hence the 
efficient level of provision will also differ.13  If instead a centralized government 
determines a uniform level of provision for a particular service benefiting a local area, for 
example public park amenities, different localities will be forced to provide this level of 
service for which there may be very little demand among its residents.  Decentralization 
allows local preferences to determine local provision and helps ensure that marginal cost 
of provision equals the sum of residents’ marginal benefits.   
 Fiscal decentralization should not be considered a fixed rule.  The No Child Left 
Behind Act of 2002 has initiated great debate among economists, politicians, and 
community leaders, a debate driving right to the heart of fiscal federalism theory.  K-12 
education has traditionally been a locally-provided public good throughout the United 
States, keeping with the notion that local preferences for education vary significantly 
across jurisdictions.14    Determining which tier of government should provide this local 
public good must account for externalities that may affect other jurisdictions.  Education 
is generally thought to have positive spillovers; whereas the lack of education may 
produce a negative spillover.  Considering the negative externality associated with low 
levels of educational attainment, with No Child Left Behind the Bush Administration has 
asserted that in the case of public K-12 education matching local interests may not be in 
the national interest (Gruber, 2007). 
                                                 
13 Oates (1999) summarizes the decentralization theorem (Oates, 1972) stating that “…in the absence of 
cost-savings from the centralized provision of a [local public] good and of interjurisdictional externalities, 
the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of 
consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is 
maintained across all jurisdictions.” 
14 A few states have maintained a central control at the state level, though the reasons for this are not 
always related to maximizing social welfare.   West Virginia is an example of a state that has maintained 
control of education policy in an attempt to equalize educational provision across jurisdictions. 
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 Fiscal federalism has indirect implications for the Leviathan hypothesis.  These 
implications derive more directly from Charles Tiebout’s (1956) model of efficient public 
good provision.  Tiebout was interested in exploring why private markets efficiently 
provide private goods, but do not fare so well in the provision of public goods.  He 
determined that shopping and competition in private markets keeps firms from providing 
inferior, inefficiently-produced goods.  Consumers have alternatives.  Tiebout recognized 
that it is not likely for residents of a country to move frequently move from one country 
to another because of inefficient public good provision.  Even inter-state migration is 
unlikely to discipline public good provision in this way.  However, he reasoned that 
competition for residents among local jurisdictions may provide the efficient level of 
public goods, since residents can more easily choose a particular location in a select 
region as well as move from one jurisdiction to another if they become dissatisfied with a 
jurisdiction’s bundle of public services.  In this way, pushing public good provision down 
to the local tier will discipline local governments to effectively and efficiently provide 
public services in order to keep existing residents and attract new residents. 
Fischel’s (2001) homevoter hypothesis provides another argument for 
decentralization that does not directly depend upon the existence of interjurisdiction 
competition, reinforcing Oates’ (1999) suggestion that interjurisdiction competition is not 
necessary to attain the efficiency-enhancing results associated with fiscal 
decentralization.  Citing evidence from numerous empirical studies that taxes and public 
services and amenities are capitalized into the value of homes, Fischel argues that 
homeowners make efficient decisions in the interest of protecting the value of their 
largest asset, their homes (Hughes & Sirmans, 1992; Katz & Rosen, 1987; Yinger, 
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Bloom, Borsch-Supan, & Ladd, 1988).  Drawing upon the analogy of municipal 
corporations to private corporations, Fischel maintains that homeowners are the largest 
“stockholders” of municipal corporations.  They have a vested interest in maintaining the 
value of their communities and ultimately their homes.  Pushing more responsibilities 
down to the local governments incorporates the homevoter into the local government 
process.  Exercising their voting options to approve decisions that enhance the 
community and increase the value of their homes has the direct benefit of helping ensure 
that local practices and policies are carried out efficiently. 
 
Vertical Relationships and Effects on Spending 
As fiscal federalism concerns the appropriate assignment of revenue and 
expenditure functions for separate tiers of government, it is not sufficient to consider only 
horizontal effects associated with interjurisdiction competition.  Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1993) present a theory of overlapping jurisdictions and implications for 
government size.  Recognizing that there are certain types of public services that county 
and municipal governments simultaneously provide, such as police and fire protection, 
road building and maintenance, and park services their theory explains the effect of 
greater (less) spending at the county (municipal) level on spending at the municipal 
(county) level.  The demand relationships between county and municipal service 
provision may reinforce, counter, or have no contribution to the existing effects of 
horizontal competition.  For example, if spending on services at the county level is 
complementary to spending at the municipal level, then vertical competition results in 
even greater total spending at all levels when either jurisdiction increases its spending.  
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Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) examine data from 139 municipalities in five mid-
western states and find a strong complementary relationship between county and 
municipal direct general expenditures.  These findings have implications for the 
Leviathan hypothesis, suggesting that greater fragmentation, the number of municipal 
governments in the local government sector, may increase the total size of the total local 
government sector rather than restrain the monopoly power of county government.   
Campbell (2004) extends their analysis examining 1980 data on police, park and 
recreation, and highway expenditures from the 50 largest MSA’s outside of the northeast 
consisting of 205 counties and 665 municipalities belonging to these counties.  The 
results suggest that leviathan behavior is more likely at the county level than the 
municipal level, possibly a result of the lower degree of competition among county 
governments relative to municipal governments and their greater number of competitors.  
Campbell (2004) also finds a complementary relationship between county and municipal 
expenditures consistent with Turnbull and Djoundourian’s (1993) results. 
Sobel (1997) examines the interrelationship of vertical tiers in a federal system of 
government from an optimal taxation perspective.  The main result of this study is the 
potential for a negative revenue externality to exist when two levels of government are 
both allowed taxing power.  Sobel (1997) focuses on federal and state tiers, but the 
concept extends to a state level analysis where the state and local tier governments share 
taxing authority.  The theory demonstrates that the common pool problem results whether 
the same tax base or separate tax bases are taxed causing the combined tax rates of the 
two levels of government to be greater than the optimal tax rate.  Three adverse effects 
arise.  There is an increase in the deadweight loss of taxation, an inefficiency bias in 
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government spending, and possibly lower tax revenue in total.  The third effect depends 
on the tax rate elasticity of the tax base.  See Figures 3a and 3b for an intuitive 
description of the negative revenue externality as demonstrated in Sobel (1997). 
Figure 3a depicts the typical deadweight loss associated with a unit tax.  This is 
the triangle labeled A in Figure 3a.  Tax Revenue when one level of government levees a 
tax equals the area of the rectangle labeled CB.  In figure 3b showing two levels of 
government taxing the same tax base, total revenue equals the area of the rectangle 
labeled DC.  The portion of revenue labeled B under one level of taxing authority has 
become part of the larger excess burden, EBA.  Revenue DC is less than, equal to, or 
larger than revenue BC depending on whether or not B is larger than, equal to, or less 
than C, which depends on the tax rate elasticity of the tax base.  Recalling that the above 
analysis extends to the case of two jurisdictions taxing separate tax bases, a further 
implication is the difficulty of determining the effect of one jurisdiction’s decision to 
levee a tax while another jurisdiction levees a separate tax.  Consider the effect of the 
state government increasing the income tax rate.  This affects the labor-leisure tradeoff, 
causing the income tax base to contract.  Local governments also taxing this base will 
lose revenue, but there is also an effect on consumption, which may decrease due to this 
income effect, affecting the sales tax base.   
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Figure 3.  Negative Revenue Externality from Two Tier 
Taxation
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Flowers (1988) examines the interrelationship of vertical tiers in a federal system 
of government in a Leviathan model framework.  When two jurisdictions in separate 
vertical tiers have taxing authority there are implications for the combined revenue 
collected from both tiers.  Unconstrained leviathan maximization behavior is a crucial 
assumption for the results of this analysis.  An unconstrained leviathan government 
acting independently will set the tax rate to maximize tax revenue.  If a second tier 
government is subsequently allowed the power to tax, the combined tax rates from the 
first and second tier governments will be greater than the revenue-maximizing tax rate, 
causing total revenue to decrease.  Flowers (1988) demonstrates this result using the 
Laffer curve.  See Figure 4 adapted from Sobel (1997). 
 
Figure 4.  Tax Revenue with Two Taxing Jurisdictions 
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R1* represents the first level government’s tax revenue without an additional tax levied by 
the level two government.  The level two government additionally taxing the base has the 
effect of decreasing total revenue extracted from the base, shown as a move from point A 
to point B on the backward-bending portion of the Laffer curve with total revenue from 
both tiers equal to R1** + R2.  Level one’s revenue has decreased from R1* to R1**.   
 For the purpose of exploring the effect of greater home rule power on the size of 
the state and local government sector, the above scenario suggests that allowing greater 
taxing authority in a municipal or county jurisdiction would cause combined tax rates 
from the separate fiscal tiers in a state to exceed the revenue-maximizing rate, decreasing 
the size of the state and local sector.  However, the model Flowers (1988) presents does 
not consider the effect of constitutional constraints already in place.  It may be the case 
that existing constraints keep tax rates below the revenue-maximizing rate.  In this case, 
granting the power to tax to more than one tier of government in a state may increase the 
total size of the state and local public sector.  See Figure 5 below for an illustration of the 
revenue effect of two vertically related taxing jurisdictions when constitutional 
constraints are in place. 
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Figure 5.  Tax Revenue with Two Taxing Jurisdictions and Constraints 
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Fiscal Illusion 
Oates (1979) and Turnbull (1998) develop and present two important theoretical 
perspectives in the fiscal illusion literature describing two separate sources of 
misperception regarding costs or benefits of public services.  Oates (1979) suggests that 
complex tax structures can allow governments to extract revenue from citizens who are 
unable to recognize the true marginal burden of their taxes.  Since taxpayers do not 
directly observe intergovernmental grants from higher levels, they underestimate the true 
tax price of public goods.  This tax price misperception has two effects.  An overspending 
effect arises from the inability to recognize the magnitude of external funding in the form 
of grants from higher levels.  Voters underestimate their tax price, thus the quantity of 
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public services demanded is greater than if their true tax price were revealed.  Second, a 
flypaper effect allows funds from higher level governments to stay in the public sector 
rather than revert to the taxpayers in the form of a reduction in local taxes.  Since 
taxpayers do not directly observe these grants, they are not aware of the excess funds, 
which in turn remain in the public sector or are extracted as a result of rent-seeking 
behavior.  
Turnbull (1998) provides a more general model of fiscal illusion based on 
uncertainty or imperfect information.  One implication of the model maintains that the 
total benefits of public services are not clear, leaving taxpayers with the impression that 
they are getting a lower level of services for their tax dollars.  He shows that tax price 
uncertainty supports a flypaper effect consistent with Oates (1979) notion of fiscal 
illusion and further demonstrates that Oates’ notion of fiscal illusion is a special case of 
the uncertainty-based model of fiscal illusion.15  Thus either model suggests that 
intergovernmental transfers provide a countervailing decentralization effect on the size of 
government.  Recent trends see governments increasing the use of intergovernmental aid 
to achieve greater decentralization, which partially offsets decentralization’s negative 
effect on government size.  Empirical models describing government size should include 
voter incomes and grants as separate variables in order to control for this countervailing 
effect.   
 
Indirect Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan 
A basic, indirect constitutional constraint on Leviathan is inherent in a federal 
system of government, whereby decentralization of taxing authorities serves to diminish 
                                                 
15 For a comparative review of this literature, see Campbell (2004) 
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the maximum power any one unit of government can achieve.  This notion first put forth 
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) is certainly their most scrutinized pontification, having 
been empirically tested in a number of studies (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Marlow, 
1988; Zax, 1989) with somewhat inconsistent results.16  Comparing government to a 
monopoly in the private sector, as competition is a method for controlling monopoly 
power, decentralization can limit government’s power in the market for public goods 
(Oates, 1985; Brennan & Buchanan, 1980).  Brennan and Buchanan’s resulting 
decentralization hypothesis is, “total government intrusion into the economy should be 
smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are 
decentralized…”  This dissertation brings one overlooked facet of their analysis to the 
forefront.  Once locational value and mobility costs are brought into the model of taxing 
power in a federal system of government, local leviathans may arise even in the presence 
of the indirect constraint of decentralization.17  Recall that home rule power describes the 
degree of freedom granted to local governments for making functional, structural, and 
fiscal decisions without interference from state government.  When local governments 
have unlimited powers, decentralization constrains this power most effectively under the 
assumption that citizens have low to no costs of migrating between competing 
jurisdictions and that they place no greater value on inherent characteristics of one 
jurisdiction over another.18  This chapter has summarized evidence demonstrating that 
county and municipal spending exhibit a complementary relationship and that counties 
                                                 
16 Sobel (1997) and Flowers (1988) imply that rather than the interjurisdiction competition effect of greater 
decentralization, the revenue externality resulting from overtaxing the same or even separate tax bases may 
primarily drive the result of smaller government size with increasing jurisdictions. 
17 See pp. 176-179 of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) for the progression of models used to demonstrate the 
efficiency characteristics of centralized and decentralized government structures in their fiscal constitution 
analysis. 
18 With greater locational value citizens are less likely to move even with zero mobility costs.  See Krupka 
(2004) for an empirical analysis of the effects of locational ammentities on migrating decisions. 
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with greater home rule power are less likely to achieve the outcome the median voter 
most prefers (Turnbull & Djoundourian, 1993, Turnbull & Geon, 2006).  Assuming that 
local governments behave as revenue maximizers, greater home rule power will result in 
greater local spending, ceteris paribus.  Since locational value and mobility costs 
diminish the effects of the constraining power of fiscal decentralization, Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) suggest that “local governments should not be allowed unconstrained 
taxing power.”19  It follows that greater home rule power may facilitate a larger state and 
local government sector.  Alternatively, denying greater home rule power may lead to a 
decrease in the size of the combined state and local government sector. 
A series of empirical studies in the American Economic Review, beginning with 
Oates (1985), employ different modeling approaches and variable formulations to test the 
decentralization hypothesis.  Oates (1985) estimates three separate models.  Using cross-
section census data from 1970 and 1972, each model regresses the aggregate state and 
local tax receipts as a share of personal income on measures for income, population, 
urbanization and intergovernmental aid, but the first model adds a measure of revenue 
centralization, the second includes a measure of expenditure centralization, and the final 
model includes a measure of fragmentation.  He finds no evidence that any of these 
measures of centralization or fragmentation has a minimizing effect on the size of 
government.   
Nelson (1987) extends Oates’ (1985) approach, also using 1970 and 1972 census 
data, but adjusts the dependent variable to control for differences among states in the 
                                                 
19 Epple and Zelenitz (1981) demonstrate that the resulting greater potential for interjurisdiction 
competition does not by itself completely restrain leviathan, on the other hand Oates (1999) suggests that 
decentralization can affect outcomes even when agents are completely immobile, making the theory more 
appealing to  European countries. 
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division of state and local services responsibilities.  His models do not include a measure 
of fiscal decentralization, instead focusing on fragmentation.  He creates two separate 
measures of fragmentation, a general purpose government measure and a single purpose 
government measure.  In addition, he includes separate measures for intergovernmental 
grants and funded mandates.  Nelson finds some support for decentralization in the 
positive coefficient on his measure of general fragmentation, which he defines as 
population divided by general purpose fragmentation.   
Zax (1989) extends the approaches of Oates (1985) and Nelson (1987), but 
focuses on the local government sector, using a more comprehensive model and a richer 
data set consisting of over 3000 county observations from the 1982 Census of 
Governments and 1980 general Census data.  He includes measures of fiscal 
centralization, general and single-purpose fragmentation and intergovernmental aid 
simultaneously with demographic and socio-economic variables.  His fragmentation 
measures additionally control for differences in population density and proximity of 
competing jurisdictions.  In his model that does not separate fragmentation into two 
separate measures based on general or single purpose governments, all four government 
structure variable coefficients have significant signs consistent with the decentralization 
hypothesis.  It is interesting to note that Campbell (2004) finds that controlling for 
vertical relationships in overlapping jurisdictions has a countervailing effect on 
fragmentation’s effect on spending.  Her results are not consistent with studies that show 
fragmentation has a negative effect on government size.20  See studies from Forbes and 
                                                 
20 Other studies that model fragmentation at the municipal level include Sjoquist (1982), Schneider (1986), 
and Eberts and Gronberg (1990). 
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Zampelli (1989), Grossman (1989) and Marlow (1988) for additional examples of 
modeling approaches to testing Leviathan. 
 
Direct Constraints 
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) also examine the role of direct constitutional 
constraints to restrain Leviathan.  The empirical studies previously mentioned overlook 
these direct constraints; however, such constraints are widely used to differing degrees by 
state governments.  Tax and expenditure limitations are the most notable examples, such 
as Proposition 2-1/2 in Massachusetts and Proposition 13 in California.  A number of 
studies have examined the motivation behind the approval of such measures (Alm & 
Skidmore 1999; Fischel 2001; Ladd & Wilson, 1982).  Employing probit analysis with a 
correction for selection bias, Alm and Skidmore (1999) find that high relative tax burdens 
and the growth in tax burdens over time are consistent with voting decisions to approve 
tax and expenditure limitations.  Skidmore (1999) examines the effects of tax and 
expenditure limitations on government size, finding that strict tax and expenditure 
limitations have a constraining effect on government size.  This evidence contrasts with 
previous studies finding no effect, reasoning that the availability of other revenue sources 
not limited by the restriction washes out any constraining effect.  In a very recent study 
extending the analysis of constitutional constraints beyond tax and expenditure 
limitations, Turnbull and Geon (2007) investigate home rule effects in an application of 
GARP analysis to median voter outcomes. They find that non-urban home rule counties 
tend to violate median voter demands while urban counties do not, suggesting that 
horizontal competition may be a stronger restraining factor in urban settings. 
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Other Explanations for Government Size and Growth 
 Holcombe (2005) presents a review of three distinct views or general explanations 
for government size and growth:  budget-maximization models, rational-choice models, 
and path-dependent models.  The reviews of Niskanen (1968, 1971) and Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980) presented in this chapter of the dissertation are sufficient summaries of 
the budget-maximization models.  Rational choice models maintain that government size 
is a reflection of a collective decision-making process.  The median voter model is an 
example that suggests government size is a reflection of voter demand.  Thus rational 
choice models suggest that government size and growth are the result of voters’ 
preferences for larger government.  Path dependency theories suggest that government 
size is influenced by historical events.  If an extraordinary event creates a need for greater 
government spending, such as a war, previously imposed constraints may be relaxed, 
never to return to the pre-war level.  Thus there is a “ratcheting” upward of government 
spending.   A current example of the ratchet hypothesis is the increased defense spending 
for the war in Iraq.  After the turnover of the House and Senate by the Republicans to the 
Democrats, there is ongoing debate about when to pull American military troops out of 
Iraq.  The rachet hypothesis says that while this troop reduction would allow for a 
decrease in government, it is more likely that some or most of the war-time spending 
level will remain in the form of other government programs.21  There is great debate 
among politicians concerning which government programs should see an increase in 
spending, while very little discussion centers on reducing spending to the pre-war level.  
                                                 
21 See Holcombe (2005) for various examples and scenarios for the above explanations for government 
growth and size. 
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Historical observation shows that post-war spending never fully returns to pre-war levels, 
evidence supporting the rachet hypothesis. 
Oates (1985) presents other theories of government size that suggest voter 
preferences determine the size of government.22  These range from Musgrave’s 
complementary (to the predicted outcome of the decentralization hypothesis) idea to John 
Wallis’s counter-hypothesis.  Musgrave suggested that decentralization would alter the 
redistribution function by creating more income-homogenous jurisdictions that would 
have less need to redistribute income within jurisdictions, while Wallis posited that since 
citizens have greater control over their local government decisions, they will empower 
the local governments to provide greater services, a conclusion exactly opposite of what 
the decentralization hypothesis predicts.      
 
Home Rule and Government Sector Size 
Home rule gives local government greater authority to obtain and manage fiscal 
resources and determine the distribution and extent of public services.  By design, this 
authority alters government outcomes.  The vast decentralization and local government 
structure literature demonstrates the complexity of predicting home rule’s effect on 
government sector size.  Adding to the complexity, home rule is fundamentally distinct 
from decentralization.  Unlike decentralization of government, home rule gives local 
government greater authority, while state government retains its authority, which may 
result in duplication of revenue generation and service provision.   
The sources of the economic effects of home rule on government size are 
numerous.  Greater home rule power enhances the complexity of the state and local tax 
                                                 
22 These two explanations appear as side discussions in Oates (1985). 
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environment, and this contributes to greater fiscal illusion.  Complementarity of the 
public service demand relationships between the fiscal tiers in the state and local public 
sector, well-documented between counties and municipalities at the local tier, imply that 
greater home rule power will cause an increase in local government size.  If this 
complementarity extends to the state and local interrelationship, home rule facilitates an 
increase in the size of the total state and local public sector.  On the other hand, 
depending on the combined sector’s tax rate in reference to revenue maximization, 
separate vertical tiers with taxing authority may produce more or less total sector 
revenue.  Furthermore, according to either the homevoter hypothesis or the effects of 
interjurisdiction competition, greater home rule authority will yield public service 
provision outcomes more in line with the median voter’s demand.  This could increase or 
decrease government size depending on the preferences of the median voter.  In a 
separate vein, home rule alters the boundary between public and private activity.  Powers 
of incorporation, annexation, extraterritorality, and eminent domain give local 
governments the ability to change their revenue and service bases.  Tax revenues will 
transfer between jurisdictions as these bases change and shuffle within jurisdictions and 
as resources move in and out of private and government sectors. 
All of this complicates government planning and public policy determination.  
Consider a recent real-world example in the home rule state of Georgia.  In 2005 Sandy 
Springs, a previously unincorporated locale just north of Atlanta, Georgia in Fulton 
County became the third largest city in the United States to incorporate.  As evidence of 
the complexity and magnitude of the economic and fiscal consequences, the bill 
proposing Sandy Springs’ incorporation numbered over 40 pages.  The ramifications of 
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Sandy Springs’ incorporation include efficiency and equity considerations of government 
functions that range from administration to service provision.  Only time will allow 
economists to determine the full effect on Sandy Springs, the rest of Fulton County and 
the state of Georgia. 
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has presented the major theories of government size and the 
underlying structural implications of decentralization, home rule, and other constitutional 
constraints.  The extensive theoretical and empirical literature examining the 
interrelationships of jurisdictions that comprise the state and local government sector is 
evidence that determining the impact of policy changes on the performance of the public 
sector is a complicated process with sometimes unpredictable results.  An empirical 
analysis of home rule and other institutional constraints on government behavior 
demands a rigorous understanding of the theory underlying these factors.  The following 
chapters present a series of empirical investigations of home rule’s effect on government 
size grounded in the structural theory of state and local government behavior.   
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Chapter 4 
State and Local Share Empirical Model 
 
Leviathan Model Methodology and Data 
This chapter discusses empirical logit estimation methods and results for home 
rule and other institutional factors’ effects on government size.  The approach is general 
and follows previous empirical leviathan tests in the economic literature (Oates, 1985; 
Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  The basic empirical model specifies government size as a 
function of state and local government structure and socio-economic factors. The 
variables are consistent with the different forms used in the empirical leviathan literature 
(Campbell, 2004; Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).   
This is the first empirical test to include a measure for home rule power.  
Additional exogenous variables include a measure of the dominant political ideology, a 
proxy variable to capture the effect of using the legal system to influence public policy, 
and a measure of tax and expenditure limitations in each state.  Census data from the 
periods of 1990 and 2000 comprise the sample, which pools 94 observations from 47 
continental U.S. states.23  Chow tests do not reject that the effects of variables are 
structurally similar across this time period, thus enabling pooling. 
 TEL is a dummy variable obtained from Skidmore (1999) that signifies whether or 
not a state has any kind of tax or expenditure limitation in force.   It captures another type 
of direct constitutional constraint on state and local governments.  The lawyers per capita 
variable employs data on occupations from the Equal Employment Opportunity Files of 
                                                 
23 Virginia is omitted from this study because cities are independent of counties in Virginia, a unique 
institutional arrangement that by itself can lead to as yet undetermined effects on public sector size.  
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the Census for 1990 and 2000.  This variable is a crude proxy for the extent to which 
special interests in a state may use courts to advance public policy initiatives.  This 
variable contains any person in the Census whose occupation is lawyer or judge, thereby 
excluding people who may have a degree in law but do not practice it as their primary 
occupation.  Baker, Micelli, Sirmans, and Turnbull (2001) introduced this variable to 
capture differences in the efficiency of the legal institution in each state in a study 
examining length of statutes with regard to adverse possession of land.   
Decentralization and fragmentation are commonly used measures to test the 
Leviathan hypothesis dating back to Oates (1985), who models Leviathan using two 
measures of fiscal decentralization and a measure of “non-fiscal decentralization” (now 
referred to in the literature as “fragmentation” ).  E Decentralization measures the degree 
to which direct expenditures are carried out at the local level as opposed to the state level.  
Other studies use the share of own-source revenues as a measure of fiscal 
decentralization as an alternative specification (Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  This study 
also uses this variable as an alternative for E Decentralization in certain model 
specifications included in Tables 4 and 5.  Fragmentation is the number of local 
governments in the state including all county governments, sub-county general purpose 
governments, public school systems, and special districts.  This definition is consistent 
with that of Oates (1985).  Nelson (1987) and Zax (1989) argue that this measure of 
fragmentation is too broad and propose splitting single purpose governments from 
general purpose governments.  Models using this break-out were tested, but the results do 
not change significantly.  Zax further suggests that the effects of fragmentation may not 
be picked up at a level of aggregation beyond that of county or metropolitan statistical 
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area.  He reasons that, since fragmentation measures local inter-jurisdiction competition, 
state-level data will include many jurisdictions that are not in direct competition with one 
another, thus masking the effects of inter-jurisdiction competition going on at local 
levels.  Nevertheless, an attempt is made here to measure fragmentation effects consistent 
with Oates (1985).  The effects of fragmentation are significant in some studies (Nelson, 
1987; Zax, 1989) and insignificant in others (Oates, 1985).  Intergovgants controls for the 
effects of fiscal illusion.  The fiscal illusion literature suggests that intergovernmental 
grants may have a positive impact on government spending if taxpayers underestimate 
the marginal tax price of public services due to the greater complexity of a tax system 
using intergovernmental grants.  Furthermore, the flypaper effect says that a dollar 
increase in grants to local governments yields a larger increase in local government 
spending than a dollar increase in voter incomes.  On the other hand, benefit uncertainty 
may cause taxpayers to underestimate the benefit of public services, decreasing overall 
demand for public services.   
 The socio-economic variables control for factors other than the fiscal effects 
described above that also have an impact on government size.  For example income tests 
Wagner’s Law, which states that increasing levels of personal income, generally 
consistent with higher levels of economic development, should have a positive effect on 
the share of government expenditures in gross state product (Oates, 1985).  Unemp 
attempts to capture changes in demand for government-provided services as the 
proportion of the population needing government assistance changes.  Higher levels of 
unemployment may put a greater strain on state and local governments for the services 
they provide, but may also reduce the level of demand for the same services.  The MSA 
  
 54
variable, MSApop, controls for effects due to economies of scale.  Unit costs of certain 
public services, for example capital infrastructure, decrease with greater population 
density.   Population captures the effect of low population density because the model also 
controls for urban density.  As a state tends to have a more rural population, government 
spending may increase or decrease depending upon whether high fixed cost services 
dominate or whether a general lower demand for public services dominates. 
Incomevariance, defined as the variation in household median incomes across 
counties in a state, controls for differences in the level of demand for services within each 
state.  A greater variance of median household incomes across counties indicates a more 
diverse population in terms of income, which in turn may create a greater need for wider 
range of local government services to meet the divergent demands of different groups 
within the state.  Democratvote captures the proportion of state popular votes for the 
democrat presidential candidate and is a proxy for political ideology.  Other measures of 
ideology were also tested, but the measured effects were not significantly different.24  
While the expected effect might be for largely democrat states to favor bigger 
government, ceteris paribus, Holcombe (2005) suggests that the power of minority 
special interest groups may overcome political party interests, thus masking or 
neutralizing effects of ideological controls.  
Two separate model specifications differ according to the method of classifying 
home rule authority.  The first specification employs an ordinal ranking formulation first 
presented in Turnbull and Geon (2006), which ranks the discretionary authority in each 
state from a low of 1, strong Dillon’s Rule, to a high of 4, strong home rule.  An 
                                                 
24 For a description of other measures of political ideology, see Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson 
(1998). 
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alternative specification uses a dichotomous formulation that aggregates weak and strong 
home rule into one general home rule category and weak and strong Dillon’s Rule into a 
general Dillon’s Rule category.  Turnbull and Geon (2006) define an ordinal rank 
variable of home rule power for 38 states in a county-level analysis.  Since the current 
study is not a county-level analysis, it is not necessary to exclude the New England states, 
which do not have county government functions comparable to other states (Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or Vermont).  For similar 
reasoning we can add states that have only a limited number of county governments 
(Arizona, Delaware, and Nevada) for this study.  Adding these states, this study classifies 
47 states according to weak or strong home rule or weak or strong Dillon’s Rule.  The 
current sample includes 20 weak or strong Dillon’s Rule states and 27 weak or strong 
home rule states.  The home rule designation is consistent across 1990 and 2000.  This 
state-level analysis characterizes some states differently than Turnbull and Geon’s (2006) 
county-level analysis.25  Table 1 in Chapter 2 provides a list of all states in the sample 
categorized by degree of home rule authority.  See Table 2 for a definition of the 
variables used in the analysis and Table 3 for summary statistics. 
 
Model Specification and Estimation 
This study uses two dependent variable formulations.  Taxshare is the level of 
combined state and local tax revenues as a share of total personal income in a state and 
osrshare is the level of combined state and local own source revenues as a share of 
                                                 
25 Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and Texas have a different home 
rule classification than that presented in Turnbull and Geon (2006). 
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personal income.  The general fractional logit model describing government size is as 
follows: 
Gi = f ( iij,wik, xil ) + ui       (3) 
where 0 < G < 1 in either taxshare or osrshare as defined above.  The vector, i, consists 
of institutional variables:  home rule, TEL- measuring a composite of state tax and 
expenditure limitations and lawyers per capita.  The vector, w, includes fiscal variables:  
E decentralization- decentralization measured as the share of local expenditures in total 
state and local spending, fragmentation- fragmentation as measured by the total number 
of local governments in a state, and intergovgrants- a measure of grants to local 
governments as a share of state expenditures.  The vector, x, comprises socio-economic 
and political variables:  income- median household income,  population, msapop- 
Metropolitan Statistical Area population, unemployment- unemployment rate for state, 
incomevariance- the variance of median household incomes across counties in a state, 
and democratvote- the percent of state population voting for democrat president in1992 
and 2000 elections, and u is a random error ~ N (0, σ2). 
 
Estimation Technique 
 Past studies of government size using a fractional dependent variable bounded 
between 0 and 1 perform a log-odds transformation and estimate the model in a logit 
framework to address the possibility of estimated dependent variable values of  β0 + Ѓ β  
lying outside the unit interval, where Ѓ includes the vectors i, w, and x discussed above.  
This study makes use of a technique that Papke and Woolridge (1996) present in an 
application to determinants of 401(k) contribution levels, where contribution levels are 
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measured in percent of salary terms.  They provide the details necessary to run the 
regression in a program such as Gauss® or Matlab®, and Stata® now includes commands 
specifically for fractional logit regressions.26   
Compared with log-odds type procedures, there is no difficulty in recovering the 
regression function for the fractional variable, and nesting the logit function in a more 
general functional form gives new robust specification tests.  This approach expands on 
the generalized linear models (GLM) literature from statistics and the quasi-likelihood 
literature from econometrics to obtain robust methods for estimation and inference, and a 
brief summary of their format and basic assumptions follows below. 
 Assume an independent (not necessarily identically distributed) sequence of 
observations {(Ѓiyi): i = 1,2,…,N}, where 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1 and N = sample size for all  
i element of (yi|Ѓi) = G(Ѓi, β) where G is a known function and 0 < G(z) < 1 for all z 
element of R.  No assumption for the underlying distribution of G is necessary, so the 
quasi-maximum likelihood of β can be obtained from the maximization of the Bernoulli 
log-likelihood over G(Ѓi, β). 
  
Empirical Results 
Tables 5 and 6 show results of the logit estimation of the Leviathan model using the 
ordinal rank home rule variable.  Looking at the regression results we find that E-
decentralization is significant at the .01 level, carries a negative sign and is robust across 
all specifications for both dependent variables.  This suggests that a local sector taking on 
more fiscal responsibility relative to the state is consistent with a decreasing size of the 
                                                 
26 See this link to the STATA support page addressing this problem in response to the Papke and Woolridge 
(1996) paper.  McDowell and Nicholas (2004)-www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/logit.html 
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combined state and local sector.  This result is consistent with the notion that forces of 
inter-jurisdiction competition have a constraining effect on government size, a result that 
is consistent with the Leviathan hypothesis advanced by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) 
and the empirical relationship found in Zax (1989).   
Intergovgrant is significant at the .01 level in the positive direction when 
decentralization is measured in terms of expenditures.  However, when decentralization is 
measured in terms of own source revenues, models 2 and 3 for both dependent variables, 
z-scores drop slightly for the models using own source revenue as the dependent variable 
and drop to insignificant levels when taxes are used in the construction of the dependent 
variable.  Additionally the magnitudes and significance of the own source revenue 
measure of decentralization are weaker than those for E-decentralization.  Nevertheless, 
as the share of state aid to localities increases relative to own-source revenues, the size of 
government increases.  This is consistent with the effect of grants decreasing local 
taxpayers’ perceived tax price of public goods, which increases the quantity demanded 
and thus the revenue collected.  The positive sign is also consistent with the flypaper 
effect (Turnbull, 1998).  Assuming balanced budgets so that increases in revenue shares 
coincide with increases in expenditure shares, then increases in intergovernmental aid 
translate into higher government spending.  The positive significant coefficient on 
intergovgrant is also consistent with the results of Oates (1985).   
Fragmentation is positive and significant in most of the specifications using taxes as 
the dependent variable in Table 6.  This result is not consistent with that of Zax (1989); 
however, it could be the case that the positive sign is picking up effects from a loss of 
scale economies as more and more small local governments provide services to a given 
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total population.  When own source revenues are the measure of government size, 
fragmentation has no explanatory power.  Not one of the demographic variables is 
significant at the 5% level in Tables 5 and 6.  For population and msapop, this is 
consistent with other studies.  These variables by themselves are not usually found to 
have a significant effect on government size.  The effect of income varies in the literature 
and is sensitive to model specification (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  Most 
studies do not include unemployment as a separate variable.  
 Democratvote is negative and significant in the model specifications for the 
dependent variable, OSR share.  It is not significant in the specifications for the 
dependent variable, tax share.  The negative sign in the OSR share model is not the 
expected result.  It indicates that states with a greater proportion of democrat voters tend 
to have lower taxes as a share or personal income.  As a proxy for ideology, this result 
appears to be evidence against the general belief that democrats favor bigger government 
than republicans.  On the other hand, the result may be evidence that largely democrat 
states are more successful in securing federal funds that partially offset state and local 
own source revenues.   
Of the institutional variables included in this model, home rule and lawyers per 
capita, only lawyers per capita is significant, and then only when the measure of 
government size is based on taxes.  It carries a positive sign, suggesting that special 
interest groups use the court system on average to uphold policies that have the effect of 
increasing government expenditures, and challenge those that restrict expenditures.  The 
TEL variable, tax and expenditure limitations, is positive and significant in models with 
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both dependent variable measures.  This sign is consistent with that found in Skidmore 
(1999).  Tax and expenditure limitations do have an effect on the size of the public sector. 
We tried several model formulations to test the home rule variable, including 
dropping E-decentralization, but it was never significant.  Tables 7 and 8 show that 
measuring home rule as a dummy variable does not significantly change the results for 
the tax share model or the own source revenue share model.  The hr dummy variable is 
not significant in either Table 7 or Table 8.  Tables 7 and 8 reveal that there are no 
significant differences in the estimated coefficients of the remaining exogenous variables 
between the models that use the binary variable for home rule, hr dummy, versus the 
ordinal rank variable for home rule, home rule.   
The leviathan hypothesis and the theory of constitutional constraints suggest that 
home rule choice is endogenous.  The empirical results in this chapter provide a starting 
point for the analysis in the next chapter.  States and their citizens collectively determine 
the degree of home rule power available to localities.  The previous chapters discussed 
the economic literature and empirical evidence of institutions’ impact on government 
size.  Home rule power is an important institutional factor in local government behavior.  
Chapter 5 addresses the endogenous nature of home rule and discusses the results of a 
more rigorous empirical test of home rule’s impact on government size. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter extended the leviathan model of government behavior to include 
institutional factors previously unaddressed in the economic literature.  Additionally, it 
provided additional evidence reducing the discrepancies of previous studies of fiscal 
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decentralization’s effect on government size that do not find consistent results (Oates, 
1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  Using 1990 and 2000 census data, this study benefited 
from a greater number of state and local sector observations than Oates’s (1985) 
empirical decentralization test.  The addition of institutional factors expanded the model’s 
capacity to explain government behavior under the leviathan hypothesis. 
The empirical results are consistent with the decentralization hypothesis and the 
leviathan model of government behavior.  Additionally, the regression results provide 
evidence that institutional factors affect government size, as the positive and significant 
coefficients on lawyers per capita and TEL indicate.  Home rule is not significant in these 
models; however, the theory of constitutional constraints suggests the parsimonious 
empirical logit model does not effectively capture the effect that the constitutional stage 
home rule choice has on government size.  Chapter 5 addresses home rule endogeneity 
and examines self-selection bias in the choice of home rule and its impact on observing 
the estimated home rule effect. 
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Table 3.  Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Taxshare
OSRshare
Independent Variables
Home rule
HR Dummy
E-decentralization
OSR decentralization
Population
Intergovgrants
Fragmentation
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
TEL
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Incomevariance
Unemployment
dummy variable for whether state has any type 
of tax or expenditure limitation on the state 
variable used in Skidmore (1999)
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
state population Census of Population
share of local own source revenue in total state 
and local own source revenue
Computed from Census of Governments
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2004), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001).  See Chapter 2
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
Binary variable.  1 = Weak or Strong home 
rule.  0 = Weak or Strong Dillon's Rule
See above.
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state and local tax revenues as share of personal 
income
state and local own source revenues as share of 
personal income
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 63
Table 4.  Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Taxshare 94 0.101 0.011 0.067 0.141
OSRshare 94 0.130 0.012 0.101 0.166
Independent Variables
Home rule 94 2.681 1.018 1 4
HR Dummy 94 0.574 0.497 0 1
OSR decentralization 94 0.412 0.076 0.2 0.545
E-decentralization 94 0.514 0.082 0.323 0.654
Fragmentation 94 1,829 1,500 119 6,835
Intergovgrants 94 0.246 0.060 0.089 0.411
Population 94 5,448,832 5,921,957 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 94 4,388,063 5,469,860 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 94 $29,465 $4,939 $20,136 $41,721
Incomevariance 94 1033 582 293 2808
Unemp 94 0.050 0.016 0.024 0.096
Democratvote 94 0.434 0.075 0.250 0.610
Lawyers per capita 94 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
TEL 94 0.404 0.493 0 1
Year2000 94 0.500 0.503 0 1  
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Table 5.  Leviathan model logit estimates with OSR share dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
OSR share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.007 *
1.88
E-decentralization -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.08 *** -0.092 *** -0.092 *** -0.070 ***
-2.95 -3.05 -3.49 -4.4 -4.41 -(3.39)
osrdecentralization -0.03 ** -0.03 **
-1.99 -2.04
fragmentation 1.90E-07 -6.45E-08 -1.09E-07 1.52E-07 -2.16E-07 -4.06E-07 -3.71E-07 -9.49E-07
0.19 -0.06 -0.11 0.16 -0.25 -0.46 -0.42 -0.96
intergovgrants 0.13 *** 0.08 *** 0.08 *** 0.13 *** 0.13 *** 0.150 *** 0.149 *** 0.135 ***
4.21 3.12 3.13 4.25 4.55 4.83 4.91 4.88
population -1.92E-09 -2.15E-09 -2.47E-09 -2.25E-09 -1.03E-09 1.00E-09 7.94E-10 4.59E-10
-0.91 -1.01 -0.96 -0.42 0.49 0.39 0.23
msapop 1.94E-09 2.24E-09 2.65E-09 2.37E-09 1.31E-09 -9.68E-10 -7.63E-10 -3.96E-10
0.77 0.86 0.97 0.9 0.47 -0.43 -0.34 -0.18
income -5.13E-07 -5.36E-07 * -6.49E-07 * -6.31E-07 * -3.51E-07 -7.23E-07 -7.28E-07 -5.48E-07
-1.61 -1.65 -1.73 -1.73 -0.86 -1.36 -1.36 -1.09
unemployment -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.104 -0.106 0.146
-0.69 -0.72 -0.73 -1.13 -1.16 1.07
home rule -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006
-0.36 -0.39 -0.23 -0.29 -0.31 0.56
democratvote -0.04 * -0.060 *** -0.059 *** -0.073 ***
-1.76 -2.63 -2.63 -3.31
lawyers per capita 5.346 5.015 5.053
1.38 1.41 1.47
incomevariance -8.23E-07 -1.14E-06
-0.37 -0.51
TEL -0.001 **
-2.41
_cons -1.763 *** -1.802 *** -1.739 *** -1.697 *** -1.582 *** -1.517 *** -1.512 *** -1.670
-20.82 -20.68 -14.54 -14.33 -11.78 -10.94 -11 -11.77
R-square 0.152 0.124 0.129 0.158 0.190 0.221 0.221 0.232
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 6.  Leviathan model logit estimates with Tax share dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Tax share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.00
0.07
E-decentralization -0.06 *** -0.063 *** -0.055 *** -0.085 *** -0.068 *** -0.064 ***
-3.23 -3.35 -2.63 -3.86 -3.86 -3.55
osrdecentralization -3.24E-02 ** -0.032 **
-2.33 -2.44
fragmentation 1.46E-06 ** 1.19E-06 * 1.42E-06 ** 1.68E-06 ** 1.84E-06 ** 1.92E-05 ** 1.67E-06 ** 9.37E-07
2.21 1.84 2.03 2.37 2.3 1.96 2.11 1.06
intergovgrants 0.08 *** 3.28E-02 0.030 0.079 *** 0.076 *** 0.122 *** 0.093 *** 0.100 ***
3.2 1.54 1.31 3.09 2.79 3.4 3.33 3.67
population -3.07E-09 * -3.32E-09 * -3.48E-09 * -3.25E-09 * -3.79E-09 ** -1.13E-09 -1.61E-09 -1.06E-09
-1.68 -1.79 -1.85 -1.75 -1.96 -0.64 -1.07 -0.72
msapop 3.34E-09 3.64E-09 * 3.76E-09 * 3.48E-09 3.94E-09 * 9.43E-10 1.45E-09 1.04E-09
1.57 1.71 1.73 1.6 1.78 0.48 0.88 0.63
income 2.01E-07 1.79E-07 3.09E-07 3.28E-07 2.03E-07 -2.96E-07 -2.50E-07 -2.79E-07
0.86 0.76 1.21 1.31 0.65 -0.58 -0.61 -0.67
unemployment 0.070 0.068 0.068 0.038 0.022 0.067
0.95 0.93 0.93 0.4 0.29 0.56
home rule -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-1.09 -1.13 -1.19 -1.24 -1.31 -0.84
democratvote 0.019 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010
0.81 -0.2 -0.16 -0.44
lawyers per capita 8.953 ** 6.026 ** 7.393 ***
2.42 2.16 2.68
incomevariance -3.493E-06 -2.96E-06
-1.61 -1.51
TEL -0.014 **
-2.51
_cons -2.133 *** -2.186 *** -2.218 *** -2.160 *** -2.229 *** -2.137 *** -2.114 *** -2.13 ***
-23.91 -24.27 -16.2 -15.58 -15.49 -14.06 -14.35 -13.28
R-square 0.136 0.098 0.116 0.154 0.164 0.238 0.226 0.234
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 7.  OSR share  dependent variable logit estimates:  home rule dummy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OSR share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 *
0.55 1.17 0.99 0.97 1.8
E-decentralization -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.084 *** -0.084 *** -0.076 ***
-2.59 -3.11 -4.07 -4.09 -3.45
fragmentation 2.11E-07 -1.02E-07 -3.13E-07 -2.68E-07 9.37E-07
0.22 -0.12 -0.35 -0.31 -0.89
intergovgrants 0.12 *** 0.13 *** 0.143 *** 0.142 *** 0.143 ***
4.07 4.3 4.64 4.71 4.81
population -2.41E-09 -1.23E-09 7.65E-10 5.26E-10 3.58E-10
-1.07 -0.52 0.39 0.27 0.17
msapop 2.50E-09 1.43E-09 -7.91E-10 -5.52E-10 -2.86E-10
0.9 0.47 -0.43 -0.34 -0.18
income -5.88E-07 * -2.45E-07 -6.18E-07 -6.24E-07 -5.90E-07
-1.67 -0.6 -1.16 -1.16 -1.1
unemployment -0.01 0.07 0.008 0.003 0.147
-0.08 0.48 0.05 0.02 0.97
hr dummy -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007
-0.48 -0.03 -0.27 -0.25 0.25
democratvote -0.05 ** -0.063 *** -0.063 *** -0.078 ***
-1.97 -2.64 -2.66 -3.21
lawyers per capita 5.346 5.015 5.053
1.37 1.37 1.44
incomevariance -1.06E-06 -1.06E-06
-0.47 -0.44
TEL -0.006 **
-2.34
_cons -1.749 *** -1.679 *** -1.602 *** -1.596 *** -1.652 ***
-12.21 -11.96 -11.31 -11.32 -11.79
R-square 0.161 0.200 0.228 0.228 0.275
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 8.  Tax share  dependent variable logit estimates:  home rule dummy
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Tax share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.2 -0.58 -0.86 -0.91 0.14
E-decentralization -0.063 *** -0.056 *** -0.070 *** -0.071 *** -0.060 ***
-3.14 -2.65 -3.94 -3.94 -3.44
fragmentation 1.53E-06 ** 1.65E-06 ** 1.30E-06 * 1.44E-06 * 7.97E-07
2.25 2.2 1.81 1.95 0.98
intergovgrants 0.082 *** 0.080 *** 0.101 *** 0.098 *** 0.096 ***
3.2 3.02 3.6 3.56 3.76
population -2.89E-09 -3.38E-09 * -4.72E-09 -1.16E-09 -8.57E-10
-1.59 -1.81 -0.35 -0.8 -0.62
msapop 3.09E-09 3.54E-09 * 3.61E-10 1.05E-09 8.31E-10
1.47 1.64 0.24 0.65 0.53
income 3.19E-07 1.64E-07 -3.06E-07 -3.21E-06 -2.61E-07
1.25 0.5 -0.71 -0.74 -0.64
unemployment 0.055 0.021 -0.043 -0.055 0.073
0.54 0.2 -0.37 -0.48 0.6
hr dummy -7.81E-04 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-0.34 -0.53 -0.92 -0.85 -0.47
democratvote 0.021 -0.001 0.000 -0.010
0.84 -0.03 0 -0.45
lawyers per capita 7.287 ** 6.058 ** 7.149 ***
2.47 2.2 2.73
incomevariance -3.026E-06 -3.04E-06
-1.7 -1.6
TEL -0.006 **
-2.62
_cons -2.185 *** -2.226 *** -2.107 *** -2.082 *** -2.13 ***
-14.25 -14.08 -13.11 -13.23 -13.28
R-square 0.145 0.156 0.235 0.221 0.287
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Chapter 5 
Home Rule in the State and Local Selection Model 
 
This chapter addresses the endogeneity of home rule status and resultant effects 
on the estimates of government size across home rule and Dillon’s Rule states.  The Wu-
Hausman test for exogeneity suggests that home rule is endogenous in the leviathan 
model.  This chapter presents and discusses results from two approaches that control for 
the existence of an endogenous regressor.  The results of both approaches, traditional 
instrumental variables estimation and Heckman’s self-selection method, indicate that 
home rule has a positive effect on government size.  The instrumental variables approach 
is standard in the literature; therefore, this chapter primarily discusses the self-selection 
method.  The two approaches use the same set of instruments to identify the estimating 
equations.  Later discussion in the chapter provides the intuition and justification for the 
instruments chosen.  Census data from the periods of 1990 and 2000 comprise the sample 
under observation. 
 
Home Rule and Self-selection 
States that view granting greater home rule power as the relaxing of a constraint 
on the size of state and local government conceptually conceive of a payoff reflected in 
the positive government size differential resulting from the choice of home rule over 
Dillon’s Rule.27  The present approach models this nature of endogeneity in the form of a 
self-selection problem.  At the constitutional stage, states select home rule to give more 
                                                 
27 Recall that Chapter 3 of this dissertation discusses factors associated with a gain in government size from 
greater home rule powers.  Refer to pages 48-50 for a review.  Recall at the constitutional stage that state 
and local government agents and citizens collectively decide on home rule. 
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autonomy to local governments, and greater budget-maximizing power under the local 
leviathan hypothesis, or alternatively select Dillon’s Rule to retain greater control and 
constrain the growth of the total state and local government sector.  A standard approach 
for correcting for a self-selection problem is Heckman’s two-step method (Heckman, 
1974; Lee, 1978; Duncan & Leigh, 1980).  Under the circumstances described above this 
method is intuitively more appealing than the traditional endogenous instrumental 
variables method because it allows the modeler to determine the precise nature of 
endogeneity.  Conceptually, modeling home rule status as a choice of state governments 
at the constitutional stage is a reasonable assumption, and using Heckman’s two-step 
method this study accounts for underlying demand factors that affect this choice while 
addressing endogeneity. 
 
 The Self-Selection Model 
 Maddala (1983) reviews numerous applications of the selection model.  The two-
stage, three-equation model forms the basis for each application.  One variety of this 
model applies to the current problem and consists of two regression equations that 
describe the behavior of the agents and a criterion function that determines which of these 
two equations in particular applies.  Lee (1978) applies this variation to the union-
nonunion wage problem.  He observes wages in the union and nonunion sectors and 
analyzes factors consistent with an individual’s decision to join a union or not to join.  
Controlling for self-selection, the precise nature of endogeneity of union choice, he finds 
that non-union wages are more responsive than union wages to factors typically 
associated with wage levels – experience, education, marital status, etc.  In a separate 
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problem, Sirmans, Sirmans, and Turnbull (1999) use the same application and examine 
returns on real estate investment for property owners who decide to self-manage a rental 
property and for property owners who decide to acquire the management services of a 
third-party professional management company.  A means-comparison shows that owner-
managed properties receive a higher return than third-party-managed properties, but 
controlling for the decision to self-manage or contract indicates that owner-managed 
properties would generate above-average returns regardless of whether or not they are 
owner-managed or third-party-managed.  In this case, the two-stage selection method 
removes the upward bias in the portion of the return attributed to owner-management of 
investment properties. 
  
Instrumental Variables for Home Rule:  Traditional IV and Self-Selection Models 
 This study employs the self-selection method to control for the underlying 
endogenous process associated with choosing home rule or Dillon’s Rule, and analyzes 
differences in determinants of government size for the two groups.  Recall the following 
government size equation from the empirical leviathan model 
Yi = bo + b1 Xi + b2 Hi  + ui,      (4) 
which denotes home rule as a regressor apart from the vector of all other regressors, Xi.   
Substitute for Hi the vector, Zi, which comprises the instruments for home rule in the self-
selection model and in the traditional IV approach.  The instruments are stateaid, 
populationvariance, and historical population change.  See Tables 8 and 9 for definitions 
and summary statistics of these and other variables included in both endogenous 
  
 71
correction approaches.  We get the following government size equation with Zi as the 
instrument for home rule 
 Yi = bo + b1 Xi + γ3 Zi  + ui.      (5) 
By assumption the Cov (Z,u) = 0, in order that Z meets the first of the two necessary 
conditions for a good instrument.  Previous theoretical and empirical studies of 
government size provide some indication that the instruments chosen are not correlated 
with the error.  The variable stateaid measures the share of local revenue comprising 
grants from state government.  The vector, Xi, includes a measure for the share of state 
expenditures spent in the form of grants to local governments in the state, intergovgrants.  
After controlling for intergovgrants, the instrument stateaid has no independent effect on 
government size.  The remaining instruments, populationvariance and historical 
population change, also do not have any expected effect on government size.  To ensure 
the second condition is met, the F-test indicates that Cov (Z,hr) ≠ 0.   
 
Traditional IV Results 
See Tables 11 and 12 for results of the traditional IV estimation of government 
size controlling for endogenous home rule.  The coefficient on the predicted home rule 
variable is significant and has the expected positive sign in the traditional IV models for 
the two dependent variable measures, Tax share and OSR share.  The coefficients of the 
remaining exogenous control variables are consistent with the results presented in 
Chapter 4.  The significant positive coefficient on home rule is evidence that home rule 
power relaxes a constraint on the size of the state and local government sector.  The next 
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section discusses the empirical model and results of estimation that corrects for self-
selection bias.    
 
Empirical Self-Selection Model for Home Rule 
First stage procedure and results 
This section presents the self-selection method and uses the vector of instruments, Zi, 
from equation (5) to control for the specific source of endogenous home rule, self-
selection.  
Let Hi be an unobservable home rule status variable such that if Hi > 0, state i selects 
home rule status; otherwise it does not.   
Structural Probit Equation (home rule choice): 
Hi = a0 + a2 Xi’ + a2Zi + a3(YHi – YDi) + εi    (6) 
where Zi is a vector of instruments for home rule, stateaid, populationvariance, and 
historical population change, that meets the necessary restrictions.  The vector, Xi’, 
contains only the government size determinants from the Leviathan model, discussed in 
Chapter 4 and restated in equation (4), that also affect home rule choice:  E-
decentralization, democratvote, and unemployment.  Equation (6) says that state socio-
economic trends and conditions and attitudes concerning the state-local intergovernment 
relationship and the role of the government sector affect the degree of home rule 
observed across localities in a state.  The variable (YHi – YDi) captures the government 
size differential between home rule and Dillon’s Rule.  Its coefficient, a3, measures the 
effect this difference has on the probability of choosing home rule.  The sign of this 
coefficient under the leviathan hypothesis depends upon whether home rule or Dillon’s 
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Rule leads to a larger public sector.  If home rule leads to a larger public sector then a 
positive sign for a3 indicates that states are more likely to choose home rule rather than 
Dillon’s Rule in order to increase the size of the government sector.  A negative sign for 
a3 indicates that states are more likely to choose Dillon’s Rule to restrain the size of the 
public sector.  Finally, the specification of the structural home rule equation includes a 
year dummy variable, year2000, to control for time fixed effects.  Other model 
specifications were tested, including a specification with a measure for tax and 
expenditure limitations; there were no significant differences in the results. 
Equations (7) and (8) are government size equations for home rule and Dillon’s 
Rule states separately.   
 Home rule regime: 
YHi = bHo + bH1 XHi + εHi      (7) 
Dillon’s Rule regime: 
YDi = bDo + bD1 XDi + εDi .      (8) 
The vectors XHi and XDi include the government size determinants discussed in the 
Leviathan model of Chapter 4, but here the sample is partitioned for home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule states respectively.   
 We do not observe the true values (YHi – YDi); therefore, we must obtain 
predicted values of (YHi – YDi).  First, estimate the reduced-form of equation (6), which 
includes all exogenous variables from the system of equations (6) – (8).  Obtain the 
predicted probit values from this reduced form estimation, and calculate the inverse mills 
ratios for the home rule and Dillon’s Rule subsamples.  The inverse mills ratios take the 
following forms:  φ(γ’Zi)/Ф(γ’Zi) and φ(γ’Zi)/[1-Ф(γ’Zi)] for the home rule and Dillon’s 
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Rule samples respectively, where φ( ) denotes the standard normal distribution and Ф( ) 
denotes the cumulative normal distribution function.  Substituting the appropriate inverse 
mills ratios into equations (7) and (8) provides the following first stage estimating 
equations: 
YHi = bHo + bH1 XHi – σHu WHi  +  ξHi for Hi = 1   (7’) 
 
YDi = bDo + bD1 XDi + σDu WDi  +  ξDi for Hi = 0   (8’) 
where WHi and WDi represent the inverse mills ratios for home rule and Dillon’s Rule 
respectively.  Look at the coefficients of the inverse mills ratios to determine the 
existence and effect of endogeneity bias from self-selection.  Suppose estimation yields a 
positive, significant mills ratio coefficient, σDu, in equation (5’).  This indicates a positive 
selectivity bias in the government size distribution for the Dillon’s Rule states.  Consider 
a sample of home rule and Dillon’s Rule states that could choose Dillon’s Rule.28  A 
positive, significant coefficient, σDu, indicates that the states actually choosing Dillon’s 
Rule have a larger government sector than the average state, whether home rule or 
Dillon’s Rule, under Dillon’s Rule.  In other words under the above scenario, had home 
rule states instead chosen Dillon’s Rule, they would have smaller government sectors 
than Dillon’s Rule states.   
The first stage estimates allow us to compare differences in exogenous effects 
across home rule and Dillon’s Rule states.  Looking at the empirical results in Tables 13 
and 14, see that the coefficient on the mills ratio in the Dillon’s Rule equation is positive 
and significant.  This result is evidence of the scenario described above.  If home rule 
                                                 
28 See Maddala (1983) based on the intuition of the hunter-fisherman earnings model of Roy (1951).  See 
Sirmans et al (1999) for more on the estimation and intuition applied in a model of owner-managed and 
third-party managed real estate assets and Duncan and Leigh (1980) for an application to wage 
determination for union and nonunion sectors. 
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states had chosen Dillon’s Rule, they would have smaller government sectors than 
Dillon’s Rule states.  At this point, one cannot conclude that home rule states would be 
smaller under Dillon’s Rule than they actually are under home rule because the 
coefficient on σHu is not significant.   
 The effect of E-decentralization is negative and significant in the home rule 
sample in the OSR share model and Tax share model.  It is not significant in the Dillon’s 
Rule sample in the OSR share model, but it is marginally significant in the Tax share 
model.  The effect of intergovgrants is positive and significant in both models for both 
samples.  The coefficient on fragmentation is positive in the Dillon’s Rule samples in 
both models, but it is not significant in the home rule samples.  The combined results for 
E-decentralization and fragmentation in the Dillon’s Rule samples suggests that fiscal 
structure differs between Dillon’s Rule and home rule states.  Decentralization does not 
have an impact in Dillon’s Rule states, and this result is evidence that local governments 
in Dillon’s Rule states have relatively little power to govern themselves.  In this case, 
decentralization is not effective, further evidence that traditional measures of fiscal 
decentralization do not explain differences in governing roles across centralized and 
decentralized government sectors.  This important result supports a primary motivation 
for this study.  Analyzing home rule power across states heightens our understanding of 
the role of institutions in the performance of the public sector. 
 The effect of urban density, MSApop, is negative and significant only in the OSR 
share model for the Dillon’s Rule sample.  The effect of population is positive and 
significant, also only in the OSR share model for the Dillon’s Rule sample.  This is weak 
evidence that government services exhibit decreasing average costs.   
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The effect of incomevariance is positive and significant in the Dillon’s Rule 
sample for both models, but it is negative in the home rule samples and only significant 
in the Tax share model.  This suggests that home rule power allows governments to meet 
the demands of a diverse electorate with greater efficiency. 
The coefficient on unemployment is positive and significant in both Dillon’s Rule 
models.  There is a direct relationship between government spending and unemployment 
in Dillon’s Rule states.  The direction of causality can not be determined in this study.  
There is a growing literature that examines the effect of government size on 
unemployment.  This dissertation does not address this issue.  See Feldman (2006) for a 
review of this literature and the latest empirical evidence. 
Lawyers per capita has little effect in either the home rule or Dillon’s Rule 
sample estimates.  Its coefficient is marginally significant, z-value (1.88), and positive in 
the home rule sample for Tax share.  The results in Chapter 4 revealed that lawyers per 
capita has a positive effect on the size of the public sector in the model with the Tax 
share dependent variable.   
The measure for ideology, democratvote, is negative and significant in the 
Dillon’s Rule sample estimates for both models.  The leviathan estimates of Chapter 4 
also revealed a negative effect on government size.  As discussed in Chapter 4, this result 
appears to be evidence against the general belief that democrats favor bigger government 
than republicans.  On the other hand, it may be evidence that largely democrat, Dillon’s 
Rule states are more successful in securing federal funds that partially offset state and 
local own source revenues.   
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Second stage procedure and results 
This section discusses the procedure and results of the second stage of the self-
selection correction method.  For the second stage, generate full-sample predicted 
estimates of government size under home rule and Dillon’s Rule.  Do not include the 
inverse mills ratios in this step because sample selection is not an issue when utilizing the 
full sample (Maddala, 1983, p. 237).  The selectivity-corrected estimation results in Table 
15. reveal a significant, positive difference between home rule and Dillon’s Rule 
compared to no significant difference without this correction.   
The full sample predicted estimates allow us to estimate the structural probit 
equation for home rule choice, equation (6).  Substitute these predicted values of (YHi – 
YDi) into equation (6) to obtain coefficient estimates of the estimated impact of the 
difference in government size between home rule and Dillon’s Rule, the second stage of 
the procedure.  This step is necessary for obtaining an estimable form of the structural 
probit equation, since we do not observe the true values of the difference in government 
size between home rule and Dillon’s Rule.  The structural probit estimation results are 
reported in Table 16.  The coefficient on the predicted (YHi – YDi) is positive and 
significant at 5% in the difference in tax share equation, indicating that the gain in tax 
share under home rule relative to Dillon’s Rule is positively correlated with the 
increasing probability of a state choosing home rule at the constitutional stage.  The sign 
is marginally significant in the model using the difference in own source revenue share. 
Of the remaining explanatory variables in the structural equation, the positive 
coefficient on population variance is the only effect significant at the 5% level.  It 
suggests that states with diverse population sizes across counties are more likely to 
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choose home rule.  In the OSR size difference model, the coefficients on E-
decentralization and unemployment are marginally significant and negative.  We expect 
decentralization and home rule to be positively correlated.  One reason for the inverse 
relationship may be that E-decentralization does not distinguish between categorical and 
block grants.  If categorical grants outweigh block grants in this measure of 
decentralization, then the result is not surprising.  The negative coefficient on 
unemployment is consistent with the first stage findings, which suggest high 
unemployment is a significant factor in the size of Dillon’s Rule states. 
Taken as a whole, the first and second stage results suggest that Dillon’s Rule 
appears to have a constraining effect on government size.  The first stage results reveal 
significant differences in the determinants of government size across home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule states.  The second stage results demonstrate that the probability of 
choosing home rule is positively affected by the gain in government size attributed to 
home rule power.  Together these results emphasize the importance of home rule as an 
institutional factor that affects the performance of the public sector.  Furthermore, the 
fiscal reforms that accompany greater home rule power do not come without costs.  The 
empirical evidence suggests that home rule powers allow governments to circumvent 
voters’ restrictions on government size; therefore, appropriate consideration of the costs 
and benefits of more or less home rule power should accompany any decision affecting 
home rule. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the effect of endogenous home rule self-selection in models 
explaining government size.  The leviathan hypothesis implies that states choose home 
rule status for local governments.  Citizens of the state, the electorate, and bureaucrats 
collectively determine the extent of home rule power available to localities.  The outcome 
of this constitutional stage collective decision becomes part of the framework under 
which political agents subsequently interact to determine in-period fiscal outcomes 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962).  Home rule or Dillon’s Rule becomes one of many binding 
rules that determine how political agents will conduct policy decisions in-period, after the 
rules of governing have been set.   
This choice of home rule or Dillon’s Rule depends on several factors that affect a 
state’s willingness to grant more or less local government control.  Behind a veil of 
ignorance concerning the future, states must weigh the expected costs and benefits 
associated with this choice.  Greater freedom to make decisions and meet the demands of 
a diverse electorate comes at a cost.  The differences in home rule power across the U.S. 
states suggests that states differ in their appetites for local discretion and, for example, in 
their desires to increase or decrease equity across local jurisdictions.  Using census data 
that controls for factors expected to influence the home rule decision, this chapter 
presented the first self-selection corrected estimates of home rule’s effect on government 
size. 
The traditional IV estimates and the self-selection corrected estimates reinforce 
the leviathan model results presented in Chapter 4; fiscal decentralization reduces 
government size and institutional factors matter.  The results from both methods of 
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endogeneity correction indicate that home rule has a positive effect on government size.  
On average, home rule localities use their greater fiscal, structural, and functional 
freedoms to expand the government sector.  The forces of interjurisdiction competition 
are not sufficiently strong to overshadow this effect.  Furthermore, the self-selection 
corrected estimates show that inherent differences in home rule and Dillon’s Rule states 
alter the effects of government structure and institutional factors.  Furthermore, the 
findings in this chapter suggest that future attempts to model institutional factors’ effects 
on government size will benefit from proper identification of underlying endogenous 
processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 81
Table 9.  Self-selection model variable definitions and sources  
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Taxshare
OSRshare
Leviathan Variables
Home rule
E-decentralization
OSR decentralization
Self-Selection Identification Variables 
Hrdummy Home rule dummy = 1 if weak, strong HR Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2006), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state and local tax revenues as share of personal 
income
state and local own source revenues as share of 
personal income
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2006), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
share of local own source revenue in total state 
and local own source revenue
Computed from Census of Governments
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
state population Census of Population
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
Unemployment
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Population
Intergovgrants
Fragmentation
Taxsize difference
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Incomevariance
OSRsize difference
Stateaid
Populationvariance
Historical population change
Difference in predicted tax size for Dillon's 
Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
Difference in predicted own source revenue 
size for Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
state population change from 1970 through 
2000
Historical Census of Population
share of state grants to localities in local 
revenues
Computed from Census of Governments
variance in average population across counties 
in state divided by state population
Computed by author from Census of Population
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Table 10.  Self-selection model summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Taxshare 94 0.101 0.011 0.067 0.141
OSRshare 94 0.130 0.012 0.101 0.166
Leviathan Variables
Home rule 94 2.681 1.018 1 4
OSR decentralization 94 0.412 0.076 0.2 0.545
E-decentralization 94 0.514 0.082 0.323 0.654
Fragmentation 94 1,829 1,500 119 6,835
Intergovgrants 94 0.246 0.060 0.089 0.411
Population 94 5,448,832 5,921,957 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 94 4,388,063 5,469,860 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 94 $29,465 $4,939 $20,136 $41,721
Incomevariance 94 1033 582 293 2808
Unemp 94 0.050 0.016 0.024 0.096
Democratvote 94 0.434 0.075 0.250 0.610
Lawyers per capita 94 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
TEL 94 0.404 0.493 0 1
Year2000 94 0.500 0.503 0 1
Self-Selection Identification Variables
Home rule dummy 94 0.574 0.497 0.000 1.000
Taxsize difference 94 0.019 0.010 -0.005 0.050
OSRsizedifference 94 0.022 0.012 0.003 0.065
Stateaid 94 0.352 0.072 0.125 0.554
Populationvariance 94 348887 512065 2 3127632
Historical population change 94 47.5 54.1 4.0 309.0  
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Table 11.  OSR share  dependent variable IV estimates
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
OSR share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 *
0.55 1.35 1.24 1.24 1.75
E-decentralization -0.08 *** -0.10 *** -0.108 *** -0.108 *** -0.092 ***
-3.53 -5.11 -5.25 -5.27 -4.57
fragmentation -1.57E-06 -2.56E-06 ** -2.41E-06 ** -2.41E-06 ** -2.28E-06 **
-1.21 -2.28 -2.17 -2.17 -2.14
intergovgrants 0.21 *** 0.24 *** 0.234 *** 0.234 *** 0.203 ***
4.04 5.64 5.65 5.65 5.38
population -3.95E-09 -3.02E-09 -1.89E-09 -1.92E-09 -1.63E-09
-1.5 -1.19 -0.79 -0.82 -0.72
msapop 3.95E-09 3.18E-09 1.95E-09 1.98E-09 1.76E-09
1.37 1.13 0.75 0.78 0.7
income -8.50E-07 ** -4.60E-07 -6.27E-07 -6.28E-07 -5.84E-07
-2.02 -1.06 -1.2 -1.19 -1.18
unemployment -0.03 0.04 0.015 0.014 0.093
-0.26 0.31 0.12 0.11 0.71
hr_hat 2.55E-02 ** 0.0340 *** 3.07E-02 *** 3.08E-02 *** 2.34E-02 **
2.09 3.33 3.27 3.31 2.6
democratvote -0.06 *** -0.071 *** -0.070 *** -0.073 ***
-2.93 -3.23 -3.22 -3.56
lawyers per capita 2.481 2.429 2.954
0.69 0.75 0.86
incomevariance -1.19E-07 -3.37E-07
-0.05 -0.15
TEL -0.004 *
-1.74
_cons -2.25 ** -2.31 ** -2.2 ** -2.20 ** -2.10 **
-8.43 -9.66 -10.51 -10.53 -9.95
R-square 0.205 0.275 0.282 0.282 0.304
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
marginal effects calculated using [b * g(xb)] except for dummy variables
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 12.  Tax share  dependent variable IV estimates
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Tax share mfx mfx mfx mfx mfx
year2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
-0.34 -0.37 -0.52 -0.56 0.21
E-decentralization -0.092 *** -0.092 *** -0.094 *** -0.096 *** -0.081 ***
-4.57 -4.6 -4.81 -4.84 -4.1
fragmentation -7.83E-07 -7.59E-07 -4.74E-07 -4.68E-07 -4.29E-07
-0.81 -0.78 -0.51 -0.5 -0.45
intergovgrants 0.195 *** 0.194 *** 0.186 *** 0.188 *** 0.162 ***
4.76 4.91 4.76 4.83 4.35
population -5.08E-09 ** -5.10E-09 ** -2.62E-09 -3.25E-09 * -2.43E-09
-2.55 -2.5 -1.59 -1.89 -1.5
msapop 5.20E-09 ** 5.21E-09 ** 2.54E-09 3.17E-09 * 2.42E-09
2.35 2.31 1.43 1.71 1.37
income -3.47E-08 -4.39E-08 -3.01E-07 -3.17E-07 -2.76E-07
-0.11 -0.13 -0.7 -0.74 -0.68
unemployment 0.014 0.012 -0.018 -0.029 0.069
0.14 0.12 -0.16 -0.27 0.6
hr_hat 3.36E-02 *** 3.34E-02 *** 2.63E-02 *** 2.76E-02 *** 1.96E-02 ***
3.42 3.71 3.44 3.61 2.66
democratvote 0.002 -0.010 -0.010 -0.015
0.07 -0.48 -0.46 -0.72
lawyers per capita 5.018 * 4.029 5.624 **
1.79 1.54 2.09
incomevariance -2.227E-06 -2.52E-06
-1.17 -1.23
TEL -0.005 **
-2.12
_cons -3.01 *** -3.01 *** -2.77 *** -2.79 *** -2.64 ***
-10.84 -11.13 -12.06 -12.38 -11.65
R-square 0.245 0.245 0.277 0.271 0.310
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
marginal effects calculated using [b * g(xb)] except for dummy variables
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 13.  Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples 
OSR share is dependent variable
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
OSR share mfx OSR share mfx
mills0 0.034 *** mills1 -0.006
5.43 -0.9
year2000 0.003 *** year2000 0.006
4.20 0.17
E-decentralization 0.004 E-decentralization -0.094 ***
0.15 -2.66
intergovgrants 0.079 *** intergovgrants 0.147 ***
2.78 2.94
fragmentation 2.27E-06 * fragmentation -1.16E-06
1.86 -1.01
MSApop -9.18E-09 MSApop -2.41E-09
-2.5 -0.73
population 6.33E-09 * population -2.69E-09
1.93 0.88
medhhincome 5.65E-07 medhhincome -5.49E-07
0.9 -0.73
incomevariance 4.74E-06 * incomevariance -2.49E-06
1.9 -0.68
unemployment 0.824 *** unemployment -0.019
3.33 -0.09
lawyers per capita -0.874 lawyers per capita 5.813
0.16 1.11
democratvote -0.115 *** democratvote -0.054
-4.93 -1.41
constant -3.000 *** constant -0.213 ***
-10.52 -8.59
R-square 0.574 0.229
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 14.  Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples 
Tax share is dependent variable
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
Tax share mfx Tax share mfx
mills0 0.024 *** mills1 0.003
2.89 0.48
year2000 0.010 * year2000 -0.020
1.67 -0.14
E-decentralization -0.047 * E-decentralization -0.055 **
-1.72 -2.35
intergovgrants 0.059 ** intergovgrants 0.111 ***
2.25 2.83
fragmentation 3.41E-06 *** fragmentation 5.23E-07
2.58 0.51
MSApop -3.18E-09 MSApop -2.22E-09
-0.96 -1.06
population 1.41E-09 population 1.96E-09
0.47 0.98
medhhincome 9.37E-07 * medhhincome -7.42E-08
1.87 -0.14
incomevariance 5.00E-06 ** incomevariance -5.23E-06 **
2.02 -2.17
unemployment 0.457 * unemployment 0.083
1.97 0.51
lawyers per capita -2.521 lawyers per capita 6.874 *
-0.44 1.88
democratvote -0.074 *** democratvote 0.007
-3.39 0.21
constant -0.024 *** constant -0.024 ***
-9.15 -12.64
R-square 0.474 0.300
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
(mfx) marginal effects in bold
z-values under marginal effects, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 15.  Testing selectivity-corrected government sizes under HR & DR
T-test
T-test 17.8
0.102 0.083
0.127 0.105
Difference in means is 21.28%
Mean predicted Taxshare  if home rule state Mean predicted Taxshare  if Dillon's Rule state
Mean predicted OSRshare  if home rule state Mean predicted OSRshare  if Dillon's Rule state
Difference in means is 22.80%
24.172
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Table 16.  Home rule structural pobit estimation
hrdummy Coefficients Coefficients
Robust s.e.'s Robust s.e.'s
OSR size difference 29.060 *
1.93
Tax size difference 48.477 **
2.1
democratvote 1.033 -1.389
0.38 -0.41
population variance 8.52E-07 ** 8.74E-07 **
1.96 1.96
Historical population change -0.003 -0.003
-1.13 -1.11
incomevariance 2.16E-05 1.96E-04
0.08 0.68
stateaid -1.970 -2.061
-0.96 -1.01
E-decentralization -2.207 -4.308 *
-1.08 -1.86
unemployment -21.785 -29.246 *
-1.35 -1.94
year2000 -0.562 -0.725
-1.06 -1.47
_cons 2.166 4.332 **
1.19 2.04
pseudo R2 0.145 0.151
*, ** significant at 10%, 5% respectively.
Huber-White robust standard errors.  
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Chapter 6 
Analyses of Separate Local and State Government Sectors 
 
 Home rule power directly affects local government decisions.  The aggregate 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 examined home rule’s impact on the size of the combined 
state and local government sector.  The results demonstrated that greater home rule 
powers for local governments contribute to a larger government sector, a result consistent 
with the leviathan hypothesis. 
 This chapter addresses home rule power’s effect on state government size and 
total local government size separately.  One perspective suggests that the size of the local 
government sector increases with greater home rule power, while the effect on the size of 
the state government sector remains ambiguous.  This prediction maintains that 
interjurisdiction competition is not strong enough to limit home rule power’s partial 
equilibrium effect on local government sector size.  The size of the state government 
sector may increase or decrease if local governments have greater home rule power 
because states do not necessarily lose powers as localities gain home rule powers.  The 
analysis in the previous chapters finds that greater home rule power increases the size of 
the combined state and local government sector, suggesting that greater home rule power 
increases local government sector size and that this effect dominates any negative effect 
on state government sector size.   
 The models in this chapter examine home rule’s impact at the state level and local 
level with and without home rule self-selection correction.  The local level and state level 
leviathan and self-selection models are similar to the models discussed in chapters four 
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and five; the level of observation, state or local, distinguishes the models.  The matrices 
of exogenous regressors are identical in the local level and state level leviathan models.  
Likewise, the independent variables in the self-selection models are identical for the local 
level and state level analyses.  See Tables 17 and 18 for definitions of variables and 
summary statistics for the leviathan models and Tables 23 and 24 for the self-selection 
models. 
 
Local Level and State Level Leviathan Models 
 This section discusses home rule’s impact on local government size and state 
government size using two alternative measures for both levels of analysis.  Local tax 
size measures the size of the local government sector as total local tax revenue divided by 
personal income in the state.  Local OSR size measures local government size as total 
local own source revenue as a share of personal income and defines own source revenue 
as tax revenue plus current charges, and omits interest income, special assessments, and 
the revenues raised from sales of government owned property.  State tax size measures 
the size of the state government sector as state tax revenue divided by personal income in 
the state.  State OSR size measures state government size as the share of state own source 
revenue divided by personal income.  The aggregate analysis of the local sector is a 
limitation of the study; however, it provides a benchmark for later studies examining 
home rule and local government size with municipal or county level data. 
The general fractional logit model describing local government size is as follows: 
si = f ( iij,wik, xil ) + ui       (9) 
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where 0 < s(.) < 1 = local tax size or local osr size as defined above.  The right hand side 
of equation (9) is identical to the right hand side of equation (3) in chapter 4.   
The following general fractional logit model describes state government size: 
Si = f ( iij,wik, xil ) + ui       (10) 
where 0 < S(.) < 1 = state tax size or state osr size as defined above.  The capital letter, S, 
denotes the state sector in equation (10).  The right hand side of equation (10) is identical 
to the right hand side of equation (3) in chapter 4 and equation (9) above. 
In each of equations (3), (9), and (10), the vector i consists of institutional 
variables:  home rule, TEL- measuring a composite of state tax and expenditure 
limitations and lawyers per capita.  The vector w includes fiscal variables:  E 
decentralization- decentralization measured as the share of local expenditures in total 
state and local spending, fragmentation- fragmentation as measured by the total number 
of local governments in a state, and intergovgrants- a measure of grants to local 
governments as a share of state expenditures.  The vector x comprises socio-economic 
and political variables:  income- median household income,  population, msapop- 
Metropolitan Statistical Area population, unemployment- unemployment rate for state, 
incomevariance- the variance of median household incomes across counties in a state, 
and democratvote- the percent of state population voting for democrat president in1992 
and 2000 elections, and u is a random error ~ N (0, σ2). 
 Table 19 reports the logit estimates for local OSR size, and Table 20 reports the 
estimates for local tax size.  Tables 21 and 22 report the logit estimates for state OSR size 
and state tax size respectively.  See Table 23 for a comparison of general results across 
the six models:  local, state, and state and local combined, each for own source revenue 
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and tax revenue separately.  The year dummy variable, year2000, has a positive 
coefficient in the local own source revenue model and in the state and local own source 
revenue model.  The sign is negative on year2000 in both state level models.  These 
results in combination with the negative effect of intergovgrants in the local models and 
positive effect in the state and combined models suggest that local governments have 
increased their reliance on alternative revenue sources, such as fees, from 1990 to 2000.    
The key variable, E-decentralization, carries the expected sign in the local and state 
models.  Greater decentralization from the state to the local sector increases the size of 
the local sector, decreases the size of the state sector but has a negative effect on the total 
sector.  The effect of the variable fragmentation is sensitive to model specification, 
consistent with the combined state and local results.  It has no impact in the state models 
but is significant in the local tax model; however, when controlling for tax and 
expenditure limitations, specification (10) in all models, fragmentation has no impact.   
 The socio-economic variables are generally insignificant in the separate local and 
state models.  This is consistent with the combined state and local model results and with 
the results of other studies (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  In the local tax 
revenue model population generally has a negative effect and msapop has a positive 
effect.  All other things equal, tax revenue as a share of personal income decreases in 
rural areas compared to urban areas.  One possible explanation for this result suggests 
that rural areas rely more heavily on other sources of income, such as intergovernmental 
grants funded by higher state tax revenue-generating urban counterparts. 
 The institutional variables have mixed results.  Democratvote is significant and 
negative in the local own source revenue model and in the combined state and local own 
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source revenue model.  This suggests that states having a dominant democrat ideology 
tend to rely less on fees and other alternative income sources, and because there is no 
impact in the tax revenue models, largely democrat states may receive a greater share of 
intergovernmental revenues from the federal government.  This outcome is consistent 
with the established flypaper effect of intergovernmental grants.  The sign on lawcap is 
positive and significant in the local own source revenue model, the state tax model, and 
the state and local tax model.  This is weak evidence that special interests use the legal 
system in a state to increase government regulation that imposes greater costs on local 
and state governments.  The positive sign in the local own source revenue model suggests 
that additional local fees result from special interest activity, such as development impact 
fees.  The positive sign in the state and combined state and local tax models suggests that 
special interest groups also encourage legislation that increases tax revenues for state and 
local governments.   
The negative effect of TEL in the local models is consistent with the results of the 
combined state and local models.  TEL has no significant impact in the state level models.  
Tax limitations tend to target local revenues, such as property taxes, more on the average 
than they target state revenues, possibly driving this result.  Finally, the coefficient on 
home rule is positive and significant in the local tax model and negative and significant in 
the state tax model.  Separately, these results suggest that local governments use greater 
home rule power to increase tax revenues relative to other own sources of revenue and 
that states reduce their tax revenues as local governments acquire greater taxing power. 
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Local Level and State Level Self-Selection Models 
 This analysis controls for home rule endogeneity and examines home rule’s 
impact on the size of separate state and local government sectors.  Similar to the previous 
section, we use two alternative measures of government size for both levels of analysis, 
local tax size and local OSR size for the local level, and state tax size and state OSR size 
for the state level.  The previous section defined all four measures.  For ease of reference 
see Tables 22 and 23 for state level and local level variable definitions and summary 
statistics respectively.  The model presentation takes the approach from Chapter 5, 
adapted for separate state and local level analyses.  The local tax size model follows 
below.  Replacing the local level dependent variable with the state level dependent 
variable gives the state level model.29   
The local government size equation from the empirical leviathan model is 
si = bo + b1 Xi + b2 Hi  + ui,      (11) 
which denotes home rule, Hi, as a regressor apart from the vector of all other regressors, 
Xi.  Lower case si denotes the size of the local government sector following the notation 
in the previous section.  Substitute for Hi the vector, Zi, which comprises the instruments 
for home rule in the self-selection model.  Identical to the model in Chapter 5, the 
instruments are stateaid, populationvariance, and historical population change.  The 
local level model employs the same data set for the regressors used in the combined state 
and local sector analysis; the dependent variable is unique to each level.  The government 
size equation with Zi as the instrument for home rule is 
 si = bo + b1 Xi + γ3 Zi  + ui.      (12) 
                                                 
29 Similarly, replacing the local tax size dependent variable with the local own source revenue measure 
yields the local osr model for self-selection. 
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By assumption the Cov (Z,u) = 0, in order that Z meets the first of the two necessary 
conditions for a good instrument.  Previous theoretical and empirical studies of 
government size provide some indication that the instruments chosen are not correlated 
with the error.  The variable stateaid measures the share of local revenue comprised of 
grants from state government.  The vector, Xi, includes a measure for the share of state 
expenditures spent in the form of grants to local governments in the state, intergovgrants.  
After controlling for intergovgrants, the instrument stateaid has no independent effect on 
government size.  The remaining instruments, populationvariance and historical 
population change, also do not have any expected effect on government size.  To ensure 
the second condition is met, the F-test indicates that Cov (Z,X) ≠ 0.   
Let Hi be an unobservable home rule status variable such that if Hi > 0, state i selects 
home rule status; otherwise it does not.   
Structural Probit Equation (home rule choice): 
Hi = a0 + a2 Xi + a2Zi + a3(sHi – sDi) – εi    (13) 
where Zi is a vector of instruments for home rule, stateaid, populationvariance, and 
historical population change, that meets the necessary restrictions.  The vector, Xi, 
contains only the government size determinants from the Leviathan model, discussed in 
Chapter 4 and the previous section and restated in equation (11), that also affect home 
rule choice, E-decentralization, democratvote, and unemployment.  The variable (sHi – 
sDi) captures the local government size differential between home rule and Dillon’s Rule.  
Its coefficient, a3, measures the effect this difference has on the probability of the state 
choosing home rule.  Under the leviathan hypothesis, we expect greater local government 
size under home rule and expect a positive sign on a3, indicating that states choose home 
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rule rather than Dillon’s Rule in order to increase the size of the local government sector.  
Finally, the specification of the structural home rule equation includes a year dummy 
variable, year2000. 
Equations (14) and (15) are local government size equations for home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule states separately.   
 Home rule regime: 
sHi = bHo + bH1 XHi + εHi      (14) 
Dillon’s Rule regime: 
sDi = bDo + bD1 XDi + εDi .      (15) 
The vectors XHi and XDi include the government size determinants discussed in the 
Leviathan model of Chapter 4, but here the sample is partitioned for home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule states respectively.   
 We do not observe the true values (sHi – sDi); therefore, we must obtain predicted 
values of (sHi – sDi).  Follow the approach outlined in Chapter 5 estimating the reduced 
form of equation (13), and obtain the inverse mills ratios for the home rule and Dillon’s 
Rule subsamples.  The inverse mills ratios take the usual forms:  φ(γ’Zi)/Ф(γ’Zi) and 
φ(γ’Zi)/[1-Ф(γ’Zi)] for the home rule and Dillon’s Rule samples respectively, where φ( ) 
denotes the standard normal distribution and Ф( ) denotes the cumulative normal 
distribution function.  Substituting the appropriate inverse mills ratios into equations (14) 
and (15) provides the following first stage estimating equations: 
sHi = bHo + bH1 XHi – σHu WHi  +  ξHi for Hi = 1   (14’) 
 
sDi = bDo + bD1 XDi + σDu WDi  +  ξDi for Hi = 0   (15’) 
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where WHi and WDi represent the inverse mills ratios for home rule and Dillon’s Rule 
respectively.  Look at the coefficients of the inverse mills ratios to determine the 
existence and effect of endogeneity bias from self-selection.   
 Tables 26 – 29 display results for the self-selection-corrected estimates of local 
tax size, local osr size, state tax size, and state osr size respectively.  Tables 30 and 31 
show structural probit estimates and predicted means for the local size models.  The mills 
ratio coefficients are not significant in the state level models; therefore, it is not 
meaningful to proceed with the second stage analysis for the state models.  One possible 
explanation for this is home rule has no effect on the size of the state government sector.  
Alternatively, home rule may impact the size of the state government sector indirectly, in 
which case the self-selection model for the state sector does not capture the specific 
relationship between home rule and state government sector size.  For ease of reference, 
Tables 32 – 34 show comparisons of the local level and combined state and local sector 
results.   
 The local level self-selection-correction yields estimates consistent with the 
results from the state and local level combined analyses.  The mills ratio coefficients are 
positive and significant in the Dillon’s Rule equations for the tax and own source revenue 
models as found in the combined sector analyses.  The local sector in Dillon’s Rule states 
is inherently larger than in home rule states.  States actually choosing Dillon’s Rule have 
a larger local government sector than the average state, whether home rule or Dillon’s 
Rule, under Dillon’s Rule.  The second stage results incorporate this information and 
yield predicted local government tax size estimates in home rule states of 4.5% of 
aggregate personal income and in Dillon’s Rule states 2.0% of aggregate personal 
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income.  The local own source revenue predicted size results show home rule states at 
5.2% of aggregate personal income and Dillon’s Rule states at 3.2% of aggregate 
personal income. 
 The coefficient on year2000 is positive and significant in the local and combined 
state and local first stage estimates for Dillon’s Rule states.  This result differs from the 
leviathan model results, which show that only own source revenue reliance increased 
over the decade.  It is not clear what specific events or policy changes over the period 
1990 to 2000 may have contributed to the increase in all own source revenues for 
Dillon’s Rule states. 
 The estimates show that decentralization has a similar effect on home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule states.  The local sector expands as responsibilities are pushed from the 
state to the local sector.  Intergovernmental grants partially supplant own source revenues 
in home rule and Dillon’s Rule states.  The fragmentation estimates are sensitive to 
specification.  These results are consistent with the previous analysis in this dissertation 
and with the findings of other studies of government size. 
 The estimation yields few significant estimates of the socio-economic variable 
coefficients.  This is also consistent with other studies.  The unemployment coefficients 
are positive in the Dillon’s Rule states for the local and combined state and local 
analyses.  It is not clear why unemployment only has a positive impact on the size of the 
local sector in Dillon’s Rule states.30
 The self-selection-corrected estimates show that lawyers per capita and the 
percentage of democrat votes for president are consistent with decreasing government 
                                                 
30 See Feldman (2006) for a list of studies that treat unemployment as an endogenous variable that increases 
with government size.  This dissertation did not consider unemployment as an endogenous variable.  
Removing the unemployment variable from the models did not significantly change any of the results. 
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size in Dillon’s Rule states.  The lawcap result is not consistent with the combined state 
and local self-selection model results.  The democratvote result is consistent with the 
combined level results. 
 The structural probit estimates in the local level analysis do not provide much 
additional insight into the underlying differences between home rule and Dillon’s Rule 
states.  The coefficient on the primary variable of interest, (sHi – sDi), is not significant in 
either local model.   However, the coefficient on unemployment is negative and 
significant in both models, and the coefficient on populationvariance is positive and 
significant.  The probability that states allow greater home rule power to localities 
increases as the state has greater variance across counties in terms of population size.  
This is what we would expect, and it is consistent with the argument that greater home 
rule power allows localities to better meet the demands of a more diverse group of 
constituents.  Greater unemployment reduces the probability that states allow greater 
home rule powers.  This result suggests that states with greater unemployment have a 
stronger preference for equalizing services across the state.   
  
Conclusion 
 This chapter analyzed the size of the local and state components of the 
government sector separately, with and without controlling for home rule endogeneity.  
The results reinforce the findings presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  Local government size 
increases as states grant greater discretionary authority.  Contrary to the effect of greater 
decentralization, greater home rule power does not translate into a smaller combined state 
and local government sector.  This important result highlights a key difference between 
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home rule and decentralization.  States that grant greater discretionary power to local 
governments do not necessarily reduce their own state-level governing powers.   
The three-level analysis of government sector size provides greater understanding 
of decentralization’s effects on government size.  Zax (1989) demonstrated that 
decentralization at the local level, between county and municipal levels, reduces the size 
of the local government sector.  The analysis in this chapter shows that the local sector 
size increases with greater state-to-local decentralization, even though the total sector size 
decreases.  The analysis in Chapter 8 provides a closer examination of county-municipal 
decentralization and home rule power and the effect on the size of the combined state and 
local government sector.  The next chapter examines additional institutional constraints in 
the form of eminent domain power and state budget stabilization funds and their effects 
on government size. 
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Table 17.  State and local Leviathan models variable definitions and sources
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Local OSR Size
State OSR Size
Local Tax Size
State Tax Size
Independent Variables
Home rule
E-decentralization
OSR decentralization
Population
Intergovgrants
Fragmentation
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
TEL
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Incomevariance
Unemployment
dummy variable for whether state has any type 
of tax or expenditure limitation on the state 
variable used in Skidmore (1999)
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
state population Census of Population
share of local own source revenue in total state 
and local own source revenue
Computed from Census of Governments
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2004), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
local tax revenues as share of personal income
state tax revenues as share of personal income
local own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
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Table 18.  Local and State Leviathan Models Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Local OSR Size 94 0.054 0.011 0.028 0.093
State OSR Size 94 0.077 0.013 0.052 0.108
Local Tax Size 94 0.039 0.012 0.018 0.096
State Tax Size 94 0.064 0.010 0.04 0.086
Independent Variables
Home rule 94 2.681 1.018 1 4
OSR decentralization 94 0.412 0.076 0.2 0.545
E-decentralization 94 0.514 0.082 0.323 0.654
Fragmentation 94 1,829 1,500 119 6,835
Intergovgrants 94 0.246 0.060 0.089 0.411
Population 94 5,448,832 5,921,957 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 94 4,388,063 5,469,860 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 94 $29,465 $4,939 $20,136 $41,721
Incomevariance 94 1033 582 293 2808
Unemp 94 0.050 0.016 0.024 0.096
Democratvote 94 0.434 0.075 0.250 0.610
Lawyers per capita 94 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
TEL 94 0.404 0.493 0 1
Year2000 94 0.500 0.503 0 1  
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Table 19.  Leviathan model logit estimates with Local OSR Size dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Local OSR Size Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
year2000 0.075 ** 0.031 0.055 * 0.166 *** 0.191 *** 0.183 *** 0.189 *** 0.251 ***
2.05 1.2 1.7 3.44 3.64 3.67 3.85 5.08
E-decentralization 2.503 *** 2.741 *** 2.635 *** 2.481 *** 2.507 *** 2.715 ***
7.4 7.74 7.43 7.23 7.33 8.41
osrdecentralization 2.650 *** 2.670 ***
14.77 15.31
fragmentation -5.720E-06 -4.040E-06 -1.670E-06 -9.170E-07 -3.650E-06 -6.400E-06 -9.140E-06 -1.940E-05 **
-0.6 -0.56 -0.22 -0.09 -0.42 -0.79 -1.11 -1.97
intergovgrants -1.582 *** 0.154 0.139 -1.752 *** -1.727 *** -1.535 *** -1.494 *** -1.592 ***
-3.33 0.64 0.59 -3.7 -3.84 -3.05 -2.95 -3.73
population 0.000 -2.81E-08 -3.08E-08 -4.15E-08 -3.18E-08 -6.96E-09 7.55E-09 4.00E-09
-1.3 -1.37 -1.41 -1.42 -1.12 -0.31 0.33 0.18
msapop 4.53E-08 2.90E-08 3.10E-08 4.59E-08 3.74E-08 9.42E-09 -5.33E-09 -4.63E-10
1.45 1.3 1.32 1.46 1.2 0.39 -0.22 -0.02
income -2.37E-06 -3.02E-06 -2.02E-06 1.08E-06 4.22E-06 -8.38E-07 -1.57E-07 1.15E-06
-0.64 -1.11 -0.73 0.3 0.96 -0.14 -0.03 0.22
unemployment 1.104 3.984 ** 4.647 *** 3.919 ** 4.202 ** 6.547 ***
1.1 2.56 2.9 2.33 2.47 3.71
home rule -0.007 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.017
-0.51 0.05 0.25 0.08 0.23 1.16
democratvote -0.425 -0.664 * -0.693 ** -0.860 ***
-1.26 -1.92 -2.06 -2.65
lawyers per capita 65.902 * 87.925 ** 83.902 **
1.68 2.09 2.41
incomevariance -0.0000545 ** -5.72E-05 **
-2.05 -2.13
TEL -0.116 ***
-3.52
_cons -3.728 *** -3.906 *** -3.987 *** -4.146 *** -4.069 *** -3.919 *** -3.985 *** -4.142 ***
-27.9 -39.58 -27.29 -17.2 -16.48 -14.84 -14.63 -16.44
R-square 0.458 0.711 0.716 0.482 0.493 0.524 0.534 0.594
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
Logit coefficients
z-values under logit coefficients, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 20.  Leviathan model logit estimates with Local Tax Size dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Local Tax Size Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
year2000 -0.012 -0.046 -0.065 0.011 0.023 0.015 0.019 0.095
-0.24 -1.15 -0.94 0.11 0.24 0.16 0.2 1.06
E-decentralization 2.007 *** 2.105 *** 2.055 *** 1.873 ** 1.898 ** 2.150 ***
3.32 2.93 2.68 2.5 2.51 2.98
osrdecentralization 2.433 *** 2.416 ***
7.1 6.4
fragmentation 0.000057 * 0.0000568 ** 0.000052 ** 0.0000545 ** 0.0000534 ** 0.000051 ** 0.0000489 ** 0.0000353
1.92 2.04 2.14 2.11 2.18 2.09 1.96 1.45
intergovgrants -2.588 *** -1.203 *** -1.100 *** -2.541 *** -2.529 *** -2.334 *** -2.298 *** -2.409 ***
-4.15 -3.62 -3.42 -3.6 -3.58 -3.08 -3.03 -3.55
population -1.43E-07 ** -1.43E-07 ** -1.32E-07 ** -1.33E-07 ** -1.28E-07 ** -1.04E-07 * -9.31E-08 -9.71E-08 *
-2.18 -2.18 -2.22 -2.26 -2.31 -1.88 -1.61 -1.7
msapop 1.56E-07 ** 1.51E-07 ** 1.38E-07 ** 1.44E-07 ** 1.40E-07 ** 1.13E-07 * 1.02E-07 1.08E-07 *
2.24 2.18 2.18 2.25 2.27 1.86 1.61 1.72
income 2.92E-06 1.49E-06 9.15E-07 3.54E-06 4.94E-06 -3.73E-07 1.36E-07 1.31E-06
0.36 0.19 0.1 0.36 0.54 -0.03 0.01 0.13
unemployment -0.878 1.003 1.287 0.551 0.741 3.602
-0.42 0.32 0.43 0.18 0.23 1.2
home rule 0.038 * 0.043 * 0.044 * 0.041 0.043 * 0.060 **
1.67 1.73 1.74 1.59 1.67 2.31
democratvote -0.189 -0.451 -0.475 -0.670
-0.43 -1.04 -1.11 -1.52
lawyers per capita 66.970 83.850 80.087
1.25 1.39 1.57
incomevariance -4.32E-05 -4.69E-05
-1.19 -1.31
TEL -0.142 ***
-2.86
_cons -3.719 *** -3.949 *** -4.001 *** -3.975 *** -3.939 *** -3.761 *** -3.811 *** -3.997 ***
-8.72 -10.38 -8.31 -6.09 -5.75 -5.47 -5.4 -5.97
R-square 0.305 0.447 0.458 0.323 0.323 0.339 0.342 0.386
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
Logit coefficients
z-values under logit coefficients, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 21.  Leviathan model logit estimates with State OSR Size dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
State OSR Size Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
year2000 -0.030 0.018 0.023 -0.092 -0.075 * -0.076 * -0.078 * -0.078 *
-1.21 0.92 0.82 -2.4 -1.71 -1.72 -1.77 -1.72
E-decentralization -2.540 *** -2.685 *** -2.795 *** -2.817 *** -2.817 *** -2.817 ***
-8.65 -10.6 -11.15 -11.48 -11.56 -11.18
osrdecentralization -2.132043 *** -2.129598 ***
-19.4 -19.73
fragmentation 7.81E-06 5.66E-06 6.16E-06 4.00E-06 1.54E-06 1.26E-06 2.02E-06 2.00E-06
0.73 0.65 0.7 0.41 0.16 0.13 0.21 0.2
intergovgrants 2.745 *** 0.853 *** 0.852 *** 2.842 *** 2.877 *** 2.907 *** 2.881 *** 2.881
8.15 4.98 5.07 9.1 8.96 8.95 8.77 8.7
population 5.85E-09 -7.33E-09 -7.57E-09 7.31E-09 1.62E-08 1.97E-08 1.58E-08 1.57E-08
0.28 -0.42 -0.45 0.38 0.84 1.01 0.78 0.76
msapop -1.22E-08 6.63E-09 6.66E-09 -1.09E-08 -1.90E-08 -2.29E-08 -1.89E-08 -1.89E-08
-0.57 0.35 0.36 -0.52 -0.91 -1.09 -0.87 -0.85
income -4.18E-06 -5.67E-06 -5.39E-06 * -7.02E-06 * -4.51E-06 -5.26E-06 -5.34E-06 -5.34E-06
-1.29 -2.25 -1.77 -1.82 -1.03 -1 -1.02 -1.02
unemployment 0.226 -2.700 -2.218 -2.336 -2.436 * -2.433 *
0.23 -2 -1.55 -1.61 -1.67 -1.71
home rule -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
-0.07 -0.26 -0.07 -0.08 -0.13 -0.12
democratvote -0.333 -0.363 -0.358 -0.358
-1.3 -1.45 -1.48 -1.49
lawyers per capita 9.537 2.736 2.739
0.39 0.1 0.1
incomevariance 0.0000172 0.0000172
0.75 0.75
TEL -0.000149
-0.01
_cons -1.723 -1.675 -1.696 -1.422 -1.351 -1.331 -1.315 -1.315
-16.51 -18.36 -11.63 -7.63 -7.65 -7.29 -7.09 -7.2
R-square 0.628 0.762 0.762 0.644 0.654 0.655 0.658 0.658
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
Logit coefficients
z-values under logit coefficients, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 22.  Leviathan model logit estimates with State Tax Size dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
State Tax Size Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
year2000 -0.057 *** -0.010 0.006 -0.105 *** -0.102 *** -0.108 *** -0.108 *** -0.106 ***
-2.65 -0.55 0.24 -3.05 -2.81 -2.94 -2.9 -2.76
E-decentralization -2.438 *** -2.552 *** -2.568 *** -2.659 *** -2.659 *** -2.655 ***
-9.25 -11.56 -11.43 -12.16 -12.12 -11.92
osrdecentralization -1.967 *** -1.968 ***
-17.16 -18.37
fragmentation 4.15E-07 -2.20E-06 1.43E-06 2.11E-09 -3.61E-07 -1.48E-06 -1.84E-06 -2.08E-06
0.05 -0.36 0.22 0 -0.05 -0.19 -0.23 -0.25
intergovgrants 3.050 *** 1.228 *** 1.169 *** 3.059 *** 3.064 *** 3.186 *** 3.199 *** 3.197 ***
9.8 6.93 6.57 10.41 10.42 11.32 11.15 11.04
population 9.32E-09 -4.04E-09 -9.86E-09 4.95E-09 6.28E-09 2.01E-08 2.20E-08 2.19E-08
0.53 -0.27 -0.68 0.3 0.36 1.21 1.35 1.33
msapop -1.39E-08 4.62E-09 1.03E-08 -6.78E-09 -7.99E-09 -2.36E-08 -2.55E-08 -2.53E-08
-0.74 0.28 0.64 -0.38 -0.43 -1.33 -1.46 -1.43
income -1.26E-06 -2.80E-06 -1.58E-06 -3.19E-06 -2.81E-06 -5.83E-06 -5.79E-06 -5.77E-06
-0.41 -1.11 -0.58 -0.88 -0.71 -1.23 -1.22 -1.22
unemployment 0.772 -2.081 * -2.006 -2.469 * -2.420 * -2.373 *
0.92 -1.7 -1.57 -1.92 -1.84 -1.82
home rule -0.020 ** -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.023 * -0.022 * -0.022 *
-2.33 -1.94 -1.88 -1.95 -1.93 -1.9
democratvote -0.051 -0.175 -0.178 -0.182
-0.29 -0.98 -0.99 -1.02
lawyers per capita 38.119 41.440 * 41.464 *
1.64 1.7 1.7
incomevariance -8.25E-06 -8.31E-06
-0.42 -0.42
TEL -0.003
-0.12
_cons -2.118 *** -2.096 *** -2.111 *** -1.824 *** -1.813 *** -1.731 *** -1.739 *** -1.742 ***
-20.28 -22.01 -15.64 -10.49 -10.4 -9.46 -9.28 -9.37
R-square 0.641 0.750 0.660 0.660 0.670 0.670 0.670 0.670
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
Logit coefficients
z-values under logit coefficients, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 23.  Comparison of Local, State, and State and Local Leviathan Model Results*
year2000 + -- -- +
E-decentralization + + -- -- -- --
osrdecentralization + + -- -- -- --
fragmentation -- a + b + f
intergovgrants -- -- + + + +
population --
msapop +
income
unemployment + -- c -- d
home rule + --
democratvote -- --
lawyers per capita + + e +
incomevariance --
TEL -- -- -- --
* General direction of coefficient effect across model specifications.
Left blank if variable generally insignificant across model specifications.
a.  Only significant in Model 8
b.  Not significant in Model 8
c.  Weakly significant
d.  Weakly significant
e.  Weakly significant
f.  Not significant in Model 8
S&L OSR S&L TaxLocal OSR Local Tax State OSR State Tax
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Table 24.  State and local self-selection models variable definitions and sources
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Local Tax Size
Local OSR Size
State Tax Size
State OSR Size
Leviathan Variables
Home rule
E-decentralization
OSR decentralization
Self-Selection Identification Variables 
Hrdummy Home rule dummy = 1 if weak, strong HR Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2004), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state tax revenues as share of personal income
state own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2004), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
share of local own source revenue in total state 
and local own source revenue
Computed from Census of Governments
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
state population Census of Population
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
Unemployment
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Population
Intergovgrants
Fragmentation
State Tax Size difference
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Incomevariance
State OSR Size difference
Difference in predicted state tax size for 
Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
Difference in predicted state own source 
revenue size for Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
local tax revenues as share of personal income Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
local own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Local Tax Size difference Difference in predicted local tax size for 
Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
Local OSR Size difference Difference in predicted local own source 
revenue size for Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
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Table 25.  State and local self-selection models summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Taxshare 94 0.101 0.011 0.067 0.141
OSRshare 94 0.130 0.012 0.101 0.166
Leviathan Variables
Home rule 94 2.681 1.018 1 4
OSR decentralization 94 0.412 0.076 0.2 0.545
E-decentralization 94 0.514 0.082 0.323 0.654
Fragmentation 94 1,829 1,500 119 6,835
Intergovgrants 94 0.246 0.060 0.089 0.411
Population 94 5,448,832 5,921,957 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 94 4,388,063 5,469,860 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 94 $29,465 $4,939 $20,136 $41,721
Incomevariance 94 1033 582 293 2808
Unemp 94 0.050 0.016 0.024 0.096
Democratvote 94 0.434 0.075 0.250 0.610
Lawyers per capita 94 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
TEL 94 0.404 0.493 0 1
Year2000 94 0.500 0.503 0 1
Self-Selection Identification Variables
Home rule dummy 94 0.574 0.497 0.000 1.000
Local Tax Size difference 94 0.025 0.007 0.006 0.044
Local OSR Size difference 94 0.020 0.011 -0.009 0.057
Stateaid 94 0.352 0.072 0.125 0.554
Populationvariance 94 348887 512065 2 3127632
Historical popution change 94 47.5 54.1 4.0 309.0  
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Table 26.  Local tax size  
Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
Local Tax Size Coefficient Local Tax Size Coefficient
mills0 0.664 *** mills1 0.200
3.08 1.27
year2000 0.459 *** year2000 0.070
3.51 0.69
E-decentralization 2.200 *** E-decentralization 1.570
4.72 1.04
intergovgrants -2.450 *** intergovgrants -1.730
-5.36 -1.19
fragmentation 0.0000325 fragmentation 4.60E-05
1.34 1.35
MSApop 3.71E-10 MSApop -2.60E-08
0 0
population -6.10E-09 population -2.60E-08
-0.09 -0.45
medhhincome 0.0000539 *** medhhincome -0.0000123
5 -0.88
incomevariance 0.0000994 incomevariance 4.34E-06
1.35 0.05
unemployment 16.570 *** unemployment 3.440
3.24 0.99
lawyers per capita -243.500 ** lawyers per capita 104.200
-2.39 1.46
democratvote -2.240 *** democratvote -0.988
-3.76 -1.13
constant -5.592 *** constant -3.196 ***
-8.44 -2.81
R-square 0.732 0.306
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
.44
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Table 27.  Local OSR size  
Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
Local OSR Size Coefficient Local OSR Size Coefficient
mills0 0.617 *** mills1 -0.058
3.96 0.85
year2000 0.586 *** year2000 0.109 *
5.45 1.82
E-decentralization 2.650 *** E-decentralization 3.280 ***
6.98 7.21
intergovgrants -1.180 ** intergovgrants -2.786 ***
-2.56 -3.9
fragmentation -1.42E-05 fragmentation -0.0000108
-0.73 -0.93
MSApop -1.01E-07 * MSApop -4.37E-08
-1.77 -1.52
population 8.25E-08 * population 5.03E-08 *
1.67 1.84
medhhincome 3.88E-05 *** medhhincome -9.52E-06
3.7 -1.41
incomevariance 3.17E-05 incomevariance -0.0000595 *
0.58 -1.81
unemployment 19.250 *** unemployment 1.806
4.54 0.84
lawyers per capita -137.800 * lawyers per capita 86.890 *
-1.69 1.87
democratvote -2.480 *** democratvote -0.102
-5 -0.3
constant -5.490 *** constant -3.970 ***
-10.7 -15.12
R-square 0.72 0.698
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
 
  
 112
Table 28.  State tax size  
Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
State Tax Size Coefficient State Tax Size Coefficient
mills0 0.017 mills1 0.006
0.18 0.13
year2000 -0.114 year2000 -0.079 *
-1.35 -1.77
E-decentralization -2.060 *** E-decentralization -2.747 ***
-5.66 -12.1
intergovgrants 2.580 *** intergovgrants 3.562 ***
7.52 12.14
fragmentation 3.25E-05 ** fragmentation -0.0000139
2 -1.46
MSApop -4.50E-08 MSApop -2.94E-08
-0.93 -1.44
population 2.26E-08 population 2.67E-08
0.54 1.37
medhhincome -1.89E-05 ** medhhincome 3.93E-06
-2.29 0.83
incomevariance -2.06E-06 incomevariance -0.0000452 *
-0.06 -1.81
unemployment 19.250 unemployment -0.621
-1.01 -0.4
lawyers per capita -137.800 lawyers per capita 32.990
1.59 1.12
democratvote -2.480 democratvote -0.326
0.62 -1.34
constant -5.490 *** constant -2.120 ***
-4.04 -9.87
R-square 0.746 0.723
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 29.  State OSR size  
Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
State OSR Size Coefficient State OSR Size Coefficient
mills0 0.019 mills1 -0.028
0.22 -0.47
year2000 -0.086 year2000 -0.043
-1.07 -0.72
E-decentralization -1.844 *** E-decentralization -3.318 ***
-5.63 -12.21
intergovgrants 1.972 *** intergovgrants 3.627 ***
6.68 9.32
fragmentation 0.0000388 *** fragmentation -9.00E-06
3.14 -0.71
MSApop -6.15E-08 MSApop -1.38E-08
-1.36 -0.47
population 3.50E-08 population 1.17E-08
0.88 0.43
medhhincome -1.89E-05 ** medhhincome 1.82E-06
-2.64 0.31
incomevariance 0.0000204 incomevariance -2.25E-06
0.6 -0.07
unemployment -3.163 unemployment -0.666
-0.96 -0.35
lawyers per capita 87.182 * lawyers per capita 9.032
1.83 0.22
democratvote 0.258 democratvote -0.702 **
1.01 -2.13
constant -1.640 *** constant -1.408 ***
-3.97 -6.29
R-square 0.794 0.718
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 30.  Home rule structural pobit estimation:  local size
hrdummy Coefficients Coefficients
Robust s.e.'s Robust s.e.'s
Local Tax size difference 29.502
1.15
Local OSR size difference 17.301
0.81
democratvote 3.471 2.257
1.48 0.8
population variance 9.16E-07 * 9.18E-07 *
1.9 1.89
Historical population change -0.001 -0.002
-0.39 -0.58
incomevariance 0.0000139 3.03E-05
0.05 0.12
stateaid -1.042 -0.604
-0.52 -0.26
E-decentralization -3.299 -3.455
-1.48 -1.48
unemployment -34.103 ** -29.956 **
-2.37 -1.97
year2000 -0.914 ** -0.873 *
-1.96 -1.75
_cons 1.952 2.555
0.96 1.34
pseudo R2 0.134 0.128
*, ** significant at 10%, 5% respectively.
Huber-White robust standard errors.
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Table 31.  Self-selection-corrected predicted mean shares
Mean predicted Local Tax size  if home rule state Mean predicted Local Tax size  if Dillon's Rule state
0.045 0.02
Difference in means is 121.9%
T-test 44.399
Mean predicted Local OSR size  if home rule state Mean predicted Local OSR size if Dillon's Rule state
0.052 0.032
Difference in means is 63.89%
T-test  23.009  
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Table 32.  Comparison of local and state & local self-selection 
Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples
n=40 Dillon's Rule, n=54 home rule
DR HR DR HR DR HR DR HR
mills 0.664 *** 0.200 0.617 *** -0.058 0.247 *** 0.025 0.304 *** -0.026
3.08 1.27 3.96 0.85 2.89 0.48 3.78 -0.48
year2000 0.459 *** 0.070 0.586 *** 0.109 * 0.110 * -0.006 0.225 *** 0.043
3.51 0.69 5.45 1.82 1.67 -0.14 3.35 0.8
E-decentralization 2.200 *** 1.570 2.650 *** 3.280 *** -0.494 * -0.555 ** -0.124 -0.826 ***
4.72 1.04 6.98 7.21 -1.72 -2.35 -0.44 -2.67
intergovgrants -2.450 *** -1.730 -1.180 ** -2.786 *** 0.612 ** 1.112 *** 0.931 *** 1.109 ***
-5.36 -1.19 -2.56 -3.9 2.25 2.83 2.97 2.84
fragmentation 0.0000325 4.60E-05 -1.42E-05 -1.08E-05 0.000 *** 5.23E-06 0.0000293 ** -8.23E-06
1.34 1.35 -0.73 -0.93 2.58 0.51 2.1 -1
MSApop 3.71E-10 -2.60E-08 -1.01E-07 * -4.37E-08 -3.32E-08 -2.22E-08 -2.33E-08 8.49E-09
0 0.44 -1.77 -1.52 -0.96 -1.06 -0.56 0.32
population -6.10E-09 -2.60E-08 8.25E-08 * 5.03E-08 * 1.47E-08 1.96E-08 5.26E-10 -5.17E-09
-0.09 -0.45 1.67 1.84 0.47 0.98 0.01 -0.21
medhhincome 0.0000539 *** -1.23E-05 3.88E-05 *** -9.52E-06 9.77E-06 * -7.42E-07 2.36E-06 -6.91E-06
5 -0.88 3.7 -1.41 1.87 -0.14 0.37 -1.2
incomevariance 0.0000994 4.34E-06 3.17E-05 -5.95E-05 * 0.0000521 ** -5.23E-05 ** 0.0001107 *** -8.30E-06
1.35 0.05 0.58 -1.81 2.02 -2.17 3.45 -0.26
unemployment 16.570 *** 3.440 19.250 *** 1.806 4.764 * 0.828 6.990 *** 0.786
3.24 0.99 4.54 0.84 1.97 0.51 2.62 0.47
lawyers per capita -243.500 ** 104.200 -137.800 * 86.890 * -26.295 68.755 * -47.703 38.603
-2.39 1.46 -1.69 1.87 -0.44 1.88 -0.79 0.98
democratvote -2.240 *** -0.988 -2.480 *** -0.102 -0.776 *** 0.075 -1.176 *** -0.519 *
-3.76 -1.13 -5 -0.3 -3.39 0.21 -3.89 -1.68
constant -5.592 *** -3.196 *** -5.490 *** -3.970 *** -2.532 *** -2.361 *** -2.141 *** -1.313 ***
-8.44 -2.81 -10.7 -15.12 -9.15 -12.64 -6.36 -6.98
R-square 0.732 0.306 0.72 0.698 0.474 0.300 0.586 0.238
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
OSR Size
State & Local
Tax Size OSR Size
Local
Tax Size
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Table 33.  Home rule structural pobit estimation:  local and s&l comparison
hrdummy Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients
Robust s.e.'s Robust s.e.'s Robust s.e.'s Robust s.e.'s
Local Tax size difference 29.502 29.060 *
1.15 1.93
Local OSR size difference 17.301 48.477 **
0.81 2.1
democratvote 3.471 2.257 1.033 -1.389
1.48 0.8 0.38 -0.41
population variance 9.16E-07 * 9.18E-07 * 8.52E-07 ** 8.74E-07 **
1.9 1.89 1.96 1.96
Historical population change -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
-0.39 -0.58 -1.13 -1.11
incomevariance 1.39E-05 3.03E-05 2.16E-05 1.96E-04
0.05 0.12 0.08 0.68
stateaid -1.042 -0.604 -1.970 -2.061
-0.52 -0.26 -0.96 -1.01
E-decentralization -3.299 -3.455 -2.207 -4.308 *
-1.48 -1.48 -1.08 -1.86
unemployment -34.103 ** -29.956 ** -21.785 * -29.246 *
-2.37 -1.97 -1.35 -1.94
year2000 -0.914 ** -0.873 * -0.562 -0.725
-1.96 -1.75 -1.06 -1.47
_cons 1.952 2.555 2.166 4.332 **
0.96 1.34 1.19 2.04
pseudo R2 0.134 0.128 0.145 0.151
*, ** significant at 10%, 5% respectively.
Huber-White robust standard errors.
Local State and Local 
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Table 34.  Comparison of local and s&l self-selection-corrected predicted mean shares
Local
State & Local
0.052 0.032
Difference in means is 63.89%
T-test  23.009
Difference in means is 121.9%
T-test 44.399
Mean predicted Local OSR size  if home rule state Mean predicted Local OSR size if Dillon's Rule state
Mean predicted Local Tax size  if home rule state Mean predicted Local Tax size  if Dillon's Rule state
0.045 0.02
Mean predicted Tax size  if home rule state Mean predicted Tax size  if Dillon's Rule state
0.102 0.083
Difference in means is 22.80%
Difference in means is 21.28%
T-test  24.172
T-test  17.8
0.127 0.105
Mean predicted OSR size  if home rule state Mean predicted OSR size  if Dillon's Rule state
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Chapter 7 
 
State Budget Stabilization Funds and 
Eminent Domain 
 
 
This chapter presents empirical analysis of two additional types of constitutional 
limitations on government powers, state budget stabilization funds and eminent domain 
practices.  The section on state budget stabilization funds extends the recent Wagner and 
Sobel (2006) study that finds weakly defined statutory state budget stabilization funds are 
positively correlated with tax and expenditure limitations.  Their study does not directly 
examine the effect of state budget stabilization funds on the size of the public sector.  
However, weakly defined statutory funds allow states greater flexibility to bypass 
revenue and spending constraints imposed by tax and expenditure limitations.  Under the 
leviathan hypothesis, states choose weakly defined funds in order to circumvent these 
limits and stronger constitutional funds to constrain leviathan power.  The empirical 
evidence in this chapter supports the leviathan hypothesis.  Constitutional state budget 
stabilization funds constrain the size of the public sector.   
The eminent domain section examines the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kelo v. New London (2005) to uphold government use of eminent domain to 
acquire land for transfer to private parties when it serves a broadly defined public purpose 
like economic development.  The empirical results are consistent with the Leviathan 
model; ceteris paribus, states that explicitly empower their local governments to use 
eminent domain for private economic development have larger government sectors than 
those that do not.  
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State Budget Stabilization Funds 
 Forty-four states currently utilize budget stabilization funds.  Only 10 of these 
states had budget stabilization funds in place before 1980.  Twenty states adopted their 
funds between 1981 and 1986.  Gold (1983) and Douglas and Gaddie (2001) advocate the 
conventional view that the recession of 1980-1982, and resulting fiscal crises for many 
states, lead to the increase in the adoption of budget stabilization funds in the early 
1980’s.  Wagner and Sobel (2006) present an alternative argument for the increase in 
fund adoption.  They note that tax and expenditure limitation laws are another fiscal 
phenomenon arising in the period from 1980 to 1982.  Since many of these laws have 
clauses requiring states to return some or all of a general fund surplus to citizens, state 
budget stabilization funds provide a way for states to retain their surpluses. 
 Every state except Vermont has some form of balanced budget rule; however in 
almost all cases these rules are written in stock rather than flow terms (Wagner & Sobel, 
2006).  If only the stock of funds must balance, states can run annual deficits financed by 
drawing down general fund surpluses from previous periods.  Following this logic, only a 
budget stabilization fund with stricter deposit and withdrawal rules than provided for in 
the general fund surplus would better prepare a state for upcoming fiscal downturns.  
This reasoning implies that strict constraints should govern state budget stabilization 
funds; however, Wagner and Sobel (2006) find that 38 of 44 funds are statutory funds 
(which they show are generally less constrained than constitutional funds) and the 
majority of these funds are no more constraining than requirements for deposit and 
withdrawal of general fund surpluses.  State legislators have more flexibility in designing 
statutory funds (they impose these on themselves) than they would in designing 
  
 121
constitutional funds, which citizens typically impose on legislatures through a successful 
voter referendum or citizen initiative.    
 Wagner and Sobel (2006) empirically test the hypothesis that some states created 
budget stabilization funds, or “rainy day” funds, to circumvent tax and expenditure 
limitation laws rather than to safeguard states from future fiscal crises similar to those 
experienced during the 1980-1982 recession.  They use a discrete dependent variable 
with three possible values that represent whether a state has a constitutional budget 
stabilization fund, a statutory fund, or no fund.  They expect to find tax and expenditure 
limitation variables, or TEL’s, significantly correlated with the adoption of statutory 
funds but not correlated with the adoption of constitutional funds.  They find that each of 
four indicator variables representing the existence of a TEL is positively correlated with 
the probability of adopting a statutory fund but not significantly correlated with the 
probability of adopting a constitutional fund.  Furthermore, their results indicate that the 
presence of a TEL that restricts the usage of general fund surpluses strongly influences 
statutory fund adoption. 
 
Empirical Budget Stabilization Fund Model  
 The leviathan models of Chapters 4 and 6, adjusted to include controls for 
constitutional or statutory state budget stabilization funds, provide a simple test of the 
hypothesis that constitutional funds constrain government size and statutory funds will 
not.  Two variables capture the effect of the funds.  The variable, constitutional fund, is a 
binary variable equal to one if a state has a constitutional fund.  The states of Colorado, 
Delaware, Maryland, Oklahoma, and South Carolina have constitutional funds.  The 
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variable, weaker fund, is equal to one if a state has a constitutional fund or a strictly 
defined statutory fund.31   This variable includes Arizona, Indiana, and Michigan in 
addition to the above states.  Define a strict statutory fund as one with strict deposit and 
withdrawal requirements.  Using the 1-4 scale from Wagner and Sobel (2006), this 
includes statutory funds categorized with a ranking of 4 for withdrawal and deposit 
requirements.  The analysis examines the effect of the funds on the state and local 
combined sector and on the local sector only.  The matrices of exogenous regressors are 
identical in the local level and state and local level leviathan models.  See Tables 35 and 
36 for definitions of variables and summary statistics for the models. 
 Consider the same general fractional logit model describing government size 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 6.  The present models estimate the effect of the funds on the 
size of the state and local sector and the local sector separately.  The dependent variables 
are s&l tax size, s&l osr size, local tax size, and local osr size in separate specifications.   
si = f (rij, iij, wik, xil ) + ui       (16) 
where 0 < s(.) < 1 equals s&l tax size, s&l osr size, local tax size, or local osr size as 
defined above.   
As in Chapter 4, equation (3), the vector i consists of institutional variables:  home 
rule, TEL- measuring a composite of state tax and expenditure limitations, and lawyers 
per capita.  The vector w includes fiscal variables:  E decentralization- decentralization 
measured as the share of local expenditures in total state and local spending, 
fragmentation- fragmentation as measured by the total number of local governments in a 
state, and intergovgrants- a measure of grants to local governments as a share of state 
                                                 
31 A strictly defined statutory fund is one that has strict deposit and withdrawal rules as defined in Wagner 
and Sobel (2006). 
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expenditures.  The vector x comprises socio-economic and political variables:  income- 
median household income,  population, msapop- Metropolitan Statistical Area 
population, unemployment- unemployment rate for state, incomevariance- the variance of 
median household incomes across counties in a state, and democratvote- the percent of 
state population voting for democrat president in1992 and 2000 elections.  The vector r is 
new in the models of this section and contains the observations for either constitutional 
fund or weaker fund, and u is a random error ~ N (0, σ2). 
 Table 37 reports the logit estimates for s&l tax size, s&l osr size, local tax size, 
and local osr size.  The results of Chapters 4 and 6 are robust to the addition of either 
measure of constitutional or weaker state budget stabilization funds.  The coefficient on 
constitutional fund is negative and significant in the s&l tax size and local tax size 
models.  The coefficient on weaker fund is not significant.  This suggests that 
constitutional stabilization funds have a constraining effect on the size of the government 
sector, but the weaker strict statutory funds have no effect on government size.  Only the 
models using tax revenue to measure government size capture the negative effect of 
constitutional funds.  The funds have no effect in the own source revenue models.  
Additionally, there is no effect on the size of the state government sector.32  These results 
are consistent with intuition.  Tax and expenditure limit laws are generally associated 
with local sources of tax revenue, such as the property tax, and the argument set forth in 
Wagner and Sobel (2006) suggests that citizens approve constitutional funds to constrain 
the use of tax revenue surpluses.  The results here provide additional evidence for this 
argument and for the leviathan hypothesis in general. 
 
                                                 
32 The state level model results are not presented.   
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Eminent Domain for Private Economic Development 
Eminent domain practices vary across states.  The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution grants, among other things, eminent domain power in but a few general 
words:  “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision Kelo v. City of New London (2005) upholds 
government use of eminent domain to acquire land for transfer to private parties when it 
serves a broadly defined public purpose like increasing the tax base or creating jobs.     
 The use of eminent domain for private economic development, upheld under the 
public purpose doctrine, raises questions about whether the practice actually serves the 
interests of the public in a broad sense. One question concerns the appropriate size and 
scope of the public sector. According to the broad public purpose doctrine expressed in 
Kelo, it is appropriate to use eminent domain in order to increase the local tax base. Local 
governments often point to the anticipated increase in tax revenues when trying to sell 
controversial eminent domain plans to the public. The question then becomes, what do 
state and local governments do with the proceeds from this larger tax base? Do they 
reduce the taxes on other residents or do the proceeds stay in the public sector? The 
question is whether the Supreme Court's current public purpose doctrine expressed in 
Kelo simply gives state and local governments a tool to pursue efficient economic 
development or if it just opens another channel through which state and local leviathans 
can expand their command over resources in the economy. 
This section examines the empirical relationship between the eminent domain for 
private development allowed by the public purpose doctrine and the leviathan hypothesis 
of Brennan and Buchanan (1980). The question is whether the current expansive public 
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purpose doctrine articulated in the Kelo decision eliminates an effective constitutional 
constraint on government size. Or, are the combined effects of fiscal decentralization and 
horizontal competition able to hold the state and local leviathans in check regardless of 
whether or not they enjoy the broad eminent domain powers affirmed in Kelo? 
The empirical results show that states that expressly grant broad eminent domain 
powers to local governments for private development purposes also tend to have larger 
public sectors than those that do not. Regardless of the net benefits from public support of 
private economic development, governments appear to exploit their eminent domain 
powers to promote greater public sector expansion, whether measured by the size of the 
combined state and local sector, individual state governments, or local governments.  
Tables 38-40indicate the empirical specifications for each of the models. The 
dependent variables follow the forms discussed in Chapters 4, 6, and 7. These variables 
are constructed for state and local governments combined as well as state and local 
governments separately.  The variable of main interest, Eminent Domain, is a dummy 
variable indicating a state whose constitution or legislation explicitly empowers local 
governments to use eminent domain for private development projects.  We surveyed state 
approaches to Kelo-type eminent domain in 2000 to construct this variable.  The Eminent 
Domain variable takes a value of one for Connecticut, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, and New York and zero for all other states in the sample.  
A positive coefficient on the Eminent Domain variable indicates that granting 
such power opens another channel for local leviathans to exploit expanded tax bases to 
grow the relative size of government.  A negative coefficient contradicts the leviathan 
model.  We suspect that our estimates of this coefficient might be biased toward zero 
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because many local governments are free to use Kelo-type eminent domain in some states 
that have not adopted a constitutional or legislative stance on the question.  This suggests 
that the empirical test is biased against the leviathan hypothesis. 
 We do not include an indicator for states explicitly prohibiting expansive eminent 
domain powers for local governments in the models reported here.  These states adopted 
their current legal stances toward eminent domain between the years 1957 and 1985, with 
the later adoptions possibly too recent to affect the public sector size in the sample 
period.  Still, one might argue that a state that recently adopted a narrower view of 
eminent domain might have been really harboring the narrow view even during earlier 
decades, possibly placing informal constraints of some sort on local governments inclined 
to follow the more expansive doctrine (although we are not sure what form such 
constraints might take).  In our preliminary empirical analysis we included a variable for 
those states that expressly forbid Kelo-type eminent domain to see if this was the case. 
The variable coefficient was always insignificant.  A later version of this model controls 
for endogeneity of eminent domain using instrumental variables.  The results do not 
change significantly. 
 
Combined state and local size effects 
Table 38 reports the logit estimates for models using relative size measures that 
aggregate each state and its local governments. Two versions of each model are reported, 
one using the own source revenue and the other the expenditure based measure of 
decentralization. The first two models in Table 38 measure government size in terms of 
tax revenues. The last two measure government size in terms of own source revenues.  
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The results of the independent variable included in the models of the previous 
chapters are robust to the addition of the eminent domain variable.  The Eminent Domain 
coefficient estimates are significantly positive in models (1) and (2) revealing that states 
that expressly allow eminent domain for private development also tend to enjoy greater 
tax revenues.  The estimates are also positive in models (3) and (4), although the 
significance is lower in model (4) using the expenditures-based measure of government 
decentralization. Still, the results indicate that states that have explicitly embraced the 
broad public purpose doctrine tend to have larger state and local public sectors than their 
counterparts that have not.  These Eminent Domain results are consistent with the 
evidence of leviathans seen in the decentralization estimates.  The broad public purpose 
doctrine appears to open another channel through which state and local leviathans can 
draw more resources into the public sphere.  
 
Separate state and local size effects 
It is also possible that eminent domain effects on government size may differ for 
state and local sectors.  For example, state governments rely more on income and sales 
taxes than they do on the property tax.  If the private development creates employment 
and income growth, state income tax revenues will increase.  If it generates increased 
retail trade, sales tax revenue will increase.  For local governments, on the other hand, 
sales and property taxes are the dominant sources of revenue.  If new private 
development expands these tax bases, local revenue will increase.  If local governments 
also award significant tax breaks to lure the new private development, however, local tax 
revenues may not increase significantly.  
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Table 39 reports the logit estimates for the separate state and local government 
size measures in terms of tax revenues while Table 40 reports the estimates for 
government size measures based on own source revenues.  Most of the parameter 
estimates resemble what we would expect in light of the pooled state and local results in 
Table 38.  Focusing on the Eminent Domain variable, the effect on state government size 
is similar to the pooled effect.  The estimated effect on the size of local governments is 
sensitive to specification.  At face value the estimates suggest that eminent domain 
powers at the local level appear to shift tax revenues from one locale to another (although 
recall that the eminent domain coefficient estimates are biased towards zero).  Coupled 
with the significant expansionary eminent domain effect at the state level, these results 
are consistent with the notion that the type of private development supported by the 
exercise of eminent domain shifts property from residential or agricultural uses into 
categories that raise state government revenues.  For example, removing modest 
residential or agricultural land from the tax base and substituting industrial, office, or 
retail property, shifts the land into uses that generate greater sales and income tax 
revenues, most of which accrue to states, not local governments.  At the same time, 
though, we are not able to determine whether the estimates for local governments reflect 
the inability of local leviathans to fully exploit the advantages of using eminent domain to 
expand their reach or whether it reflects the offsetting effects of attendant local tax 
abatements or other fiscal inducements sometimes offered to private developers.  
This section examined whether allowing eminent domain for private economic 
development purposes has any effect on the size of state and local governments.  The 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. New London solidifies an expansive public 
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purpose doctrine that has gradually replaced narrower interpretations of the public use 
clause in the Fifth Amendment.  The decision eliminates the federal constitution as a 
constraint on government eminent domain powers, instead relying on individual states to 
adopt their own explicit prohibitions if they are so inclined.  The Leviathan model 
predicts that states that allow their local governments broad eminent domain powers will 
have larger public sectors than those that do not. 
We identified the states whose constitutions or legislation expressly empower 
local governments to exercise eminent domain for private development purposes.  These 
states generally have larger public sectors, results that are consistent with Brennan and 
Buchanan’s (1980) leviathan hypothesis.  The effect of broad eminent domain powers on 
state governments resembles that for combined state and local governments.  The effect 
on the size of the local public sector varies across model specifications, ranging from no 
effect to effects resembling the state and combined state and local results.  Taking these 
results together, it appears that--regardless of their usefulness in economic development 
programs--broad eminent domain powers also open an additional channel through which 
state and local leviathans can increase their command over resources in the economy.  
The empirical results indicate that, in terms of Kelo v. Leviathan, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision was decidedly in favor of Leviathan.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presented empirical results from two studies of institutional factors 
and their effects on government size.  States have great latitude in choosing among 
varying degrees of constraint within budget stabilization funds, and states likewise are 
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free to determine how they interpret constitutional law regarding eminent domain power.  
These two studies test the hypothesis that these particular institutional choices have 
consequences for the size of the public sector.   
The first study in this chapter extended research on state budget stabilization 
funds presented in Wagner and Sobel (2006).  Their original hypothesis proposes that 
some states created budget stabilization funds, or “rainy day” funds, to circumvent tax 
and expenditure limitation laws rather than to safeguard states from fiscal uncertainty.  
The findings from their empirical investigation support this hypothesis; the use of weakly 
defined statutory budget stabilization funds, rather than strict statutory funds or 
constitutional funds, is strongly correlated with tax and expenditure limit laws. 
In particular, the presence of a TEL that restricts the usage of general fund surpluses 
strongly influences statutory fund adoption.  This chapter tests the hypothesis that strict 
constitutional funds effectively constrain government size.  The empirical results support 
this hypothesis;  states that have constitutional budget stabilization funds tends to have 
smaller government sectors. 
 The second part of this chapter examines the Kelo (2005) decision, which upholds 
government use of eminent domain to acquire land for transfer to private parties when it 
serves a broadly defined public purpose like economic development.  This empirical 
study tests the hypothesis that the broad public purpose doctrine in Kelo effectively 
removes one potential constitutional constraint on state and local governments.  The 
empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis.  States that explicitly empower their 
local governments to use eminent domain for private economic development have larger 
public sectors than those that do not. 
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Table 35.  State budget stabilization funds and eminent domain
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Local OSR Size
State OSR Size
S&L OSR Size
Local Tax Size
State Tax Size
S&L Tax Size
Independent Variables
E-decentralization
Home rule
Weaker fund
state expressly allows eminent domain for 
private economic development
Compiled by author
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Constitutional fund denotes state has constitutional state budget 
stabilization fund
Variable obtained from Wagner and Sobel (2006)
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
local tax revenues as share of personal income
state and local own source revenues as share of 
personal income
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2004), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
state population Census of Population
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
Compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
Incomevariance
Unemployment
dummy variable for whether state has any type 
of tax or expenditure limitation on the state 
Variable used in Skidmore (1999)
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
Population
Intergovgrants
Fragmentation
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
TEL
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Eminent Domain
denotes state has either constitutional state 
budget stabilization fund or a strict statutory 
fund
variable obtained from Wagner and Sobel (2006)
local own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state tax revenues as share of personal income Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
state and local own source revenues as share of 
personal income
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Table 36.  State budget stabilization funds and eminent domain
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Local OSR Size 94 0.054 0.011 0.028 0.093
State OSR Size 94 0.077 0.013 0.052 0.108
S&L OSR Size 94 0.130 0.012 0.067 0.141
Local Tax Size 94 0.039 0.012 0.018 0.096
State Tax Size 94 0.064 0.010 0.04 0.086
S&LTax Size 94 0.130 0.012 0.101 0.166
Independent Variables
Constitutional Fund 94 0.106 0.310 0 1
Weaker Fund 94 0.170 0.378 0 1
Eminent Domain 94 0.149 0.358 0 1
E-decentralization 94 0.514 0.082 0.323 0.654
Fragmentation 94 1,829 1,500 119 6,835
Intergovgrants 94 0.246 0.060 0.089 0.411
Population 94 5,448,832 5,921,957 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 94 4,388,063 5,469,860 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 94 $29,465 $4,939 $20,136 $41,721
Incomevariance 94 1033 582 293 2808
Unemp 94 0.050 0.016 0.024 0.096
Democratvote 94 0.434 0.075 0.250 0.610
Lawyers per capita 94 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005
Home rule 94 2.681 1.018 1 4
TEL 94 0.404 0.493 0 1
Year2000 94 0.500 0.503 0 1
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Table 37.  State budget stabilization fund coefficient estimates
Dependent Variable S&L Tax Size S&L Tax Size Local Tax Size S&L OSR Size S&L OSR Size Local OSR Size
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constitutional Fund -0.065 ** -2.130 *** -0.223 *** 0.005 -0.019
-2.09 -13.05 -2.69 0.17 -0.29
Weaker Fund -0.008 0.007
-0.31 0.29
E-decentralization -0.682 *** -0.622 *** 1.951 *** -0.539 *** -0.542 *** 2.699 ***
-3.93 -3.54 2.74 -3.34 -3.35 8.39
fragmentation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.86 1.04 1.31 -0.94 -0.95 -2.04
intergovgrants 0.957 *** 0.968 *** -2.414 *** 1.052 *** 1.048 *** -1.593 ***
3.71 3.68 -3.64 4.88 4.84 -3.73
population -6.59E-09 -9.99E-09 -8.73E-08 3.27E-09 3.36E-09 4.80E-09
-0.49 -0.7 -1.61 0.21 0.22 0.21
msapop 5.88E-09 9.68E-09 9.59E-08 -2.75E-09 -2.79E-09 -1.44E-09
0.39 0.61 1.62 -0.16 -0.16 -0.06
income -3.09E-06 -2.63E-06 -4.87E-07 -4.23E-06 -4.32E-06 9.81E-07
-0.78 -0.64 -0.05 -1.08 -1.1 0.18
unemployment -0.090 0.561 1.084 1.198 1.208 6.332 ***
-0.07 0.45 0.35 1.04 1.06 3.
home rule -0.009 -0.009 0.062 ** 0.005 0.005 0.017
-0.79 -0.85 2.4 0.55 0.56 1.17
democratvote -0.116 -0.092 -0.717 -0.568 *** -0.571 *** -0.865 ***
-0.54 -0.43 -1.64 -3.29 -3.3 -2.65
lawyers per capita 76.359 *** 71.127 ** 95.918 * 38.903 39.603 85.495 **
2.91 2.64 1.88 1.44 1.48 2.33
incomevariance -1.44E-05 -2.68E-05 1.03E-05 -9.98E-06 -1.03E-05 -5.26E-05 *
-0.78 -1.37 0.25 -0.56 -0.58 -1.8
TEL -0.049 ** -0.057 ** -0.110 ** -0.054 ** -0.055 ** -0.113 ***
-2.07 -2.31 -2.25 -2.39 -2.38 -3.35
year2000 -0.015 0.000 0.038 0.062 * 0.062 * 0.246 ***
-0.45 0 0.42 1.85 1.85 4.8
_cons -2.057 *** -3.755 *** -1.676 *** -1.673 *** -4.121 ***
-12.32 -5.5 -11.36 -11.74 -16.18
R-square 0.310 0.291 0.410 0.276 0.276 0.594
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under marginal effects, calculated using Huber-White robust standard errors
48
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 134
Table 38
Logit estimates for state and local sector dependent variables S&L Tax Size and S&L OSR Size
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE S&L Tax Size S&L Tax Size S&L OSR Size S&L OSR Size
Independent Variables
Eminent Domain 0.08** 0.08** 0.07** 0.07*
(2.20) (2.03) (1.97) (1.80)
OSR Decentralization -0.27* _ -0.34*** _
-(1.87) -(2.58)
Exp Decentralization _ -0.53*** _ -0.61***
-(2.62) -(3.48)
Fragmentation 1.10E-05 1.27E-05* -0.00000874 -0.00000686
(1.49) (1.72) -(1.29) -(1.03)
Grants 0.29578 0.71** 0.52*** 0.99***
(1.33) (2.47) (2.76) (4.17)
Home Rule -0.01817 -0.01794 -0.00558 -0.00539
-(1.47) -(1.46) -(0.59) -(0.57)
Urban   4.29E-08 3.89E-08* 1.37E-08 9.44E-09
(2.10) (1.93) (0.69) (0.49)
Population -3.99E-08** -3.6E-08** -1.01E-08 -6.27E-09
-(2.20) -(2.06) -(0.57) -(0.37)
Med Income -5.77E-07 0.000000106 -0.00000497 -0.00000428
-(0.17) (0.03) -(1.46) -(1.26)
Unemployment 0.57504 0.56297 -0.60408 -0.60970
(0.85) (0.83) -(0.93) -(0.94)
Democrat 0.23808 0.17229 -0.26218 -0.33**
(1.08) (0.81) -(1.63) -(1.97)
constant -2.22*** -2.15*** -1.58*** -1.52***
-(16.11) -(15.20) -(13.16) -(12.15)
R 2 0.189 0.214 0.196 0.231
n 94 94 94 94
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
z-statistics in parenthese, computed using Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 39
Logit estimates for state or local dependent variables State Tax Size and Local Tax Size
Model (5) (6) (7) (8)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE State Tax Size State Tax Size Local Tax Size Local Tax Size
Independent Variables
Eminent Domain 0.08*** 0.06* 0.18* 0.20*
(2.79) (1.85) (1.67) (1.83)
OSR Decentralization -2.03* _ 2.40* _
-(18.94) (6.47)
Exp Decentralization _ -2.39* _ 2.05*
-(9.29) (3.51)
Fragmentation -6.76E-06 -2.67E-06 4.23E-05*** 3.92E-05***
-(1.21) -(0.35) (2.52) (2.27)
Grants 1.11*** 2.89*** -1.19*** -2.63***
(6.45) (9.00) -(3.15) -(4.02)
Home Rule -0.02*** -0.02* 0.02803 0.03071
-(2.80) -(1.63) (1.34) (1.27)
Urban   6.99E-09 -6.54E-09 1.38E-07** 1.38E-07**
(0.43) -(0.36) (2.49) (2.39)
Population -4.3E-09 3.93E-09 -1.29E-07*** -1.23E-07**
-(0.29) (0.23) -(2.55) -(2.36)
Med Income -2.78E-06 -1.79E-06 -2.12E-06 -5.28E-07
-(0.97) -(0.48) -(0.24) -(0.05)
Unemployment 0.47314 0.64883 0.63137 0.42957
(0.86) (0.88) (0.55) (0.30)
Democrat -0.15228 -0.19068 -0.12013 -0.19307
-(1.28) -(1.23) -(0.36) -(0.46)
constant -1.96*** -2.02*** -3.94*** -3.69***
-(15.93) -(13.84) -(7.98) -(6.72)
R 2 0.772 0.641 0.509 0.391
n 94 94 94 94
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
z-statistics in parenthese computed using Huber-White robust standard errors  
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Table 40
Logit estimates for state or local dependent variables State OSR Size and Local OSR Size
Model (9) (10) (11) (12)
DEPENDENT VARIABLE State OSR Size State OSR Size Local OSR Size Local OSR Size
Independent Variables
Eminent Domain 0.09*** 0.06* 0.042 0.063
(3.06) (1.84) (1.06) (1.18)
OSR Decentralization -2.26*** _ 2.61*** _
-(20.65) (14.86)
Exp Decentralization _ -2.66*** _ 2.30***
-(9.20) (6.24)
Fragmentation -6.10E-06 -1.64E-06 -8.08E-06 -1.22E-05
-(0.91) -(0.18) -(1.08) -(1.23)
Grants 0.75*** 2.74*** 0.09217 -1.49***
(4.51) (7.88) (0.41) -(3.06)
Home Rule -0.004 0.000 -0.010 -0.006
-(0.45) -(0.02) -(0.75) -(0.35)
Urban   -3.71E-09 -1.82E-08 2.53E-08 3.17E-08
-(0.22) -(0.90) (1.08) (0.95)
Population 6.58E-09 1.51E-08 -2.30E-08 -2.21E-08
(0.42) (0.79) -(1.07) -(0.74)
Med Income -5.40E-06* -4.12E-06 -2.98E-06 -1.17E-06
-(1.71) -(1.02) -(0.82) -(0.23)
Unemployment -0.505 -0.287 -0.435 -0.635
-(0.84) -(0.36) -(0.55) -(0.53)
Democrat -0.39*** -0.43** -0.110 -0.193
-(2.55) -(1.96) -(0.59) -(0.62)
constant -1.41*** -1.49*** -3.78*** -3.53***
-(11.54) -(10.03) -(26.16) -(14.59)
R 2 0.869 0.773 0.903 0.811
n 94 94 94 94
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%
z-statistics in parenthese computed using Huber-White robust standard errors
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Chapter 8 
 
Home Rule and Overlapping Jurisdictions 
 
 
The analysis in the previous chapters has not considered the effect of overlapping 
jurisdictions among the separate vertical tiers of state and local government.  This chapter 
applies the overlapping jurisdictions model of Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) to 
examine home rule’s influence concerning the effect of county centralization on the size 
of the public sector.  We model the demand relationship between county and municipal 
general expenditures as complementary, drawing upon the empirical findings from 
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) and Campbell (2004).  Controlling for the share of 
county general expenditures in total local sector spending, the analysis implies that 
pushing service provision to the lowest level possible, municipalities, will have no effect 
on the size of government in home rule states; however, it will reduce the size of the 
public sector in Dillon’s Rule states.  This suggests that county governments have greater 
leviathan power than municipal governments in Dillon’s Rule states. 
 
Overlapping Jurisdictions 
Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) present a model of the demand relationship of 
overlapping jurisdictions at the local level in which county governments and municipal 
governments provide similar or identical services.  Police and fire protection, parks and 
recreation, health services, and road construction and maintenance are some examples of 
the services that county, municipal, and sometimes even state governments each provide.  
If county and municipal expenditures are complementary, expansion of the county public 
sector will induce an increase in municipal expenditures, increasing the overall size of the 
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local public sector.  If on the other hand there is a substitute relationship between county 
and municipal expenditures, additional spending at the county level will be met with less 
spending at the municipal level.   
The overlapping jurisdictions hypothesis suggests that the demand relationship 
between county and municipal expenditures has consequences for the leviathan 
hypothesis, which maintains that greater competition for local residents constrains 
government’s monopoly power and that there is an inverse relationship between the 
number of competing jurisdictions and the size of the public sector.  Furthermore, the 
leviathan hypothesis implies that counties have greater leviathan power than 
municipalities, since counties face relatively few local competing jurisdictions, other 
counties.  Empirical tests of leviathan prior to Turnbull and Djoundourian’s (1993) study 
have overlooked this vertical dimension of jurisdictions in the state and local government 
sector.  Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) provide empirical evidence of a 
complementary relationship between county and municipal general expenditures.  This 
complementary relationship suggests that greater spending at the county level induces 
greater spending at the municipal level contributing to a larger local public sector. 
 Campbell (2004) empirically tests the leviathan hypothesis at the local level and 
controls for the effects of overlapping jurisdictions and fiscal illusion.  The approach 
follows that of Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) based on the median voter model.  
Campbell (2004) uses 1980 data on police, park and recreation, and highway 
expenditures in an effort to minimize the effect of intergovernmental revenues.  
Empirical results of this study suggest that failure to account for the vertical relationship 
of local tiers overstates decentralization’s negative effect on government size.  The study 
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also finds empirical evidence in support of a complementary demand relationship 
between county and municipal per capita expenditures and evidence of leviathan at the 
county layer but not the municipal layer.  Fragmentation at the county layer decreases 
county expenditures; however, it has no effect on municipal expenditures.   
 Geon (2005) uses county and municipal cross-sectional data to examine home 
rule’s effect on overlapping jurisdictions.  The study ranks home rule power separately 
for counties and municipalities and submits that greater home rule power for counties 
will constrain counties’ leviathan behavior, since home rule counties will have greater 
freedom to provide services that compete with municipalities resulting in greater 
interjurisdiction competition for counties and municipalities.  The empirical findings 
support the hypothesis that greater home rule power for counties allows counties to 
compete with municipalities, reducing the leviathan power of counties.   
The county reaction function estimates of the pooled sample of home rule and 
Dillon’s Rule governments yield a significant and positive coefficient on the variable 
measuring city expenditures.  This is evidence that county and municipal services are 
symmetric complements.  Splitting the sample and estimating the county reaction 
function for home rule counties and Dillon’s Rule counties separately yields different 
results.  In the home rule sample there is no evidence that counties and municipalities 
have a complementary demand relationship, evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
greater home rule power increases injurisdiciton competition between counties and 
municipalities.  The Dillon’s Rule sample estimates again reveal a complementary 
relationship between counties and municipalities, further evidence supporting the above 
hypothesis.  These results suggest that greater home rule power for county governments 
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allows counties to better compete with municipalities for local residents, restraining the 
leviathan power of county and municipal governments.   
 
Overlapping Jurisdictions Model 
 The empirical model in this chapter of the dissertation uses aggregate local level 
data to test the hypothesis that local government decentralization and home rule power 
for counties reduces the size of the local government sector.  The model is loosely based 
on the median voter model for overlapping jurisdictions first presented by Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1993) and later extended by Campbell (2004) and Geon (2005). 
 Consider the strategic interaction of representative municipal and county median 
voters in the choice for the optimal level of municipal and county public services.  The 
analysis assumes that the median municipal voter is not the median county voter, so that 
municipal and county demands for public services are determined interdependently rather 
than jointly.  From Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993), the municipal median voter’s 
utility function takes the following general form:33
 U = U(X, Em, Ec )       (17) 
where X represents the municipal median voter’s spending on the private good, Em is 
spending on municipal public services, and Ec is spending on county public services.   
 Em = Expendituresm / Nmα      (18) 
 Ec = Expendituresc / Ncβ      (19) 
where N represents municipal or county population according to its subscript and α and β 
are congestion parameters ranging from 0 to 1 for municipal and county public goods 
                                                 
33 Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972) demonstrate deriving the private 
demand function for public goods. 
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respectively such that the parameter takes a value of zero in the case of a pure public 
good and a value of one for a pure congestible public good.  The municipal government 
chooses Em to maximize the median voter’s utility, equation (17), subject to the median 
voter’s budget constraint: 
 I = X + Tm + Tc       (20) 
where Tm = the municipal voter’s share of municipal taxes, Tc = the municipal voter’s 
share of county taxes, and the price of one unit of the private good, X, is one dollar.  The 
consumer’s tax bill or share of taxes takes into account intergovernmental aid so that 
 Tm = sm [Nmα Em - Am ]      (21) 
is the municipal tax bill which simply states that the voter’s municipal tax bill is his or 
her share of municipal expenditures less the municipality’s aid from other governments, 
and sm is the municipal voter’s marginal tax price or share of total municipal taxes,  
Nmα Em equals municipal spending, Expendituresm, and Am represents total 
intergovernmental aid received by the municipality.  The general form for the county tax 
bill is 
 Tc = Tc (sc, Nc, Ec, Ac )      (22) 
Assume that δTc / δsc > 0, δTc / δEc > 0, and δTc / δAc < 0, and substitute (21) and (22) 
into the municipal voter’s budget constraint, equation (20) to get 
 I + smAm - Tc = X + sm Nmα Em     (23) 
The earlier assumption that the municipal median voter is not the county median voter 
assures that X* and Em* are those values which maximize (17) subject to (23).  Solve (23) 
for X and substitute into (17) to get 
 U = U[( I + smAm - Tc - sm Nmα Em ), Em, Ec ]    (24) 
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Take the derivative of (24) with respect to Em to get the first order condition 
 F = dU/dEm  = U2 - sm Nmα U1 = 0     (25) 
The second derivative of (25) less than zero satisfies the second order condition for a 
maximum 
J = d2U / dEm2 =  U22 - 2sm Nmα U12 + (sm Nmα)2 U11 < 0  (26) 
which holds for a strict quasi-concave utility function and is the Jacobian determinant for 
use in the implicit function theorem.  From (25) we have the median voter’s relative tax 
price equals the marginal rate of substitution between the private good, X, and municipal 
services, Em
 MRS Em.x = U2 / U1 = sm Nmα      (27) 
Solve (23) implicitly to obtain the municipal public demand function 
 Em* = φ (sm, I, Am, Tc, Ec,)      (28) 
Implicit differentiation of (25) yields the income effect on municipal expenditures 
 dEm* / dI = - [(δF / δI) / (δF / δEm)]  
     = - [(U21 - sm Nmα U11) / J] > 0     (29) 
which is positive under normality.   
 Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993), Campbell (2004), and Geon (2005) find a 
complementary demand relationship between municipal and county expenditures.  
Theoretically we view this result as a special case of the effect of county expenditures on 
municipal expenditures.  Recall from equations (22) and (28) that county expenditures 
affect municipal expenditures through two associations:  directly through the utility 
function and indirectly through the county tax term.  Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993) 
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refer to these two effects as a pure taste effect and an income effect.  After implicit 
differentiation of the first order condition (25), we have  
 dEm* / dEc = - {(δF / δEc) / (δF / δEm)}  
       = - {U23 – (δTc / δEc)U21 - sm Nmα U1[U3 - (δTc / δEc)U1]} / J 
       = (sm Nmα U13 - U23) / J - (δTc / δEc)(sm Nmα U11 - U21) / J 
Note that dEm* / dI = (sm Nmα U11 - U21) / J from equation (29), and substitution yields 
 dEm* / dEc  = (sm Nmα U13 - U23) / J – (dEm* / dI)(δTc / δEc)  (30) 
The first right hand side term in (28) is the pure taste effect and the second right hand 
side term is the income effect.  The income effect is negative under the normality 
assumption, including the negative sign.  The sign of the pure taste effect depends on the 
effect of county services on the marginal rate of substitution between municipal services 
and the private good.  A positive pure taste effect that is strong enough to offset the 
countervailing negative income effect results when municipal services and county 
services are symmetric complements.  The empirical findings from Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1993) and Campbell (2004) support the case of symmetric complements.  
Geon (2005) finds evidence to support a complementary relationship in a pooled sample 
of home rule and Dillon’s Rule counties and in a separate analysis of only Dillon’s Rule 
counties.  Geon (2005) finds no relationship between county and municipal expenditures 
in home rule counties.  This is evidence that greater home rule power for counties yields 
greater competition between counties and between counties and municipalities.  The 
remainder of this chapter considers the case of symmetric complements. 
 The demand equation (28) for municipal services is also the median municipal 
voter’s reaction function for the case in which the median municipal voter resides in the 
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same municipality as the county median voter.  The two reaction functions for municipal 
spending and county spending respectively are 
 φm* = φ (sm, I1, A1m, Tc, Ec,)      (31) 
 φc* = φ (sc, I2, A2c, Tm, Em,)      (32) 
Figure 6 demonstrates the Nash equilibrium for county and municipal services in the case 
of symmetric complements.     
 
Figure 6 
Strong Complement Nash Equilibrium 
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County Centralization with Overlapping Jurisdictions 
 Home rule theory and empirical evidence presented in previous chapters of this 
dissertation and in Geon (2005) suggest that county level centralization of local public 
expenditures has different effects in home rule and Dillon’s Rule states.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that home rule power reduces leviathan power of county governments, 
increasing interjurisdiction competition between counties and municipalities as counties 
take on more services that municipalities also provide.   
Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate the comparative statics of greater county 
centralization in home rule and Dillon’s Rule states respectively.  To simplify the 
comparison, we model the interaction of the municipal and county reaction functions, 
equations (31) and (32) respectively, as that in a complementary demand relationship.  
Empirical evidence from Turnbull and Djoundourian (1993), Campbell (2004), and Geon 
(2005) suggests this is a reasonable simplification.   
Consider a $1 transfer of public expenditures from the municipal level to the 
county level.  Total local public sector spending either remains constant or decreases as 
the result of this transfer depending upon whether counties have the same leviathan 
power as municipalities or less leviathan power.  On the other hand, if counties have 
more leviathan power than municipalities, the same $1 transfer results in an increase in 
total local sector public spending.  Figure 7 demonstrates the case for equal leviathan 
power for municipalities and counties in home rule states.  The dotted line between 
Φ0c(m) and Φ1c(m) refers to the location of the county reaction function for in the case 
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that counties have less leviathan power than municipalities.  Note that the iso-
expenditures line remains the same after the transfer in the case that counties have the 
same leviathan power as municipalities.   
 
Figure 7 
Effect of Transfer in Home Rule State 
“Counties and Municipalities Have Same Leviathan Power” 
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Figure 8 depicts the scenario in Dillon’s Rule states.  It shows an outward shift in 
the iso-expenditures line after the same $1 transfer.  This outward shifts results if 
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counties have greater leviathan power than municipalities in Dillon’s Rule states.  The 
dotted lines in Figure 8, moving from bottom to top in the graph, represent county 
reaction functions under less leviathan power and same leviathan power respectively for 
counties.  Note that municipal expenditures almost return to their initial level due to the 
complementarity of the demand relationship. 
 
Figure 8 
Effect of Transfer in Dillon’s Rule State 
“Counties Have Greater Leviathan Power than Municipalities” 
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Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis of the overlapping jurisdictions model considers the effect 
of greater county level centralization of expenditures on the size of the total local public 
sector.  Using data on the aggregate local public sector, this study compares the effect of 
greater county centralization across home rule and Dillon’s Rule states.  The empirical 
analysis examines pooled census data for 41 states over the 1990 and 2000 census periods 
and excludes the six New England states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont because their county governments do not 
perform complete roles comparable to the remaining U.S. states.  Virginia is also omitted 
in this data set as in the data sets used for the empirical models in the previous chapters.  
Counties in Virginia take on functions traditionally reserved for municipalities; therefore 
counties and municipalities do not overlap in Virginia (Turnbull & Tasto, in press). 
The empirical model is based on the self-selection model presented in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this dissertation.  Two dependent variable constructions are tested, local tax size 
and local osr size.  The variables in the model follow those used in the previous chapters.  
The addition of a measure of centralization of expenditures at the county level relative to 
the municipal level allows us to compare the strength of county leviathan power across 
home rule and Dillon’s Rule subsamples.  See Tables 41 and 42 for definitions and 
summary statistics of the variables used in the two models.  Tables 43 and 44 display the 
empirical results for the local own source revenue model and local tax model 
respectively. 
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Consistent with the empirical results of the previous self-selection models in the 
dissertation, the mills ratio coefficient in the Dillon’s Rule subsample is positive and 
significant in both models, and it reminds us of the different effects the exogenous factors 
have on the measures of government size under home rule and Dillon’s Rule regimes.   
There are few changes in the coefficients under the new specification.  E-
decentralization has a significant positive impact on local government size in Dillon’s 
Rule states as observed in the previous local sector empirical results.  The coefficient on 
intergovgrants is also negative in the Dillon’s Rule and home rule subsamples.  The 
effects of unemployment, lawyers per capita, and democratvote are also consistent across 
specifications that control for county centralization and the previous models that do not 
control for county centralization.   
Finally, we see that the coefficient on county centralization is positive and 
significant in the Dillon’s Rule subsample in both models.  It is not significant in the 
home rule subsample in either model.  This supports the hypothesis that county leviathan 
power is stronger under Dillon’s Rule.  As expenditures are shifted to the county level of 
the local public sector, the size of the total local public sector expands in Dillon’s Rule 
states.  This effect is offset in home rule states.  The greater home rule power increases 
interjurisdiction competition for counties, constraining leviathan.  The empirical findings 
in this study confirm that vertical structure plays an important role in the performance of 
the public sector and in particular demonstrate that home rule power alters the nature of 
the interaction between counties and municipalities within this vertical structure. 
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Conclusion 
 This chapter extended the overlapping jurisdictions model of Turnbull and 
Djoundourian (1993) and examined the effect of county expenditure centralization on the 
size of the local public sector across home rule and Dillon’s Rule regimes.  Previous 
empirical studies of overlapping jurisdictions find that county and municipal expenditures 
exhibit a complementary demand relationship.  This complementary relationship yields 
an increase in the size of the local public that is greater than the increase in either county 
or municipal expenditures alone.   
 The empirical findings in previous chapters of this dissertation and findings from 
Geon (2005) suggest that home rule power affects the vertical interaction of counties and 
municipalities.  The hypothesis is that home rule power allows counties to offer services 
that compete with municipal services, increasing interjurisdiction competition and 
constraining leviathan at the county level.  This chapter presented findings from 
empirical tests of this hypothesis, incorporating a measure of county expenditure 
centralization and examining its effect on local government sector size across home rule 
and Dillon’s Rule regimes. 
 The empirical results support the hypothesis that home rule power constrains 
county level leviathan power.  Centralization of expenditures at the county level has a 
positive effect on the size of the local public sector, but home rule power effectively 
constrains this tendency.  These results reinforce the findings in the previous chapters that 
demonstrate the importance of home rule as an institutional factor that affects public 
sector performance.  Furthermore, it reminds us that decentralization is more or less 
effective as lower tier governments have more or less ability to make decisions to meet 
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the demands of local constituents.  Future empirical studies of decentralization will have 
more meaning if they incorporate differences in constitutional rules across localities, 
states, or countries that affect the ability of decentralization to actually push decisions 
governing public service provision and revenue acquisition down to the lowest tier 
possible. 
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Table 41.  Overlapping jurisdictions model variable definitions and sources  
Variable Name Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variables
Local tax size
Local osr size
Leviathan Variables
Home rule
County centralization
E-decentralization
OSR decentralization
Self-Selection Identification Variables 
Hrdummy Home rule dummy = 1 if weak, strong HR
share of county expenditures in total local 
sector spending
Computed from Census of Governments
state population change from 1970 through 
2000
Historical Census of Population
share of state grants to localities in local 
revenues
Computed from Census of Governments
variance in average population across counties 
in state divided by state population
Computed by author from Census of Population
Difference in predicted local tax size for 
Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by author
Difference in predicted local own source 
revenue size for Dillon's Rule and home rule
Estimated by authorLocal osr size difference
Unemployment state rate of unemployment BLS:  Local Area Unemployment Statistics
dummy variable for year 2000 = 1, base year is 
1990
Populationvariance
Historical population change
Population
Stateaid
Fragmentation
Local tax size difference
Democratvote
Lawyers per capita
Year2000
MSApop
Medhhincome
Incomevariance
Intergovgrants
compiled by author
% of state popular vote for democrat 
presidential candidate (1992 and 2000)
1994 City and County Data Book and 
http://www.cnn.com (Date:  01/06/01)
# of lawyers (primary occupation) in state 
divided by state population
Equal Employment Opportunity Files of Census 
1990 and 2000
variance in Medhhincome  across counties 
divided by state population
Calculated by author
state population Census of Population
share of population in MSA Census  Tiger Database
median household income (1989 $'s) Census  SF3
Computed from Census of Governments
total number of all local government units in a 
state
Census of Governments:  Vol.1, No. 2, Individual 
State Descriptions
dollar value of grants to local governments as a 
share of state expenditures
Computed from Census of Governments
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2006), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
Computed from Census of Governments and 
Census of Population
local tax revenues as share of personal income
local own source revenues as share of personal 
income
Degree of home rule power for localities;  
1=Dillon's Rule, 2=Weak Dillon's Rule, 
3=Weak home rule, 4=Strong home rule
Variable compiled by author with reference to 
Turnbull & Geon (2006), Krane, Rigos, Hill 
(2001)
share of local expenditures in total state and 
local spending
Computed from Census of Governments
share of local own source revenue in total state 
and local own source revenue
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Table 42.  Overlapping jurisdictions model summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
Local tax size 82 0.038 0.012 0.018 0.096
Local osr size 82 0.054 0.011 0.028 0.093
Leviathan Variables
home rule 82 2.659 1.057 1 4
County centralization 82 0.251 0.147 0.110 0.810
E-decentralization 82 0.528 0.077 0.334 0.654
Fragmentation 82 2,009 1,523 205 6,835
Intergovgrants 82 0.257 0.054 0.151 0.411
Population 82 5,915,375 6,161,807 453,588 33,900,000
MSApop 82 4,735,609 5,722,619 134,368 29,300,000
Medhhincome 82 $28,801 $4,630 $20,136 $40,927
Incomevariance 82 1,092 597 341 2,808
Unemp 82 0.050 0.016 0.026 0.096
Democratvote 82 0.426 0.073 0.250 0.600
Lawyers per capita 82 0.0025 0.0008 0.0015 0.0055
Year2000 82 0.5 0.503 0 1
Self-Selection Identification Variables
Home rule dummy 82 0.561 0.499 0 1
Local tax size difference 82 0.017 0.006 0.004 0.027
Local osr size difference 82 0.012 0.008 -0.007 0.034
Stateaid 82 0.357 0.067 0.232 0.519
Populationvariance 82 373,591 542,158 2 3,127,632
Historical population change 82 50.41 56.86 4 309
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Table 43.  Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples 
Local osr size is dependent variable
n=36 Dillon's Rule, n=46 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
Local osr size Coefficient Local osr size Coefficient
mills0 0.319 *** mills1 0.026
5.64 0.36
County decentralization 0.356 ** County decentralization -0.015
2.48 -0.08
E-decentralization 2.190 *** E-decentralization 3.183 ***
7.90 5.83
intergovgrants -0.170 intergovgrants -2.330 ***
-0.35 -2.73
fragmentation 1.54E-05 fragmentation -1.36E-05
0.72 -0.8
MSApop -2.61E-08 MSApop -5.94E-08 *
-0.59 -1.74
population 1.52E-08 population 6.30E-08 *
0.4 1.88
medhhincome 1.87E-06 medhhincome -7.77E-06
0.21 -0.86
incomevariance -1.27E-05 incomevariance -7.70E-05
-0.34 -1.34
unemployment 9.300 *** unemployment 1.390
3.52 0.51
lawyers per capita 103.660 * lawyers per capita 112.870 **
1.8 2.12
democratvote -1.983 *** democratvote -0.324
-5.01 -0.84
year2000 0.366 *** year2000 0.116 *
4.69 1.66
constant -4.460 *** constant -3.990 ***
-12.3 -11.09
R-square 0.79 0.713
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
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Table 44.  Self-selection-corrected Leviathan model sub-samples 
Local tax share is dependent variable
n=36 Dillon's Rule, n=46 home rule
Dillon's Rule sample home rule sample
Local tax size Coefficient Local tax size Coefficient
mills0 0.254 *** mills1 -0.208
3.98 -1.18
County centralization 0.472 ** County centralization 0.238
2.2 0.64
E-decentralization 1.98 *** E-decentralization 1.128
6.29 0.64
intergovgrants -1.020 ** intergovgrants -0.117
-2.05 -0.06
fragmentation 7.45E-05 ** fragmentation 7.34E-05
2.21 1.58
MSApop 1.05E-07 * MSApop 3.45E-08
1.85 0.47
population -1.01E-07 ** population -3.95E-08
-1.97 -0.54
medhhincome 7.65E-06 medhhincome -2.86E-05
0.81 -1.28
incomevariance 9.16E-05 ** incomevariance 7.61E-05
2.5 0.61
unemployment 6.664 ** unemployment 2.699
1.99 0.57
lawyers per capita 72.198 lawyers per capita 143.649
1.09 1.59
democratvote -1.887 *** democratvote -1.498
-4.24 -1.51
year2000 0.250 *** year2000 0.103
2.71 0.94
constant -4.661 *** constant -2.928 **
-11.29 -2.31
R-square 0.82 0.349
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively
z-values under coefficients, calculated with Huber-White robust standard errors
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
 Public sector decentralization is a popular theme in public policy debate.  Policy 
reformers prescribe greater decentralization as a means to curb corruption in developing 
countries, reduce government waste, and increase the quality and efficiency of public 
service provision.  Yet, at the same time there is a movement to centralize education and 
environmental standards, nationalize the sales tax, and to regionalize economic 
development policy.  Strong, informed opinions influence both sides of all of these 
debates, and there are winners and losers in any policy decision.   
Local discretionary authority, or home rule power, is one aspect of 
decentralization that considers institutional rules and restraints facing local governments.   
Any debate concerning more or less home rule power for local governments must 
consider the economic impact of these rules and restraints on the performance of the state 
and local government sector.  Recent policy decisions have redefined institutional rules 
governing local government authority in the United States.  In one example, the Supreme 
Court decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005) grants states the freedom to extend 
greater eminent domain powers to local governments, effectively removing one 
constraint on local government authority.  There are great economic consequences to this 
decision, and legislatures in many states have rushed to assembly to determine how their 
state will interpret this decision. 
 This dissertation answers many questions that arise concerning policy decisions’ 
effects on public sector performance.  Institutional rules governing local government 
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authority vary across states and across localities in many states, and the effects of 
decentralization are not invariant to changes in these institutional rules.  Locational 
factors affect decentralization’s impact on government size.  The relative strength of 
interjurisdiction competition varies across urban and rural locales; this affects 
decentralization’s impact on government size.  These answers point to an important 
factor to consider when implementing decentralization policies.  Institutions matter, and 
they affect policy outcomes.   
This dissertation presents new empirical tests of home rule power and other 
institutional factors with respect to their effects on the size of the local, state, and 
combined local and state government sectors.  The findings reinforce a growing literature 
concerned with the role of institutions in the public sector, finding that institutions have 
real, measurable effects on public sector performance.  Furthermore, by extending 
traditional measures of fiscal decentralization to include measures of discretionary 
authority this dissertation contributes to the broader public finance literature.  The 
empirical results demonstrate the importance of considering interstate and 
interjurisdiction variation in constitutional rules and restraints, finding that greater home 
rule power has a positive effect on the size of the public sector. 
A review of the decentralization and tax and expenditure limitation literatures 
demonstrates the complexity of predicting institutional factors’ impacts on public sector 
performance.  The leviathan hypothesis, for example, maintains that decentralization is an 
effective indirect constraint on government size.  The results of this dissertation, 
however, suggest that horizontal and vertical relationships often combine to produce 
seemingly counterintuitive effects.  Previous empirical studies have found that traditional 
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measures of fiscal decentralization, the proportion of local expenditures or revenues in 
the combined state and local public sector, are consistent with a smaller government 
sector.  The home rule analysis presented in this dissertation suggests that qualitative 
measures of decentralization provide better insight into the static effects of greater 
decentralization. 
Traditional quantitative measures of decentralization do not distinguish between 
block grants or categorical grants or between funded and unfunded mandates and they do 
not capture the variation in rules and discretion regarding revenue and spending authority 
across units of observation.  These general measures explain very little about the effects 
of varying degrees or types of decentralization.  The empirical findings in this 
dissertation suggest that with greater discretionary authority or home rule power local 
governments can potentially increase their revenue and spending capabilities if they can 
differentiate their service bundle from would-be competing jurisdictions and if there are 
enough citizens that do not pose an out-migration threat to the jurisdiction.  Greater 
decentralization does not necessarily increase interjurisdiction competition and reduce 
government size.   
Using 1990 and 2000 Census data this dissertation answered several questions 
regarding institutional factors’ effects on public sector performance.  The empirical tests 
of the leviathan hypothesis in Chapter 4 incorporate institutional factors previously 
unaddressed in the economic literature.  The results are consistent with past studies of 
decentralization that find an inverse relationship between the traditional fiscal 
decentralization measures and government size (Oates, 1985; Nelson, 1987; Zax, 1989).  
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Additionally, the findings are consistent with past studies finding a positive correlation 
between tax and expenditure limitations and reduced government size. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates that greater local sector discretionary 
authority, home rule power, can open the possibility for the emergence of local 
government leviathans.  This chapter addresses home rule endogeneity and examines 
self-selection bias in the choice of home rule and its impact on observing the estimated 
home rule effect.  The traditional IV estimation results and the self-selection corrected 
estimation results indicate that home rule has a positive effect on government size.  On 
average, home rule localities use their greater fiscal, structural, and functional freedoms 
to expand the government sector.  The forces of interjurisdiction competition are not 
sufficiently strong to overshadow this effect.  The findings in this chapter suggest that 
future attempts to model institutional factors’ effects on government size will benefit 
from proper identification of underlying endogenous processes.  
In Chapter 6, we analyze the government sector on three separate levels:  the local 
public sector, the state public sector, and the combined state and local public sector.    
This three-level analysis of government sector size provides for a greater understanding 
of decentralization’s effects on government size.  The empirical findings indicate that 
government size increases as states grant greater discretionary authority or home rule 
power.  Contrary to the effect of greater decentralization, greater home rule power does 
not translate into a smaller combined state and local government sector.  Additionally, the 
empirical results indicate that local sector size increases with greater state-to-local 
decentralization, even though the total state and local sector size decreases.  These results 
highlight a key difference between home rule and decentralization.  States that grant 
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greater discretionary power to local governments do not necessarily reduce their own 
state-level governing powers as the empirical estimates of home rule’s impact on the size 
of the state and local public sector confirm. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of two empirical studies that examine other 
institutional factors and their effects on the size of the public sector.  The first study 
acknowledges that states have great latitude in choosing among varying degrees of 
constraint within state budget stabilization funds (Wagner & Sobel, 2006).  These funds 
vary from weakly defined statutory funds to strictly defined constitutional funds.   State 
legislators have more flexibility in designing statutory funds (they impose these on 
themselves) than they would in designing constitutional funds, which citizens typically 
impose on legislatures through a successful voter referendum or citizen initiative.  
Wagner and Soble (2006) find that tax and expenditure limitation variables, or TEL’s, are 
significantly correlated with the adoption of statutory funds but not correlated with the 
adoption of constitutional funds, evidence that some state’s legislatures adopt statutory 
budget stabilization funds to circumvent tax and expenditure limitations.  The empirical 
study in the first section of Chapter 7 tests the hypothesis that strict constitutional funds 
effectively constrain government size.  The empirical results support this hypothesis; 
states that have constitutional budget stabilization funds tend to have smaller government 
sectors. 
The second study in Chapter 7 empirically examines the Kelo (2005) decision, 
which upholds government use of eminent domain to acquire land for transfer to private 
parties when it serves a broadly defined public purpose like economic development.  This 
empirical study tests the hypothesis that the broad public purpose doctrine in Kelo 
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effectively removes one potential constitutional constraint on state and local 
governments.  The empirical results are consistent with this hypothesis.  States that 
explicitly empower their local governments to use eminent domain for private economic 
development have larger public sectors than those that do not. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 of this dissertation we consider how overlapping 
jurisdictions affect decentralization’s impact on public sector size across different 
institutional regimes.  We test the hypothesis that home rule power allows counties to 
offer services that compete with municipal services, increasing interjurisdiction 
competition and constraining leviathan at the county level.  The empirical results support 
this hypothesis, finding that centralization of expenditures at the county level has a 
positive effect on the size of the local public sector in Dillon’s Rule states, but greater 
home rule power effectively constrains this tendency. 
The studies in this dissertation collectively suggest that institutions matter.  There 
is no one-size-fits-all policy for decentralization.  There is no “law of decentralization” 
linking decentralization and public sector size.  Future empirical studies of 
decentralization will have more meaning if they incorporate differences in institutional 
rules across localities, states, or countries.  These institutional rules help determine the 
extent to which decentralization effectively pushes decisions governing public service 
provision and revenue acquisition down to the lowest government tier possible. 
The empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that future research should 
attempt to more precisely identify institutional factors that affect home rule choice across 
states as well as across counties and municipalities.  The structural home rule equations 
in this dissertation do not adequately describe the demand for home rule across states.  
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Home rule power across the states has changed little over time, making this a difficult 
task; however, historical observations of the economic and social conditions at the time 
states set the tone for local discretionary power in their constitutions should provide at 
least a starting point for more rigorous static analysis.   
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